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ABSTRACT 
 
From the state of the art on ―radicalisation‖, the only thing we can say with a relative degree 
of certainty is that the life-paths of known terrorists and the life-worlds of people at risk of 
―radicalising‖ differ to such an extent that no single explanatory model suffices. The fight 
against contemporary terrorism and jihadism has become a ―wicked problem‖ for which no 
other solution exists than a radical re-framing of the phenomenon itself (De Graaff, 
2017:23). This objective is what the CONRAD project aims to achieve: to develop alternative 
discourses and approaches for thinking of or talking about ―radicalisation.‖ From literature 
study, policy analysis, framing analysis and field research in Brussels and Verviers between 
2017 and 2019, this report concludes that the term ―radicalisation‖ is problematic both in the 
public debate and as a scientific tool; it is unclear what it refers to. Furthermore, this report 
shows that this terminological unclarity has caused policy-makers to deploy myriad 
programmes with legion priorities. The interplay of policy-makers, media, civil society, security 
actors and researchers on the topic of ―radicalisation‖ is experienced by vulnerable and 
stigmatised groups as a ―radicalisation machine‖. The counter-radicalisation policies and 
initiatives may have counterproductive effects. 
 
―Radicalisation‖; policy analysis; framing analysis; action research; vulnerable youth; 
radicalisation machine; counter-productive effects 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Whether in the media, research texts, policy documents, or programmes related to 
―radicalisation‖ in civil society, we see that different terms are often used interchangeably to 
denote violent, radical or religious extremism, violent or non-violent ―radicalisation,‖ 
―radicalism,‖ terrorism, jihadism, etc. A remarkable number of policy documents neither 
attempt to distinguish between these popular terms nor to define them (e.g. Belgian Senate 
6-205/1; Belgian Senate 54 1752/008; Council of the European Union, 2005). When talking 
about ―radicalisation,‖ commentators, policy-makers and researchers refer to a process in 
which individuals gradually embrace radical ideas and which eventually results in extremist 
violence. However, in many policy and research documents it is unclear whether (the 
willingness to engage in) violence is a necessary condition to talk about ―radicalisation.‖ In 
some publications the non-violent process towards this state is also dubbed ―radicalisation‖ 
(Mc Cauley and Moskalenko 2008; Reinares et al. 2008; Schmid 2013; Vidino 2010).  
 The same diversity in the use of terms can be noticed when analysing policy 
documents, thus reflecting the complexity of the phenomenon as well as the different 
perspectives through which it can be understood. For instance, in a 2005 communication 
published by the European Commission, ―radicalisation‖ is referred to as ―the phenomenon 
of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism as 
defined in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism‖ (COM 2005: 2). 
However, the 2002 Framework Decision does not explicitly define what ―radicalisation‖ is. It 
specifies that each member state must take the necessary measures regarding a series of 
nine intentional acts which are considered as terrorist offences and then goes on to list these 
nine acts. What is defined here then is terrorism since the fight against ―radicalisation‖ and 
its prevention originate in the fight against terrorism. Even though, in these past years, 
preventing ―radicalisation‖ has become a field, ranging from social to security policies, policy 
documents have made no meaningful progress in better defining the phenomenon. This 
proves that ―radicalisation‖ is still widely considered as a predisposition to terrorism rather 
than as a phenomenon that also reflects the vulnerabilities within our present-day societies. 
 Although Europe has been confronted with cycles of political violence and terrorism 
for quite a long time, a structured public policy response aimed at preventing processes of 
―radicalisation‖ and extremist violence has only started to develop relatively recently. 
However, it would be wrong to say that public policy has ignored the kind of terrorism and 
political violence that occurred throughout the 20th century. There is a growing consensus 
among experts that the political violence in recent years, especially of a jihadi nature, has 
triggered the elaboration of more nuanced and complex policy-approaches (Vidino and 
Brandon 2012). This conflation of various aspects of ―radicalisation‖ can be problematic. For 
instance, the aim of the British PREVENT programme is to ―stop people becoming terrorists 
or supporting violent extremism‖ (Home Office 2009:80). This prevention programme clearly 
places the facts of being a terrorist and supporting this kind of behaviour on equal footing. 
Similarly, the AIVD, the Netherlands‘ domestic intelligence agency, states that its role is to 
monitor ―radicalisation‖ leading to terrorist violence, but also claims to be equally concerned 
about ―forms of non-violent radicalisation which could severely disrupt society‖ (AIVD 
2007:10) (see further in the policy analysis). 
Quite some studies have been undertaken in recent years to determine the root 
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causes of ―radicalisation,‖ the one more empirically-based than the other. Colaerts (2017:16; 
our translation) adds the following:  
 [T]he public and political debate is losing itself in monocausal explanations for Jihadi 
 terrorism. One school is searching causes for the current gulf of violent extremism 
 primarily in Islam, whereas the other looks at feelings of injustice. There are two 
 different schools in the research as well. One school emphasises political and 
 religious ideology, the other focuses on contextual factors such as local socio-
 economic circumstances.  
At present, the only thing we can say with a relative degree of certainty is that the life-paths 
of known terrorists and the life-worlds of people at risk of ―radicalising‖ differ to such an 
extent that no single explanatory model suffices. The battle against contemporary terrorism 
and jihadism has become a ―wicked problem‖ for which no other solution exists than a 
radical re-framing of the phenomenon itself (De Graaff, 2017:23).  
 This ambitious objective is what the CONRAD project aims to achieve: to develop 
alternative discourses and approaches for talking about the controversial topic of 
―radicalisation,‖ i.e. alternative ways of thinking or of talking about ―radicalisation.‖ The 
CONRAD team regards these discourses as ―alternative‖ in the sense that (1) they provide 
more nuanced perspectives compared to the dominant approaches, (2) they are based 
(partly) on empirical work rather than desktop research, (3) they give a voice to socially 
excluded groups and (4) they constitute a power-critical analysis of the dominant 
approaches to ―radicalisation.‖ We adopt a critical stance towards the dominant use of the 
term ―radicalisation‖ because we believe the term potentially reinforces the stigmas and 
stereotypes associated with vulnerable groups. This is why we have chosen to place the 
term between quotation marks. 
About the term and topic ―radicalisation‖ we want to emphasise at this point, firstly, 
that the fieldwork data are not used as a means by which to make objective statements 
about reality, but rather to collect life-world experiences and perceptions, thus showing how 
powerful institutions and discourses are experienced in stigmatised, so-called high-profile 
settings such as Molenbeek and Verviers. Secondly, the CONRAD team wishes to continue 
to use quotation marks, in order to signal the problematic nature of the ―radicalisation‖ 
concept (see 4.1.1.). We believe ―radicalisation‖ to be unidimensional, unclear and reductive 
since it attempts to grasp a complex phenomenon by way of a single container concept. 
Moreover, it is stigmatising towards certain social groups, and is generally used in the public 
debate without much scientific evidence or consensus regarding its validity. Indeed, our 
team wishes to distance itself from this dominant discourse, backed by policies, programmes 
and research projects. 
In order to do so, the CONRAD project deploys four methodologies: (1) a thorough 
study of the existing literature which has mapped the gaps in our understanding of the 
phenomenon, methodological weaknesses in the existing research as well as problematic 
assumptions in much of the governmental approaches and some of the scientific 
approaches related to ―radicalisation,‖ (2) an inductive framing analysis at the Institute of 
Media Studies (KU Leuven—Institute of Media Studies) which shows the most dominant 
problematising and non-problematising frames used in the public debate (tv, written press, 
social media, scientific debate), (3) a sociological and discursive analysis of policy 
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approaches to ―radicalisation‖ on a European, federal, regional and local level, conducted 
by KU Leuven—Leuven institute of Criminology and ULg—Centre for Ethnicity and Migration 
Studies, and (4) participatory action research in deprived and stigmatised areas in 
Brussels (D‘Broej and Odisee) and Verviers (Terrain d‘Aventures, CRVI, ULg) which 
provides an insight into how ―radicalisation‖ is experienced and talked about by local actors 
(young people, youth workers and other professional groups). Field research focused on the 
areas along the Canal in Brussels and the neighbourhood Hodimont in Verviers (Figure 1).
 Field research included interviews, focus groups and other research activities with 
local professionals as well as with vulnerable groups. With ―vulnerable‖ we refer to the fact 
that these individuals and groups live in situations of social exclusion, suffering multiple 
harms from global transitions.   
 
Molenbeek/Canal zone (Brussels) 
 









Figure 1: Canal Zone in Brussels and Hodimont in Verviers (Source: Open Street Map)
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Within the CONRAD research, these levels of analysis resonate since they show how 
―radicalisation‖ is used, experienced and framed in media, policy, research and among 
vulnerable groups in stigmatised neighbourhoods. Many commentators in the public debate 
talk about these local sites without being very familiar with what takes place on the ground. 
We argue that the most powerful actors in the institutional apparatus, namely the media and 
policy-makers, use discourses that produce powerful (negative) effects in local communities. 
Due to decades of stigmatisation, injustice and discrimination, local actors in turn distrust 
these perceived outsiders which renders conversations (including the well-intentioned ones) 
about ―radicalisation‖ difficult. By bringing these viewpoints together, the CONRAD team 
hopes to introduce some much-needed nuance in the debate on ―radicalisation.‖ 
To structure the fieldwork and help analyse the data, the CONRAD team has 
adopted a conceptual framework (see Figure 2) which is based on an exercise in reflection 
of a group of youth workers in Brussels, following the departure of young people to Syria and 
the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. It is based on the hypothesis formulated by a 
group of youth workers that ―radicalisation‖ is intensively related to (young) people‘s 
decreasing resilience, caused by global transitions (macro-level) and the way in which 
these intersect in the life-worlds of local residents, causing social vulnerability, everyday 
harm and multiple injuries (micro- and meso-level). Contrary to the individualised, 
monocausal accounts in much of the ―radicalisation‖ research, however, the CONRAD team 
applies this same conceptual framework to the macro-level. Indeed, ―radicalisation‖ should 
also be understood as a phenomenon taking place in larger collectives, as a result of global 
transitions causing vulnerabilities in society at large, among state and non-state actors. 
Social vulnerability is a term which emerged in social ecological theory and hazard and 
disaster research. It refers to a ―set of characteristics of a group or individual in terms of their 
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. It 
involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone's life and 
livelihood is at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or society‖ (Blaikie et al. 1994:9). 
In line with Schmid‘s (2013) definition of ―radicalisation,‖ we argue that it should be 
considered an individual or group process that occurs when normal practices of dialogue are 
abandoned. It consists of multiple processes, often simultaneously, in which subordinate 
groups move away from the mainstream, views of the majority population harden, and 
actions or reactions of the state become more stringent. 
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Figure 2: The initial central concepts in the CONRAD project 
 
In this report we show that ―radicalisation‖ is problematic as a concept and as a scientific tool 
for multiple reasons: (1) it assumes a linear process from religiosity, to orthodoxy, to non-
violent radicalism, to extremist violence. This ―conveyor belt model‖ is, however, a myth. 
From the study of the lives of known violent extremists we know that there is no single 
extremist profile, nor is there a single trajectory to this type of violence. (2) The concept 
refers almost only to the individual level, whereas it becomes increasingly clear that 
―radicalisation‖ resonates with collective processes. (3) It is a term that stigmatises 
particularly because it has almost entirely been reserved for Islamic ―radicalisation‖. (4) The 
term discredits genuine political engagement or indignation—people with grievances about 
experiences of injustice are being told to ―deradicalise‖ rather than that they are taken 
seriously and recognised. (5) The ―radicalisation‖ concept justifies questionable security 
strategies which engage in counterterrorism pre-emptively, that is, when nothing illegal has 
yet taken place. (6) The study of the root causes of ―radicalisation‖ in the last 10 to 15 years 
has mainly yielded dissensus. As a result, we argue that this may relate to the 
unsustainability of the term itself. Its gaze is simultaneously too narrow and too wide. 
Unfortunately, the problematic nature of the concept and the doubts whether there is 
a homogeneous and unique phenomenon we can call ―radicalisation‖ have not stopped 
local, national and supranational authorities to develop policy approaches. Our analysis of 
the EU-level shows that also EU-actors experience a definitional challenge and because of 
this difficulty develop myriad programmes with legion priorities—we call it a bazooka-like 
tactic, because the EU-approach penetrates nearly every aspect of life and it that sense 
seems to fire a canon at a mosquito. 
In the public debate, as our inductive framing analysis shows, 12 frames are used to 
talk about ―radicalisation‖. These images either see ―radicalisation‖ as a problem (4 out of 12 
Project BR/165/A4/CONRAD: Constructive analysis on the attitudes, policies and programmes that relate to radicalisation 
BRAIN-be (Belgian Research Action through Interdisciplinary Networks) 12 
frames) or not (8 out of 12). Interestingly, when confronting these frames with the state of the 
art, we see that only half of the frames are scientifically supported. Two frames that resonate 
with the dominant policy approaches are also the ones most heavily criticised in the 
literature.  
Looking at the terrain, the term ―radicalisation‖ is sensitive. From focus groups and 
interviews in Brussels with vulnerable young people we can conclude that the term is 
understood by the latter as referring both to a positive commitment to religion and a 
negative, destructive commitment to violence. This is experienced as an injustice since 
terrorist attacks in the name of Islam have cast a dark shadow over their own quest for 
meaningfulness, spirituality and authentic values. Furthermore, the term also refers to the 
dominant, stigmatising discourse, to the traumatic experiences of Molenbeek inhabitants 
after the attacks in Paris and Brussels and to the effects this has had on their life-worlds. 
Lastly, young people believe that the term ―radicalisation‖ is also a symptom of an underlying 
illness within broader society, an aspect they feel is underappreciated in the public debate.  
From the field research in Verviers, and particularly from the study of the social 
ecology and the history of Verviers, we conclude that there is no single key to understanding 
the ―radicalisation‖ of young people. The individual cases under study mobilise various 
personal factors such as family, relationships, religion, ideology etc. Therefore, we argue, 
―radicalisation‖ should be considered as a peculiar modality of a larger phenomenon, namely 
the biographical intentional break with the social and political order.  
Targeted and vulnerable communities experience government policies with regard to 
―radicalisation‖ as a machine. In our metaphor, the ―radicalisation machine‖ has parts (policy-
makers, researchers, media, civil society, security actors) which move according to 
mechanical rules and which aren‘t conscious of their interaction with the other parts or their 
effects on the outside world. As a whole, the machine is characterised by the fact that it is 
exclusively concerned with wielding its power and consolidating its further existence. In other 
words, the machine is blind, thoughtless and only focused on survival. Also youth work 
organisations and researchers are a part of this machine—the challenge for them is to 
acknowledge its nature and to liberate themselves from it.  
Both in the public debate and in some research, ecological assumptions are made 
which connect certain environments such as Hodimont in Verviers and Molenbeek in 
Brussels to the phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖. These areas are then called ―jihadogenic‖—
they produce or generate ―radicalisation‖ and ―jihad‖. However, these assumptions are 
challenged by our findings. The description of these urban neighbourhoods as deprived, 
dense and diverse areas also fails to capture the dynamic and numerous ways in which 
young people respond to their own living conditions, and the ways in which they manage to 
survive and even thrive despite difficult living circumstances. 
We recommend opposing any strategy conflating – even indirectly – youth work with 
anti-radicalisation. Working with vulnerable young people should not be done under the 
guise of a security agenda but simply because young people are inherently worth it.  
We recommend improving dialogue, partnership and collaboration within the youth 
sector so that youth workers share more convergent visions and procedures. All too often, 
the very basic idea of what constitutes radical behaviour and what needs to be done 
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professionally to assist youngsters at risk, differs between institutions located within the 
same urban territory.  
We recommend increasing the institutional completeness of youth work organisations 
(i.e. recognised youth centres or more hybrid organisations) with due consideration for the 
existing needs at neighbourhood level.  
We recommend an investment in social and psychological support for youth workers. 
Youth workers are often caught in a web of multi-level vulnerabilities. As vulnerable workers, 
they often struggle within vulnerable environments for the sake of vulnerable youngsters. In 
addition to the insufficient level of funding of youth institutions, the very demanding nature of 
their job weakens the stability and resilience of their workforce which often results in broken 
professional careers and professional struggles due to an overload of work.  
We recommend offering youngsters more opportunities for internal exchange with 
legitimate and knowledgeable facilitators (e.g. to discuss the place of religion in public and 
personal life) and external contacts with other social environments (nationally, internationally 
but also within the city).  
We recommend a critical parliamentary discussion about (1) the blurred boundaries 
of the legal framework of security actors who engage in anti-terrorism pre-emptively, (2) the 
importance of professional secrecy for frontline practitioners and the risks of shared 
professional secrecy in the local integrated security cells (LIVC-Rs), (3) the ways in which 
suspected ―radicalised‖ people are added to black lists nationally and internationally and how 
this harms their civil rights and their privacy, (4) the myth of collaboration and the multi-
agency approach due to the inherent power imbalance between vulnerable groups, frontline 
organisations on the one hand and state and security actors on the other, and (5) the 
possible counterproductive effects of counter-radicalisation policy. 
Finally, we recommend to stop using the term ―radicalisation‖. Instead we propose to 
use the term ―political violence‖ or to only talk about ―the preparation and execution of 
terrorist attacks.‖ 
 
The structure of the report is as follows: in the following chapter, we state the objectives and 
research questions of the CONRAD project, engage in a thorough analysis of the existing 
literature and present the conceptual framework. In the third chapter we introduce the 
methodologies used in the project1. The fourth chapter contains some of the most important 
findings of the project as well as a set of recommendations to a variety of publics. In the 
remainder of the report we give an overview of the valorisation activities undertaken in the 
previous two years and of the texts submitted for publication in a scientific journal and those 
to be published in book form. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 We have also negotiated and written an ethical framework for the field research, the transfer of data to the other 
team members, the storage of data, the interpretation of data and the eventual dissemination of the analyses. 
This ethical framework is not presented in this final report due to a lack of consensus regarding the content and 
meaning of this framework.  
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2. STATE OF THE ART AND OBJECTIVES 
2.1. Objectives and research questions 
Instead of focusing too narrowly on the processes leading to ―radicalisation,‖ the CONRAD 
team sees great promise in utilising a multi-level (micro, meso, macro) analysis, which 
focuses on the various ingredients that may contribute to violent ―radicalisation.‖ The team 
also adopts a critical stance about the concept itself. ―Radicalisation‖ is not only an empirical, 
―real‖ phenomenon but also a mindset, a media story, a political discourse. As a social 
construction it has a real impact on the terrain. This is an effect we are particularly interested 
in. Furthermore, we do not consider ―radicalisation‖ as merely an individual process but also 
regard it as a collective reality. In this respect it is interesting to notice that the amount and 
intensity of terrorist attacks in Western Europe is on the decline, whereas the ―radicalisation‖ 
discourse, arguably, is still on the rise. Our team advocates a deconstruction and reframing 
of the dominant use of the term ―radicalisation,‖ as it also appears in some of the scientific 
literature, by studying the effects of that discourse on areas affected by it.  
As a result, a set of CONRAD research questions is formulated: 
1) What does the study of the existing literature teach us about ―radicalisation‖ as a 
concept? 
2) How is ―radicalisation‖ framed in the public debate and approached in (European) 
policy? 
3) How is the phenomenon understood and experienced by vulnerable groups in 
Brussels and Verviers? 
4) What are the characteristics of the so-called ―jihadogenic‖ spaces of Brussels and 
Verviers? 
5) Which alternative discourses can be developed to talk about ―radicalisation‖ and how 
can these be useful for civil society and public bodies?  
 
 
2.2. State of the art 
2.2.1. Phases, triggers and types 
The term ―radicalisation‖ refers to a process. For analytical purposes, many researchers 
distinguish between phases in this process, which is impacted by a series of causal factors 
depending on the phase the individual is currently in. 
 An often-cited example is Moghaddam‘s (2005) ―staircase to terrorism,‖ which 
indicates a series of psychological phases. The process starts with the experience of 
injustice, which may trigger a reaction in some individuals to address this experience. In a 
second phase, feelings of anger and aggression are harboured. The third phase is marked 
by the acknowledgement of the morals of a terrorist organisation, which precedes the fourth 
phase: membership of a terrorist organisation. In Moghaddam‘s model, the actual act of 
violence or terrorism is the fifth and final step of the staircase. This model is echoed by 
Feddes et al. (2016) who speak of four phases: openness, exploration, membership and 
action. Borum (2011), similarly, discerns four successive psychological stages: (1) strong 
personal grievances about the current situation, (2) resentment and perception of injustice, 
(3) externalisation and projection on a certain social group, (4) demonising of that group. 
Sageman (2004) identifies four stages including (1) moral outrage, (2) generalised 
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interpretation of events, (3) resonance with personal experience and (4) mobilisation through 
networks. Glees and Pope (2005) speak about a conveyor belt from Islamism to terrorism. 
 According to Ponsaers et al. (2012), the first phase is one in which the individual‘s 
social context and environment plays a role, as well as subjective factors such as relative 
deprivation, discrimination and the perceived threat to social identity (see also Reinares et 
al. 2009). Interestingly, these authors point out that the first phase of ―radicalisation‖ has 
relatively little to do with individual factors such as psychological problems and subjective 
perceptions of individual victimhood. Rather, social identity (Tajfel et al. 1970) and ideology 
play major roles in this phase, especially when a person feels that a particular group identity 
is under threat, thus reinforcing in-group bonds and out-group adversity. The latter building 
blocks are instrumental in creating a black and white world-view, by dividing people into neat 
―us‖ or ―them‖ categories.  
 In a second phase, more impact is generated by group processes such as ―group 
polarisation‖ (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), which refers to the phenomenon that 
ideological and emotional topics discussed in a group context generate polarisation, i.e. 
smaller groups with more moderate opinions are drawn into more extreme positions because 
they feel that they would otherwise be perceived as weaker and less influential. The extreme 
opinions shared within the group also contributes to the group‘s social isolation. In this 
phase, the main production of the extremist mindset takes place, including (1) the belief that 
information coming from outside the in-group is fake, (2) black-and-white thinking, (3) social 
distancing from the out-group, (4) feelings of superiority and (5) dehumanising the other, in 
order to be able to engage in violence towards them (Örell 2017). 
 Contrary to these authors, some researchers argue that the image of a process or 
―staircase‖ is too linear to capture this complex phenomenon. Mc Cauley and Moskalenko 
(2008) consider a pyramid shaped model, with ―radicalisation‖ as the bottom level, 
extremism as the middle and terrorism as the top level. Below this bottom level they also 
identify a broader layer of citizens sympathising with these radical ideas but who do not 
condone the use of violence. Mc Cauley and Moskalenko‘s levels coincide with three phases 
of recruitment: ―spotting,‖ ―indoctrination‖ and ―completion.‖  
 Hafaz and Mullins (2015) adopt the image of a puzzle comprising four pieces or 
components (grievances, networks, ideologies and a supporting social environment), which 
are greatly interdependent. ―Grievances‖ can derive from economic marginalisation, cultural 
alienation, victimhood, traumatic incidents, etc. ―Networks‖ refers to the social relations that 
can socialise a person into having extreme or radical ideas. ‗Ideologies‘ are the stories that 
individuals construct to give meaning to the world, and which may be both religious and 
political in nature. ―Supporting environments‖ are physical and virtual settings that can bring 
a person into contact with radicals. Sageman (2008), similarly, considers four non-sequential 
elements: (1) feelings of moral injustice, (2) interpretation of these feelings, (3) personal 
reality of the individual, (4) online and offline group dynamics. Between these models some 
elements or phases clearly overlap (injustice or grievance, for instance) but there are also 
some serious divergences. This probably indicates the fact that such a process is too 
complex to account for with a simplified model. 
 Another way to look at ―radicalisation‖ is through the occurrence of ―trigger events,‖ 
which might be instrumental in urging individuals from one phase to the next. These trigger 
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factors, we could claim, are more punctual and happen against the backdrop of more 
structural causes. Ponsaers et al. (2010) distinguish push factors as those that lead an 
individual to start the process of radicalisation (perceived relative deprivation, repression, 
discrimination, loss of social identity…) and to continue down that road, whereas pull factors 
are mostly related to group dynamics and recruitment (online as well as offline). In this 
regard, several of these factors or trigger events should be seen as catalysts rather than 
causal factors. Crenshaw (1981) also argues that a more structural breeding ground for 
―radicalisation‖ should be distinguished from proximate and immediate triggers such as 
violence against members of the in-group, outrageous acts, police brutality, contested 
elections, provocations or compromising speeches.  
 Feddes et al. (2016) distinguish a set of different personality types prone to 
―radicalisation,‖ each linked to certain triggers: (1) identity-seekers are struggling with a 
sense of belonging and looking for social connection, (2) justice-seekers are drawn in by the 
perception of injustice and are looking to set this straight, (3) sense-seekers have usually 
experienced a personal crisis and are trying to get a grip, (4) sensation-seekers are looking 
for adventure and excitement. In her study of young women who have travelled to Syria, 
Noor (2016) finds that these women share a few characteristics (difficult family situation, 
cultural pressure, lack of stability, previous ―frivolous‖ behaviour, low level of education), but 
they can also be organised into three categories: naïve, idealistic and ideological. 
 
2.2.3. Root causes 
In his meta-study, Victoroff (2005) analyses various theories that claim to explain the 
process of ―radicalisation.‖ Remarkably, none of these theories can clearly identify or explain 
the basic causes of ―radicalisation.‖ Theories that nevertheless do offer such explanations 
can be ordered according to various characteristics. Ponsaers et al. (2010) distinguish 
between theories that refer to specific characteristics of individuals or groups, theories that 
refer to subjective perceptions and justifications employed by ―radicalising‖ individuals or 
groups and theories that are connected to the contextual causes of ―radicalisation.‖ 
 Miller and Selig Chauhan (2017) order these theories according to monocausal axes: 
(1) geopolitics, (2) the Internet, (3) social factors such as relative deprivation and exclusion, 
(4) local context, (5) group factors such as social networks, group dynamics, the feeling of 
belonging, family and status, (6) individual factors such as mental health, personality traits, 
criminality, (7) religion and (8) emotions, experiences and identity. It has become clear, 
however, that no single monocausal theory will ever be able to grasp the full picture of so 
complex a phenomenon as ―radicalisation.‖ 
 In the following section we have opted for an approach along five axes: (1) the socio-
economic, (2) the (geo)political, (3) the psycho-pathological, (4) the religious, and (5) the 
personal and affective.  
 
2.2.3.1. Socio-economic 
According to Victoroff (2005) a substantial number of studies refer to relative deprivation—
the perception that one is deprived of certain means compared to other citizens —as a basis 
for ―radicalisation.‖ This would localise the risk of ―radicalisation‖ among underprivileged 
people or an oppressed underclass. However, this theory can never in itself explain 
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theprocess of ―radicalisation,‖ if only because a vast majority of people live in situations of 
deprivation and/or poverty and do not engage in extremist violence. A study of the profile of 
known terrorists or radical Muslims shows that they are generally not poor or deprived 
(Veldhuis and Staun 2009), although several studies find that most foreign terrorist fighters 
are from the lower or middle classes (Bakker 2006; Weggemans et al. 2014). In Bonelli and 
Carrié (2018), for example, the most serious acts committed by the ―radicalised‖ youngsters 
were perpetrated by those of whom it was least expected: young people from stable families 
with an excellent school record. While, in the Netherlands, AIVD (2014) points out the widely 
shared frustrations among young Muslims about their socio-economic position, Silber and 
Bhatt (2007) find that most of the individuals engaged in the preparation or execution of 
terrorist violence in the US did not come from economically underprivileged backgrounds. 
Khosrokhavar (2016:9) finds that middle-class jihadi‘s, in contrast to the youths from 
deprived areas, are not motivated by hate for society:  
[T]hey have neither interiorised the exclusion which the former [youth from deprived 
areas] have encountered nor do they consider themselves to be victimised. They 
invoke humanitarian grounds to justify their opposition to the fascist like Assad 
government. […] Their problem is one of authority and norms.  
Although socio-economic factors in themselves cannot explain the process of radicalisation, 
it is possible that they play a role in the background. Several related factors have been 
identified as significant in causing ―radicalisation‖: economic discrimination (Piazza 2011), 
unemployment (Weenink 2015; Gouda and Marktanner 2016) or a low level of education 
(Weggemans et al. 2014; Noor 2016). However, even these factors are contested. For 
instance, Bakker (2006) finds that the unemployment level in his sample group of jihadi 
terrorists was lower than the European average.  
 Remarkably, Bondokji et al. (2008:24) note in their literature review that there is a 
serious research gap considering the role of economics and particularly of relative 
deprivation, in shaping ―radicalisation‖: 
 For example, are economic factors more important to specific fighters‘ profiles or are 
 they more relevant in Africa and Central Asia? How is relative deprivation affecting 
 the decision to join armed groups? And what areas of material deprivation are more 
 important than others?  
The same point was made by Khosrokhavar (2018), who concludes, from extensive 
research with ―radicalised‖ individuals in prison, that there are rather large socio-economic 
differences between the profiles of Belgian and French homegrown terrorists on the one 
hand, and those from North-Africa on the other. 
 
2.2.3.2. (Geo)political 
Some authors stress the importance of (geo)political factors. Members of certain ethnic 
communities in the West are outraged about the situation in Gaza, about the American 
invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq or the situation in Syria. Based on their in-depth interviews 
with 117 Islamic terrorists in the UK and the US, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) 
found that for these participants the ―clash of civilisations‖ was identified as an essential 
motivation to become attracted to terrorism. In his large-scale survey in Italy, Groppi (2017) 
found similar radical opinions in his sample group, linking the support of terrorism with insults 
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of Islam. Similarly, in a survey of 6.678 Muslims respondents in Muslim and Western 
countries, support for terrorism was linked with Western economic oppression and the 
incompatibility of Western democracy and Islam. The same findings are reported in the 
Demos study of Bartlett et al. (2010). 
 However, with the exception of Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), these 
quantitative studies do not reveal much about the process of ―radicalisation‖ since they only 
map out the distribution of ―radical‖ ideas and the motivations and rationales behind these 
ideas. These studies only provide a temporal snapshot of the ideas and motives within a 
population. They do not, however, provide much information on the individual psychological 
process of a person adopting gradually more extreme ideas until they are willing to engage 
in violence. Moreover, these studies are not very sensitive to the difference between what 
people say and what they are willing to do. Nonetheless, these studies do give an indication 
of the weight that is attached to certain motives or causal factors compared to other potential 
factors in the populations examined. 
 In recent years the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and the subsequent establishment of an 
Islamic State constituted highly relevant political pull factors. These conflicts contribute to an 
―enabling‖ environment, as Reinares et al. (2008) call it, an attractive political project for 
immediate implementation that is juxtaposed with more pragmatic or politically weaker 
Islamic discourses. Similarly, some authors point out that the appeal of jihadism or the 
process of ―radicalisation‖ can also be inspired by a genuine aspiration for political and social 
change (ICG, 2015:2). Local political factors can also play a role. As Bondokji et al. (2017) 
suggest, the reasons why an Iraqi youth joins IS may differ considerably from those of a 
Jordanian youngster joining IS. The same goes for European youth in countries with different 
political projects.  
 
2.2.3.3. Psycho-pathological 
Quite some studies focus on the role of certain psycho-pathological factors for explaining the 
process of ―radicalisation.‖ In a survey in Bangladesh and Pakistan, Bhui et al. (2014) find 
that there is a correlation between depression and sympathies for violent protest and 
terrorism (although they also show that individuals with a large social capital are resistant to 
such convictions). Interestingly, the authors point out that migrant experiences of adversity, 
discrimination and injustice may be the cause for depression and psychosis. Poor health and 
symptoms of depression can be a consequence of low social capital, isolation and suffered 
inequalities (Marmot, 2005). The same is shown in the RAN (2019) case study on mental 
health and violent ―radicalisation,‖ by Paul Gill, who argues that mental health issues may be 
a cause of a cause of a cause, a by-product of terrorist commitment, or a condition that is 
present but does not play role. In short, there is no one-on-one link, there are multiple links.2  
A recent study of Bakker and De Bont (2016), based on research of a publicly available 
database of 370 foreign fighters in Belgium and The Netherlands, detected psychological 
problems in 60% of the individuals. Khosrokhavar (2016) also points towards psychological 
problems that contribute to ―radicalisation‖ as a ―total social phenomenon.‖ However, two 
earlier overview studies on ―terrorism‖ conclude that most evidence points towards the 
                                                          
2
 See the RAN YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=243&v=yOv_lvhj3KE 
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―normality‖ of terrorists, rather than revealing certain psycho-pathological characteristics 
(Corrado 1981; Silke 1998). One of the world‘s leading voices in terrorism research, Martha 
Crenshaw, continues to find that psycho-pathological theories cannot explain ―radicalisation‖ 
(Crenshaw 1981; 1986; 2000).  
 Furthermore, one of the final conclusions of the SAFIRE research project is that the 
process of ―radicalisation‖ is not at all abnormal. In fact, many aspects are remarkably similar 
to the way adolescents develop. This has consequences for how we need to address 
―radicalisation.‖ If the process of ―radicalisation‖ is the normal development of an adolescent 
who risks going down the wrong path, then principles of normal intervention need to be 
applied. Common social work methods should, in this case, be just as effective as other 
methods developed specifically for dealing with ―radicalised‖ people (CORDIS, 2015). 
 A more promising angle might lie in studying the psychological processes that can be 
found in the lives of ―radicalised‖ people and ―terrorists,‖ for which a link is often established 
with the psychology of petty criminals: difficult childhood, search for meaning and identity, 
and group dynamics (Lees Simi et al. 2016). However, it can be argued that these factors 
should not be considered as psycho-pathological but simply as psychological, personal or 
―affective‖ (see section 3.5). 
 
2.2.3.4. Religious and ideological 
According to Vidino (2010:3) ―[f]ew issues are more heavily debated than the importance of 
religion in the radicalisation of jihadist militants, with the extremists in the debate attributing 
to it either a central role or no role at all.‖ Silber and Bhatt (2007:6) argue that we should 
understand ―radicalisation‖ as follows: ―jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates 
young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‗autonomous jihad‘ via acts of 
terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives 
recruitment and is the basis for action.‖ It is composed of four phases: pre-radicalisation, 
self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization. At the same time, the authors acknowledge 
that not all individuals necessarily pass through all four states, nor that it always concerns a 
linear progression. 
 Groppi (2017) finds that no statistically significant support can be found for theories 
proposing discrimination, economic disparity, outrage at Western foreign policy, oppression 
of Muslims, traumatic experiences, or any standard sociological variable - including gender 
and being a convert to Islam - as predictors for supporting violence. By contrast, the most 
significant predictor variables relating to the support of violence are: (1) taking offense 
against the insult of Islam and (2) the endorsement of an Islamic, theocratic form of 
government. In their internet survey, van den Bos et al. (2009) find that a higher degree of 
religiosity correlates with feelings of moral superiority. Weggemans et al. (2014) conclude 
from interviews with friends and acquaintances of known Dutch foreign fighters that the latter 
showed an increasing interest in religion before they left to fight with IS. The same 
phenomenon is observed by Bakker (2006). 
 At the same time, Perliger and Milton (2016) emphasise that among the 1.175 foreign 
fighters studied, only 15% had a religious background. Most of these rarely appeared to be 
recent converts, however, and had often been Muslims since childhood though not overly 
religious. Because ―radicalisation‖ by definition refers to a process of intensification of 
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religiosity, it seems self-evident that ―radicalised‖ individuals should come across as highly 
religious. Based on the existing research, however, it is far from clear whether religion 
actually acts as a root cause. We know from multiple sources, e.g. two reports by Europol 
(2015; 2016), that many known Muslim terrorists were not engaged in any religious practice 
before they ―radicalised.‖ Less than half of the individuals arrested for IS-related incidents 
had a relevant knowledge of the Islamic faith. Also, in their Australian case study, Aly and 
Striegher (2012) find that religion plays a far lesser role than contended by Silber and Bhatt 
(2007), and many government responses with them.  
 In his study of 50 Islamist plots since 9/11, Mueller (2012:14) concludes that the 
frame of ideological or religious ―radicalisation‖ may be wrong in its entirety:  
The concept tends to imply that there is an ideological motivation to the violence, but 
what chiefly sets these guys off is not anything particularly theoretical but rather 
intense outrage at American and Israeli actions in the Middle East and a burning 
desire to seek revenge, to get back, to defend, and/or to make a violent statement 
expressing their hostility to what they see as a war on Islam.  
Venhaus (2010) concludes that people joining Al Qaeda seldom have a religious 
background. Contrary to these findings, the view that religion in itself can explain 
―radicalisation‖ is dominant in many Western countries. Interestingly, religion is also treated 
as a factor with huge explanatory force in countries with a Muslim majority. As a result, their 
de-radicalisation programmes focus on educating these ―deceived‖ and ―naïve‖ men and 
women in the ―true Islam‖ (Vidino 2010). 
 It might, therefore, be more relevant to talk about ideological rather than religious root 
factors. Indoctrination may play quite a crucial role in bringing discontent individuals with 
perceptions of injustice and feelings of uprootedness to the brink of violence. Ideology 
contributes to the acceptance of violence as a method for bringing about political change 
and leads to the creation of a subculture of violence. Ideology is used to reduce potential 
moral inhibitors and to justify the resort to extreme methods from a broader repertoire of 
methods of waging political conflict. Cognitive frameworks derived from certain exclusive 
ideologies have been used to build collective identities based on narratives of violent 
struggle (Coolsaet 2011). 
 
2.2.3.5. Personal and affective 
In a Special Report entitled ―Why Youth Join al-Qaeda,‖ Venhaus (2010) aptly divided those 
seeking to join jihadist networks into revenge-seekers needing an outlet for their frustration, 
status-seekers needing recognition, identity-seekers in need of a group to join, and thrill-
seekers looking for adventure. It should be emphasised, of course, that these personal 
factors never paint the full picture. ―Radicalisation‖ is a complex and highly individualised 
process, often shaped by a poorly understood interaction of structural and personal factors 
(Vidino 2010). 
 
Perception of injustice, discrimination, exclusion or stigmatisation 
Quite some evidence has been found that factors such as the perception of injustice, 
discrimination, exclusion or stigmatisation might indeed play a crucial role. Abbas and 
Siddique (2012), for instance, have found that, among British South-Asian Muslims, 
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perceptions of islamophobia and reactions to the implementation of repressive anti-terrorism 
legislation have been important in the ―radicalisation‖ of British Muslims. Studies in the US 
(Richardson 2012), UK (Wiktorowicz 2004) and Australia (Woodlock and Russell 2008) have 
found a similar relation between discrimination and ―radicalisation.‖ In the Netherlands, 
Geelhoed (2012) reports that nearly all of this (formerly) ―radicalised‖ respondents refer to 
feelings of social exclusion and stigmatisation, particularly after 9/11 and the murder of Theo 
van Gogh in 2004. 
 De Bie (2016) finds that the persecution of (innocent) people suspected of terrorism 
can have ―radicalisation‖ as an unintended consequence. The same study points out that the 
way irregular migrants are treated in temporary detention centres has made them vulnerable 
to recruiters. Blackwood et al. (2013) find that perceptions of excessive forms of control as 
well as of an apathic government regarding the needs, fears and worries of minorities have 
contributed to the development of negative feelings. In their study of young Muslims with 
radical and extremist sympathies, van den Bos et al. (2009) show that a large proportion of 
the respondents experienced discrimination (see also AIVD 2014). Some young people 
―radicalise‖ because they feel they are trapped in a hopeless situation in their home country 
(United States Presidential Task Force, 2009).  
 However, as Schmid (2013) adds, the amount of injustice in the world contrasts with 
the relatively low number of terrorists. Therefore, perceived injustice alone cannot explain 
the phenomenon. Feelings of injustice, alienation, or perceptions of stigmatisation and 
discrimination can result in lower self-esteem, feelings of threat and fear, and the withdrawal 
from society (Aly and Striegher 2012), all of which can make individuals more vulnerable to 
extremist discourses and on/offline recruiters. Furthermore, emotional experiences with 
injustice can also function as trigger factors in the process of ―radicalisation‖ (Choudhury and 
Fenwick 2011). Interestingly, Bonelli and Carrié (2018) comment that a trigger event such as 
an experience of injustice, humiliation or rejection can create a much greater impact among 
educated young people from stable families with higher expectations of life than it might 
among young people growing up in precarious conditions. 
 Another factor that is quite often mentioned is the perceived violence against 
minorities perpetrated by the authorities. Crenshaw (1981) already indicated this trigger in 
her early work, i.e. long before the social construction of the term ―radicalisation.‖ 
Perpetrators of radical violence often refer to their unjust treatment by the government, 
robbing them of their identity, security and freedom, as a motive to join radical groups 
(Crenshaw 1986; Taylor and Quayle 1994). Policies and dominant discourses of 
―radicalisation,‖ perceived as symbolic violence, may cause entire communities to feel 
stigmatised and treated as a security hazard (Vermeulen and Bovenkerk 2012). Recruiters 
and radical groups consciously tap into these feelings (Lakhani 2012). Negative emotions 
such as humiliation, contempt, insult, frustration and anger play an important role in the 
development of ―radicalised‖ thoughts (Feddes et al. 2012), for example in the emotion of 
betrayal experienced by young people who feel they are being denied better opportunities in 
secondary education. As noted by Bonelli and Carrié (2018), the impossibility to imagine a 
future for themselves makes young people more vulnerable to the promise of a complete 
make-over by joining the IS caliphate. 
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 Although repression or exclusion usually targets social groups, this does not result in 
the ―radicalisation‖ of entire communities. In fact, very few individuals from these 
communities actually commit terrorist offences (Silke 2003). Many people live in frustrating 
circumstances that result in despair, yet they will never commit violence to pursue change. 
As Friedland (1992) has found, many terrorists do not belong to excluded or repressed 
communities and cannot in truth claim their acts to be acts of despair. Finally, terrorist 
groups explicitly tap into these grievances by ―marketing‖ themselves as champions of the 
cause of certain oppressed groups, a phenomenon which Khosrokhavar (2005) calls 
―humiliation by proxy.‖  
 
Recognition, belonging, identity-search 
Several reports explain the process of ―radicalisation‖ as a search for identity, recognition or 
belonging (United States Presidential Task Force 2009). This is sometimes linked to the fact 
that many second-generation migrants feel ―stuck‖ between two cultures (Wolff 1997; 
Geelhoed 2012). Experiences of discrimination and exclusion in their home country trigger a 
new identification with their culture of origin. In his study based on interviews with friends 
and relatives of foreign fighters in Belgium, Leman (2016) refers to this phenomenon as a 
―counter-culture.‖ The attractive story of a radical Islam is contrasted with a society where 
these young Muslims do not feel welcome or experience feelings of exclusion. The particular 
interpretation of l‟islam du quartier (the local, neighbourhood Islam) or a so-called ―pure‖ 
Islam functions as a lubricant, a common ground among members of the group who feel a 
lack of belonging in society (Silber and Bhatt 2007). But, as Ponsaers et al. (2010) argue, 
the wish to belong to a larger group of like-minded spirits seems to contradict the findings 
formulated in several studies about ―radicalising‖ individuals withdrawing from society. They 
hypothesise that the former may take place in an earlier stage, while the latter happens 
towards the end of the process.  
 Some studies refer to the quest for purpose (Taylor and Quayle 1994) and status 
(Bartlett and Miller 2012), which functions as an emotional pull towards meaning and 
significance, leading to ―radicalisation‖ almost ―by accident‖ (Slootman and Tillie 2006). 
Other theories refer to the desire for sensation, thrills and fame (Ahmed 2015), in line with 
the criminological work of Jack Katz (1988) who links criminal and deviant behaviour to 
affects such as seduction. Research into right-wing extremism in Europe found that people 
are attracted to it because of a mix of opportunistic and criminal motivations, as well as the 
promise of sensation and thrills, rather than racial or ideological motivations (Bartlett and 
Miller 2012).  
 
Social environment and group dynamics 
It seems clear that ―social environment‖ in the broadest sense of the word plays an important 
role in the development of radical ideas and the willingness to engage in violence. The 
process seems remarkably similar to gang or cult membership (Schmid 2013). However, 
while organised crime groups lack political motivation, avoid publicity, scrutiny and engage in 
focused activities, Decker and Pyrooz state that terror groups seek publicity for their cause 
and act largely from expressive motivations (2011). However, they also conclude that ―there 
is an axis of continuity across criminal, deviant, and extremist groups that, when explored, 
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will bring a better understanding to radicalisation processes‖ (Decker and Pyrooz 2011:161).  
 The social dynamics studied in this section may range from dynamics in the family or 
social group, dynamics among a ―bunch of friends‖ (Sageman 2004), contact with recruiters 
or with radical networks in prison. This focus in understanding ―radicalisation‖ has been 
particularly upheld by scholars working in a framework of social movement and social 
network theory. These studies emphasise the role of social bonds and networks and the 
individual‘s interaction with a radical group, recruitment processes, group membership and 
the eventual adoption of the group‘s frame of reference, values and beliefs. In itself, the 
membership and formation of a group already produces meaning and identity, which links 
this perspective to the one treated above. 
 In their life-cycle research of 1.175 foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, Perliger and 
Milton (2016) found that an ―accessory environment‖ encourages people to cross the line 
into extremist violence: 22% were recruited by a religious mentor, 50% by a member of their 
social group and 10% by a friend. This research argues that it is crucial for ―radicalising‖ 
individuals to have one or several like-minded people in their immediate vicinity. This is in 
line with Sageman‘s (2004) ―bunch of guys‖ theory according to which young people do not 
formally join an existing radical organisation but rather develop a terrorist cell in a bottom-up 
fashion.  
Events taking place in the family environment could also function as triggers, from the death 
of a relative (Buijs et al. 2006; Lankford 2014), to (economic) misfortune, to a crisis in the 
family (Kleinmann 2012). Some studies find that the lack of strong family ties or social 
isolation constitute important characteristics of the lone-acting terrorist (Gill et al. 2014). 
Social learning can explain how ―radicalisation‖ takes place in a learning process in the 
institutional context of Muslim schools or through cultural diffusion in informal environments. 
However, this theory cannot explain why the large majority of groups exposed to extremist 
propaganda and radical discourses does not ―radicalise‖ (Ponsaers et al. 2010:20). 
Conversely, some studies find that family influence is an important reason for not engaging 
in violence (Cragin et al. 2015). As Bondokji et al. (2008) note, there is some anecdotal 
evidence that mothers in Libya and family and clan members in Kenia have been influential 
in convincing fighters to return. Much attention has therefore been spent on the potential 
roles played by families in the rehabilitation of ―radicalised‖ individuals. According to Spalek 
(2016), attention of this kind may lead to a certain community becoming suspect.  
 Similarly, the dynamics within small groups (of friends or relatives) could present a 
social environment that may form an important factor in the crucial transition from radical 
ideas to actual criminality and terrorism. A 2012 research project with 1.086 young Dutch 
people shows how the feeling of moral superiority of the in-group plays a crucial role in far-
right ―radicalisation‖ (Doosje et al. 2012). Here, ―injustice frames‖ often play a role, thus 
bringing the group together, reinforcing feelings of ―othering,‖ thinking in terms of ―us‖ vs. 
―them,‖ and legitimising the process of ―radicalisation‖ (Feddes et al. 2016). On the other 
hand, while ―brotherhood‖ as a collective identity acts as a driver within jihadist groups, 
(excessively) intense group dynamics may be experienced as intimidation and cause group 
members to distance themselves and refrain from ―radicalising‖ (De Bie 2016). The 
disappointment of being a member of a radical or terrorist group may be a push factor to ―de-
radicalise‖ (Horgan 2009). 
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 Because of the diversity observed among extremists (left-wing, right-wing, Islamist, 
nationalist), researchers have increasingly focused on group dynamics, particularly against 
the background of social psychological theory, including phenomena such as group 
polarisation, groupthink, in-group/out-group bias, diminished sense of responsibility, 
perceived rewards and benefits, group norms and rules (Borum 2011). Bonelli and Carrié 
(2018:200) add that a shared affective space, as well as a shared group representation to 
the outside world, are highly important in the formation of such groups: 
 We see the importance of the constitution of a group of equals that transforms 
 progressively and closes itself off in an emotional community. This community, that 
 shares similar representations of the world (the more moderates detach themselves) 
 and that grows together through affective ties, constitute the framework and space in 
 which the action occurs. 
Recruiters and ―functionaries of radicalism‖ may help them to find sense in their acts, in 
legitimising them, even to facilitate them technically, but they are not the motor of the group. 
These intermediaries are products of group dynamics rather than causal actors. 
 Several authors have also analysed the role of the Internet. Schils (2017) for 
example argues that there is no consensus whether the Internet in fact plays a role. It could 
facilitate the access to certain information, which in turn could result in involvement in certain 
radical milieus (Conway 2012). This last link, however, is an assumption since the relation 
may not be a causal one, in which case the Internet may merely function as a catalyst and 
trigger. Moreover, most empirical research seems to confirm that the majority of known 
―radicalised‖ persons were first socialised offline (Schils 2017). As Bonelli and Carrié (2018) 
argue, ―self-radicalisation‖ on the Internet is a myth, and violent ―radicalisation‖ is mainly a 
collective phenomenon, foregrounding the importance of meso-level ties and dynamics. In 
short, the Internet plays a role among individuals who are already receptive to the content 
that is being offered. A breeding ground must already be in place before someone might 
start looking for radical messages online. As Nesser (2012) found in his study of the 
formation of terrorist cells among Muslims between 1995 and 2010, recruitment usually 
followed the moral shock experienced by individuals seeing gruesome movies of atrocities 
committed against Muslims in conflicts in the (Middle) East. Online fora offer recruiters the 
possibility to reach an audience, to engage in personal relations with a worldwide public and 
to give them access to uncensored content. This does not only benefit the bilateral relations 
between recruiters on the one hand and potentially ―radicalising‖ individuals on the other, but 
it is also instructive in the development of group dynamics. 
 
2.2.4. Discussion and conclusion 
Looking at ―radicalisation‖ as a single and linear process does not take into account how 
different factors have an effect on each other (Bondokji et al. 2017) and ultimately overlooks 
the chance factor in the process of ―radicalisation.‖ For this reason, we adopt a puzzle-like 
framework for looking at ―radicalisation,‖ which implies focusing on the necessary building 
blocks or ingredients of the breeding-ground for (political or religious) violence and terrorism 
to occur. This boils down to asking the question why anyone is ―radicalisable,‖ rather than 
why anyone has ―radicalised.‖ Because of this approach, we reject models that focus on a 
single, simple linear process. Rather, we consider ―radicalisation‖ as a series of processes 
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taking place in one individual and in the outer world simultaneously. Violence, in this 
perspective, takes place when circumstances and drivers meet in the ―right‖ constellation, 
i.e. when these various processes intersect.  
 This perspective is informed by the historical parallels drawn by Reinares et al. 
(2008) about political ―radicalisation‖ waves since the late 19th century. According to these 
authors, these waves share a number of structural features: (1) they all thrive in an enabling 
environment characterised by a widely shared sense of injustice, whether real or perceived, 
exclusion and humiliation, (2) there is always a personal trajectory or component necessary 
for setting off violent behaviour, which explains why the large majority of people sharing the 
same sense of injustice, and living in the same polarised environment do not turn to violence 
or terrorism; (3) the actual use of violence involves only a very limited number of individuals.  
So, while there are several processes that need to take place in order for someone to 
―radicalise,‖ the shift towards violence also depends, to some extent, on timing and chance, 
in order for these processes to intersect. Therefore, we ought not only to study the various 
factors that may play a role in the process of ―radicalisation‖ but also examine the effect 
these factors have on each other. With Schmid (2011) and Reinares et al. (2008), we also 
argue that greater emphasis should be placed on how the social environment resonates with 
the individual, with propaganda and recruitment as chance catalysts, and with certain 
structural factors playing (only) in the background. 
 
2.2.4.1. Methodological reflections 
In 2008, Silke estimated that only 20% of studies had produced new empirical knowledge, 
only 1% had conducted interviews and not a single one had undertaken any systematic 
research with jihadis. Indeed, a substantial amount of the existing research is anecdotal or 
based on desktop research (RAN 2016). Bondokji et al. 2017:23) conclude their literature 
review with the statement that ―the subject of radicalisation is limited by a dearth of empirical 
evidence; the majority of that which does exist, lacks in methodological and scientific rigour.‖  
Many findings on both radicalisation and de-radicalisation are merely tentative and can often 
only be applied locally or within narrow, regional contexts (Schmid 2013). Methodologically, 
researchers such as Khosrokhavar (2006) and Crettiez (2017), who have conducted 
interviews with ―radicalised‖ people in prison, have been confronted with serious problems 
regarding the establishment of a trusting relationship and the provision of the right kind of 
circumstances for an honest interaction with their subjects.  
 Some studies are surveys that try to map opinions of respondents in their relation to 
the socio-economic data of these respondents. Slootman and Tillie (2006), for instance, 
conclude on the basis of a large survey among Muslims in Amsterdam that a strict and 
orthodox view on Islamic religion and the feeling of injustice towards Muslims on a national 
and international scale coincides with the following individual variables: age (16 to 18), 
secondary school education level, strong connection with the ethnic group, strong perception 
of discrimination, strong political distrust and social isolation.  
 Surveys, of course, have some limitations regarding explanatory power. For instance, 
how can a survey which maps the distribution of beliefs and opinions say anything 
meaningful about the process of ―radicalisation‖? Can the difficult issue of why and how an 
individual decides to engage be revealed with a temporal snapshot of opinions? The 
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question is also what such a survey tells us when we do not compare these insights with 
similar surveys conducted among other migrant groups or among the white majority: ―no 
control group of young people in similar situations that have not radicalised or, when 
radicalised, did not opt for terrorism, has been used in the radicalisation studies surveyed 
here‖ (Schmid 2013:38). To say the least, such a survey setup reinforces the dominant and 
popular discourse of ―radicalisation.‖ 
 The same criticism can be made in the case of Groppi (2017), who finds that support 
for violence relates to (1) taking offense against insults of Islam and (2) the endorsement of 
an Islamic, theocratic form of government. Apart from the facts that such correlations do not 
reveal much, that comparison with ―radical‖ views among other social groups is simply not 
offered and that such a setup reinforces the dominant discourse, there are also some 
methodological remarks to be made about the tool of a survey. We know from previous 
ethnographic research (De Backer 2016) that vulnerable young (Muslim) participants 
demand a high degree of trust and reassurance before opening up to a researcher. We also 
know that those participants are bound to play games with the researcher if this trust is not 
established and that answers to questions can be exaggerations, lies or answers that are 
perceived as socially desirable. A survey, in other words, has no way of telling which is 
which.  
 Some other large-scale quantitative studies add important insights to the discussion, 
especially from a macro-perspective. Perliger and Milton (2016), for instance, in their study 
of the life-cycles of known terrorists propose a set of causal factors and prioritise those that 
seem to make a bigger difference than others, while also remaining sensitive to the diversity 
within the subject group. Similarly, Piazza (2011) has shown that there is a link between how 
countries treat their minorities at the economic level and the number of home-grown 
terrorists, while Gouda and Marktanner (2016) found a similar link with unemployment. 
 The existing ethnographic research, which is intrinsically more sensitive to diversity 
within the sample group and which generally provides a better estimation of the 
trustworthiness of answers given in a research context, paints a complex picture. Research 
on known foreign fighters, based on interviews with these ―radicals‖ (Slootman and Tillie 
2006; Europol 2016) as well as with their relatives and friends (Weggemans et al. 2014; 
Leman 2016) sketches a complex image and discerns a wide variety of individual profiles. Of 
course, the fundamental problem with qualitative research, i.e. the difficulty to generalise 
from a limited sample, remains unresolvable.  
 
2.2.4.2. Certainties and research gaps 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above literature study. Firstly, existing research 
focuses on socio-economic, geopolitical, psycho-pathological, religious and affective factors. 
However, no single factor can explain the whole phenomenon. According to Viktoroff 
(2005:35) ―[t]heories that claim the predominance of one of these influences over the others 
are premature since no studies have systematically examined more than one or two of these 
factors, let alone empirically examined one while controlling for the others.‖ To fathom the 
importance of every one of these causal factors is the topic of heated debate: Several 
studies, for instance, find that socio-economic factors rarely play a role in explaining the 
―radicalisation‖ into violence of an individual, whereas other studies show a clear link with 
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unemployment or economic discrimination (Piazzi 2011), allowing that the social 
psychological aspect of relative deprivation may also play a role. There is no single, unitary 
process of ―radicalisation.‖ Bonelli and Carrié (2018) conclude from their research with 
young people placed in judiciary protection on suspicion of involvement in radical 
movements that there are multiple forms of radicalism, which they define as appeasing, 
rebellious, agonistic and utopian. 
 Secondly, much research tackles Islamist or religious ―radicalisation‖ as an 
exceptional phenomenon, without taking into account the similarities with right-wing, left-
wing or nationalist extremism (Rabasa et al. 2010)3. For this reason, the ―radicalisation‖ 
discourse and anti-radicalisation programmes and policies are experienced as stigmatising 
by Muslim populations in the West, which is why we need a radical reframing of the concept. 
Interestingly, the RAND Europe (2011) study, reviewing causal factors among ―radicalised‖ 
individuals from across Islamist, left-wing, right-wing, single issue and separatist groups, 
identified the following factors as most significant: (1) perception of impotence to affect 
political change, (2) past training activity, (3) political activity, (4) proneness to violence and 
(5) experience of negative meaningful events. Social environment, ideology and affective 
factors are foregrounded here as the most important.  
 Thirdly, what most of the research has failed to uncover is that ―radicalisation‖ is a 
process involving both ―ideal‖ (religion, identity, geopolitics) and ―non-ideal‖ (emotions, group 
dynamics) factors. The methodological implication of this insight is that while researchers 
can quite easily focus on the ―ideal‖ through interviews, focus groups and surveys, 
investigating the ―non-ideal‖ is much harder and demands a much more thorough and time-
consuming, in-depth ethnographic approach. Such an approach also requires that 
researchers be sensitive to the emotive, pre-cognitive, and non-cognitive aspects which are 
easily overlooked in Western scientific practice. 
 This insight resonates with the study of Bartlett and Miller (2012) that compares 
terrorists with non-violent ―radicals‖ as a control group, in order to find out how exactly 
―radicalisation‖ can lead to violence. They suggest four factors, all of which are emotive and 
irrational: emotional pull by feeling of injustice, thrill, status and peer pressure. Finally, this 
insight also fits with Vidino‘s (2010) remark that ―radicalisation‖ is a complex and highly 
individualised process and that it should be understood as a complex interaction of structural 
and personal factors. 
 Fourthly, most research continues to focus on ―radicalisation‖ as only an individual 
process, emphasising ―the individual as the focus of analysis and, to some extent, the 
ideology of the group, and significantly de-emphasis[ing] the wider circumstances that might 
help explain why radicalisation becomes significant at a given moment in time and might 
lead to terrorist actions‖ (Coolsaet, 2011: 262). We agree with Feddes et al. (2016) that we 
need to look at push and pull factors on micro-, meso- and macro-levels. Veldhuis and Staun 
(2009), similarly, argue for an analysis on different levels, distinguishing between the macro-
level (involving political, economic and cultural causes) and the micro-level, including both a 
                                                          
3
 As Schmid (2013:35-6) argues: ―It might well be that radicalisation, where rewards for participation in group 
violence is apparently sanctioned by religion, is in some ways different from radicalisation of members of secular 
ethno-nationalist groups.‖ However, while many authors claim that religion represents a stronger pull factor, 
compared to e.g. nationalist doctrine, this is simply assumed. We simply have too little data to be able to make 
these claims. 
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social level (identification, group processes, relative deprivation) and an individual level 
(psychological and personal). Bjørgo (2005) structures root causes in a framework including 
structural causes (demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid modernisation, transitional 
societies, increased individualism, relative deprivation, class structure), facilitating causes 
(mobility, technology, transportation, publicity, weapons technology, weak state control), 
motivational causes (i.e. grievances) and triggering causes (political calamity, outrageous 
act).  
According to Schmid (2013), this type of analysis is also important because the dominant 
focus on vulnerable youth has obscured the role of the environment in which ―radicalisation‖ 
can take place as well as the role and responsibility of society and the government. 
Therefore, he refers to the meso-level, the ―radicalising‖ or ―radical‖ environment, which is 
supportive or complicit, ―which serves as a rallying point and is the ‗missing link‘ with the 
terrorists‘ broader constituency or reference group that is aggrieved and suffering injustices 
which, in turn, can radicalise parts of a youth cohort and lead to the formation of terrorist 
organisations‖ (Schmid 2013:4). The macro-level looks at the role of government and society 
at home and abroad, specifically focusing on the ―radicalisation‖ of public opinion and party 
politics, on tense relationships between the majority and minorities, and on lacking socio-
economic opportunities.  
 The study of ―radicalisation‖ at micro-level thus appears as a substitute to a more 
thorough analysis and criticism of contemporary (geo-)politics. Kundnani (2012:5) states the 
following: 
The result is a systematic failure to address the reality of the political conflicts that 
radicalisation scholars claim they want to understand. Instead, a concept has been 
contrived which builds into official thinking biases and prejudices that, in turn, 
structure government practices introduced to combat radicalisation, resulting in 
discrimination and unwarranted restrictions on civil liberties. 
This type of analysis points at the responsibility of researchers and clarifies the role played 
by research in the development or contestation of the dominant ―radicalisation‖ discourse. 
With Schmid (2013) we would like to emphasise that although much is unclear about what 
―radicalisation‖ is, which factors play a role and to what extent they do so, there are a 
number of things we can consider as established knowledge about those who have become 
―radicalised‖ towards terrorism: 
1) ―radicalisation‖ does not have pathological roots, 
2) the study of the background of terrorists shows that no single profile of ―the 
terrorist‖ exists, and that there are many paths to terrorism, 
3) ―radicalisation‖ is a gradual process, which is not linear, 
4) poverty is not an important factor to help explain ―radicalisation,‖ but 
unemployment may play a role, 
5) grievances and perceptions of injustice play a rather central role, although they 
may act as triggers rather than as causal factors, 
6) social networks and group dynamics are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths to a 
terrorist movement, 
7) ideology plays an important role, providing the potential terrorist with a ―license to 
kill.‖ 
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However, we must be wary not to treat these factors as indicators that are able to predict the 
―radicalisation‖ of vulnerable individuals. From the research into the life-cycles of known 
terrorist we know that there are simply too many exceptions. In fact, as Veldhuis and Staun 
(2009) argue, we should move away from the view that certain groups are vulnerable to 
―radicalisation‖ and from continued attempts to identify these groups. Instead, we need to 
look at the conditions that make them ―radicalisable‖:  
Statistically, Islamist terrorists in the West have been young, male, and relatively well 
educated (e.g. Bakker 2006). This does not mean that young, male, well-educated 
Muslims are more vulnerable to radicalisation, let alone that policy makers should 
target this group on which to focus counter-radicalisation policy. [...] We argue that it 
is crucial for policy makers to move away from the question of which groups are likely 
to radicalise, but instead ask under what conditions individuals become more likely to 
radicalise (Veldhuis and Staun 2009:64-6). 
 
 
2.3. The CONRAD conceptual framework 
Inspired by the multi-level approach of Bjørgo (2005), Veldhuis and Staun (2009) and 
Schmid (2013), the CONRAD research team proposes a conceptual framework 
incorporating micro-, meso- and macro-level analysis, through the concepts of transitions, 
social vulnerabilities, individual vulnerabilities, ―radicalisation‖ and resilience. Furthermore, it 
is argued that the continuum of radicalisation/resilience should be considered at each of 
these levels, since it affects the lived world of young urbanites and the suburban middle 
classes, of left-wing and right-wing politicians, of workers and rich folk , of the political and 
public debate. All these phenomena, the ―avatars‖ of radicalisation as Khosrokhavar (2016) 
calls them, appear in the same glass jar model (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The glass jar model  
 
―Transitions‖ and ―vulnerabilities,‖ the first two central concepts in the CONRAD framework 
capture most of the work that is presented in the above section on causal factors. Some of 
these factors, such as geopolitics, religious doctrine, ideology or socio-economic dynamics 
operate on a macro-level (―transitions‖). Others deal with the internal dynamics of an 
individual or group, i.e. on a micro- or meso-level, such as the affective and 
psychopathological factors discussed above. They are the ―vulnerabilities‖ experienced by 
individuals or groups, which may be a result of global transitions and their intersecting 
impacts. As Dzekhova et al. (2016:7) argue, ―radicalisation‖ should be understood as a 
dynamic, multi-staged and multifaceted phenomenon that occurs when individual 
vulnerabilities (biographical dimension) interact with an encouraging environment. This 
resonates with the remarks made above about the role of chance in bringing the processes 
that lead to ―radicalisation‖ to a point where they will intersect. Phrases such as ―vulnerability 
to radicalisation‖ are widely used in this type of research. For instance, the UK PREVENT 
strategy is largely focussed on radicalisation, ideology and vulnerability of the vulnerable 
groups (Aly 2013). This is why Schmid (2013) argues that we need to steer away from a 
focus on vulnerable groups (which is once again stigmatisation) and instead look for the 
conditions that make people ―radicalisable.‖ In other words, we can still use the term 
―vulnerable,‖ but not in an individualised fashion and we must detach it from the expected, 
suspect social groups. 
 Rather than focusing exclusively on ―radicalisation‖ as an inherently negative and 
destructive process, and unlike most of the existing ―radicalisation‖ research, the CONRAD 
research team proposes to include ―resilience‖ at the other end of the ―radicalisation‖ 
continuum. A first interesting insight when studying research that mentions both 
―radicalisation‖ and ―resilience‖ is the fact that the latter topic is seldom explained, analysed 
or properly conceptualised. Especially in the UK—influenced by the terminology of the 
influential PREVENT programme—quite some studies speak of resilience against 
―radicalisation‖ as a sort of synonym of ―resistance‖ (as if it were simply a cognitive matter). 
Other studies focus on ―community resilience,‖ which is also interesting. This places the 
emphasis on the meso-level, above the individual ―at risk‖ and below the macro forces that 
play on this individual.  
 The concept of ―resilience‖ has its origin in psychology, ecology and architecture, 
denoting the capacity of materials, people and biospheres to resist sudden changes and 
negative events, as well as the capacity to recover from these events. In public health and 
prevention discourses, a paradigm shift towards positive psychology has been realised, with 
therapies and trainings increasingly focusing on protective elements and positive emotions. 
In social work, ―resilience‖ has been conceptualised, along with social capital and 
empowerment, as the main tools of any social worker. According to Jan Van Gils (quoted in 
Peeters 2010), it consists of informal social networks of support (inside and outside the 
family), the discovery of meaning, social and problem-solving capacities, self-worth and a 
sense of humour. Resilience is ―the ability of a person or a system (group, community) to 
lead a good life despite difficult circumstances, and to develop in a positive and socially 
acceptable way‖ (Peeters 2010:141; our translation). Resilience relies on the individual‘s 
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own strengths and resources, and on the pride of the survivor. It can also be called 
―psychological capital.‖ 
 On an individual level, the recent work of Hallich and Doosje (2017) is relevant. Their 
study focuses on evaluating the experimental Dutch programme Diamant-plus which aims to 
―de-radicalise‖ young people and to invest in their resilience. The programme consists of a 
mix of two existing methods in youth rehabilitation and social work. The first, entitled 
―Diamant identititeitsontwikkeling en weerbaarheid‖ (―Diamond identity development and 
resilience‖), is preventive in nature and aims to enlarge young people‘s resilience to 
―radicalisation.‖ The effects of this method have been substantiated by earlier studies (e.g. 
Feddes et al. 2013). The second, ―Coach je kind‖ (―Coach your kid‖), is a pedagogic method 
developed specifically for parents with a migration background. Also, this method has been 
corroborated and recognised by the Dutch Youth Institute (NJI). Hallich and Doosje (2017) 
define ―resilience‖ as the extent to which citizens resist to extremist influences through 
cognitive, affective and behavioural indicators.  
Although it is a pilot study in which only 5 families were followed, there is an 
indication that a multi-actor and hands-on approach such as the Diamant-plus programme 
can be effective in reintegrating isolated youngsters, strengthening their identity and skills (in 
dealing with conflicts), and, to a lesser extent, bringing about a critical stance towards 
extremist ideas. Such programmes can also result in amending the problematic relationship 
between parents and youngsters, strengthening the pedagogic skills of the parents, and 
informing them of the road towards official assistance and about the dangers of 
―radicalisation.‖ 
 In another, longitudinal study by Feddes, Doosje and Mann (2015), adolescents with 
a ―dual identity‖ were investigated in the context of a resilience training based, on the 
Diamant-plus method. Here participants were subjected to three modules of training during a 
period of three months. Each module is aimed at dealing with a ―dual identity,‖ intercultural 
moral judgements and intercultural conflict management. A total of 46 male and female 
Muslim adolescents and young adults participated. The study showed that the Diamant 
resilience training reinforced participants‘ agency and self-esteem and their capacity to deal 
with a variety of perspectives. The study also confirmed that this training lowered the 
seductive force of radical ideas for participants, and that attitudes towards ideological 
violence and the participants‘ own violent intentions had changed and decreased 
substantially. This study does not show, however, whether resilience trainings are effective 
in ―de-radicalising‖ violent extremists. It is also unclear whether the effects of these trainings 
may be considered at all permanent. Finally, we also need to emphasise at this point that 
these trainings were assessed using quantitative methods which, although applied in a 
longitudinal way, still have serious limitations considering the assessment of mental states 
and ―non-ideal‖ aspects of ―radicalisation.‖ 
One could argue that the above approach of countering ―radicalisation‖ by enhancing 
resilience is problematic, because it also focuses exclusively on the individual level and 
continues to disregard collective responsibilities. Aly (2013), on the other hand, 
conceptualises resilience as collective resistance, based on a study of the UK‘s PREVENT, 
Australia‘s Resilience and the United States‘ Diminish programmes, promoting democratic 
values, social harmony and active participation. The author argues that there is little or no 
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evidence base for these individual resilience approaches. Instead, she argues for a re-
conceptualization of collective resilience, which she views as resistance against terrorism by 
promoting social harmony and religious tolerance. In this regard, social cohesion 
programmes should absolutely be distinguished from counterterrorism programmes. Instead, 
the author observes examples of spontaneous and ―bottom-up‖ counterterrorism which 
consist of small-scale ―everyday political‖ acts (De Backer et al. 2019) such as the creative 
and collective appropriation of a bombing site. 
 The CONRAD project also regards resilience on a societal level. The question here is 
how entire communities can be made more resilient. From the perspective of contra 
terrorism, resilience can be considered a protective factor that can diminish the negative 
impact of terrorism on individuals and societies. A resilient society is capable of recovery 
after certain traumatising events. As such resilience is the logical opposite of vulnerability. 
As Bakker (2012:7-8; our translation) argues: ―if we choose to enhance the resilience of our 
society, the current [anti-terrorism] policies will need to be adjusted. Obviously, it remains 
important that governments take initiative to prevent possible future terrorist attacks. But the 
understanding needs to grow that the nature and gravity of terrorist threat is more than only 
the possibility of an attack and the direct, physical consequences thereof.‖ Terrorism does 
not mainly aim at killing people. Its primary objective is to trigger a social and political 
reaction; hence the success of terrorism is directly linked to the degree of resilience with 
which a given society responds to it.  
 Vulnerability, as a logical counterpart of resilience, should be criticised in a similar 
manner. According to Schmid (2013), the dominant focus on vulnerable youth obscures the 
role of the social environment in which ―radicalisation‖ can take place, as well as the role and 
responsibility of society and the government. In fact, as Veldhuis and Staun (2009) argue, 
we should move away from the view that certain groups are vulnerable to ―radicalisation‖ 
and that we should continue to identify these groups. Instead, we need to look at the 
conditions that make them ―radicalisable.‖ 
 In the CONRAD conceptual framework, ―radicalisation‖ is not only considered at the 
individual level (as indeed most authors do), but as a ―total social phenomenon‖ 
(Khosrokhavar 2018). As Schmid (2013:39) proposes, the concept of ―radicalisation‖ 
remains useful if we ―see it as a process that can affect conflict parties on both sides in a 
confrontation‖ and ―apply it not only to individuals and small groups but also to larger 
collectivities.‖ Indeed, Schmid (2013:37) argues the case as follows:  
When it comes to terrorism, such a one-sided discourse is, however, still widely 
accepted. Too many analysts have sought the causes of radicalisation only on the 
side of non-state actors. It might well be that many, perhaps even the majority of ‗root 
causes‘ of radicalisation are indeed on one side of the net, but the almost systematic 
disregard for government counter-terrorist behaviour is nevertheless striking.  
Instead of focusing only on ―us‖ or ―them‖ we need research into the culmination and 
―radicalisation‖ of the conflict itself (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011). Examples of the 
―radicalisation‖ of Western societies can be found in the increasing use of state violence and 
control, in the increasing implementation of extreme measures (e.g. waterboarding) and the 
erosion of human rights and privacy. 
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 It is a phenomenon that takes place in the context of a ―radicalising‖ society or, 
perhaps, in what has been called a ―polarising‖ society (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011). 
Fear and anxiety may cause discrimination and polarisation, which may lead to 
―radicalisation‖ (Bakker 2012). Some terror organisations are aware of this dynamic: ―our 
fearful overreaction renders the terror instrument yet even more attractive‖ (Bakker 2012: 6; 
our translation). The culture of fear has substituted reason and empirical evidence and 
analyses of threat are increasingly determined by speculation and imagination (Furedi 2007). 
Bakker (2012) concludes that to overcome the self-fulfilling prophecy fed by fatalism and 
overreaction, societies need to invest in resilience.  
 It follows from the above observations that one of the most painful gaps in our 
understanding of ―radicalisation‖ lies exactly in the injustices experienced as well as the 
radical and violent reactions produced by groups targeted by ―de-radicalisation‖ and 
―counter-radicalisation‖ policies. To put it slightly differently: to what extent do these policies 
themselves have ―radicalising‖ effects? Especially in the geopolitical sphere, interventions by 
the West in Islamic countries have generally strengthened the attractiveness of radical 
groups such as Al Qaeda or contributed to an enormous sense of injustice among Muslims 
groups in the West (Geltzer 2012). Schmid (2013:6) adds the following: 
 [I]t does seem that many acts of terrorism are motivated by revenge for acts of 
 repression, injustice and humiliation and that a tit-for-tat process can evolve after a 
 while […] If the state overreacts to terrorist provocations and becomes very 
repressive  and aggressive, it often produces additional mobilisation on the other side 
There is much to be gained from research into the effects of radicalisation policies, projects 
and programmes. As De Bie (2016) notes, the persecution of terrorism suspects leads to 
―radicalisation‖ among people of the same community. Likewise, Blackwood et al. (2013) see 
a link between ―radicalisation‖ and excessive violence wielded by the authorities. Mitts 
(2018:1) found that ―local-level measures of anti-Muslim animosity correlate significantly and 
substantively with indicators of online radicalisation, including posting tweets sympathizing 
with ISIS, describing life in ISIS-controlled territories, and discussing foreign fighters.‖ 
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3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1. Five methodologies 
3.1.1. Framing analysis 
The use of frames and the exercise of identifying them in an unambiguous and reliable 
manner are grounds for discussion. Nevertheless, this might also provide researchers with 
some sense of comfort, since it means that a frame is only an invitation to look at reality in a 
specific way. Ultimately, however, sufficient validation of the identified frames remains 
crucial for them to actually represent the object of the frame analysis, i.e. to provide insight 
into the underlying patterns of a certain discourse. This external validation is needed to 
remind one that radicalisation is a complex phenomenon, with many different aspects. Only 
when citizens become aware of the possibility of multiple perspectives will their view of the 
world become more nuanced. Only then will it be possible to reach a sustainable solution for 
tendencies of ―radicalisation‖ within society. In order to tackle these challenges, we engaged 
in inductive framing analysis (e.g. Van Gorp 2006; Van Gorp 2010; Van Gorp and 
Vercruysse 2012). 
 
3.1.1.1. Central concepts 
Definitions of framing tend to vary depending on the researchers who study it (e.g. Iyengar 
2005; Scheufele 1999). In the public debate, framing is even viewed as a purposely distorted 
presentation of reality and usually something which is being said about the opponent in an 
accusing tone.  
 In communication sciences, a more neutral and broad understanding of framing is 
used. Some scholars even see framing as synonymous with the way in which matters are 
suggested by the media, namely for representation. A more specific definition is the one 
developed by Reese (2001:5), stating that ―[f]rames are organizing principles that are 
socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the 
social world.‖ In other words, frames are steadfast perspectives or viewpoints that can be 
used to structure reality in a meaningful way. As such, frames help people to understand 
what is going on in the world around them. Facts do not stand on their own, but gain 
meaning by being embedded in a narrative. Frames are mutually shared in society and 
therefore change relatively little over time. Hence, frames represent images that are familiar 
and come natural to the users. Their persistent and stable character ensures that they play 
an important role in communication, even more so when social issues are being addressed. 
However, their familiarity and constancy might be the reason that they are not recognized as 
frames.  Therefore, a framing analysis can help towards recognising and identifying 
frames, thus making them visible and tangible. This type of analysis also shows the clear 
difference with the use of the concept in everyday parlance, namely that framing results in a 
wrong/distorted perception of reality. It must be noted, however, that, contrary to common 
belief, frames allow reality to take shape. Framing then should be regarded as the dynamic 
process through which the meanings of complex, social issues come about.  
 Radicalisation is a particularly relevant issue for applying a framing analysis. On the 
one hand, many frames are used, or even needed, in order to explain what radicalisation is, 
while, on the other hand, it is notoriously difficult to point out an empirical reality that 
corresponds to the notion of ―radicalisation.‖ Indeed, it is not even certain that such a thing 
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as ―radicalisation‖ even exists. The lack of consensus between academics, police, youth 
workers, etc. has resulted in ―radicalisation‖ being defined in a variety of ways. In other 
words, what some people regard as ―radicalisation‖ is refuted by others. A strong dedication 
to religion, for example, may be perceived as a sign of radicalisation, or simply as the 
attempt of an individual ―to find meaning in life.‖  As opposed to dementia or child poverty, 
for example, on which previous framing studies have been based, there might not be an 
objective reality in the case of ―radicalisation.‖ In the examples of dementia or child poverty, 
there is an obvious reality that is beyond discussion. Although it is possible to observe 
dementia and child poverty through a variety of frames, the issue itself undoubtedly exists. If 
an empirical reality is largely or entirely missing, it should be obvious that a concept such as 
―radicalisation‖ can be regarded as a social construct which takes shape by means of an 
interactive process of constructing a shared meaning. In this case, the framing of 
―radicalisation‖ will play an even bigger role. After all, if a different frame results in a different 
definition of the phenomenon, the causes, consequences, solutions and moral judgement 
may alter fundamentally (Entman 1993). Especially when there is an interest in formulating a 
solution for ―radicalisation,‖ it is important to disentangle the different ways in which the 
concept is framed.  
 Since framing is hard to avoid, and everyone (un)consciously speaks and acts 
according to their own frame, the CONRAD project also starts from a specific view on 
―radicalisation,‖ as is the case for BELSPO‘s project call through which this project took 
shape. The empirical reality on which this project is based are Molenbeek and Verviers, and 
more specifically the youngsters with a migration background who live there. The reasoning 
behind this choice is that ―radicalisation‖ presents a first stage of extremism and eventually 
terrorism. From this perspective, it is important to try and intervene in this process. 
Therefore, insights in the possible ―radicalisation‖ of youngsters in Molenbeek and Verviers 
might help to prevent extremism and possibly even terrorism.  
 In order to obtain a global image of the situation and an overview of the various 
frames at play, a framing analysis always needs to take a few steps back and let go of the 
limitation that follows the demarcation of the specific research topic. Therefore, the framing 
analysis in the CONRAD project looks beyond the situation in Molenbeek and Verviers, by 
taking into account the entire public discourse on ―radicalisation.‖  
 Framing works by means of association. The frame suggests the prism through 
which one can look at reality, thus guiding the individual‘s perception. The idea of guiding 
suggests that a frame does not impose itself. This can either be regarded as positive, since 
the audience is not forced to follow that steering. On the other hand, framing may occur 
unnoticed, in which case it can be interpreted as a form of propaganda. That is why frames 
are often connected to political positions and policy views, especially when it comes to 
radicalisation.  
 Furthermore, it is important to emphasise that framing results in a simplification of 
reality. Certain aspects of reality are accentuated (what Entman calls ―salience‖), while other 
aspects remain in the shadow. This is also a pitfall: the frame that simplifies the most, might 
get the most recognition, since it offers a somewhat black and white definition of reality. 
More complex frames are harder to get across. Two framing strategies can solve this issue: 
the combination of different frames and the use of counter-frames. Whereas a frame results 
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in a problematising description of a situation, the use of a counter-frame leads to a de-
problematising definition of a situation. In this study, both problematising frames and de-
problematising counter-frames will be mapped.  
 
3.1.1.2. Method 
The analysis material was mainly collected by using GoPress Academic, a news database. 
The material consisted, first, of news articles and reports published in popular and quality 
newspapers, news websites and magazines from January 2015 to the present date. To 
ensure enough diversity, the newspaper sample was supplemented by a convenience 
sample of TV-debates, radio-programmes and documentaries. Besides traditional media, the 
sample also included policy documents as well as social media and internet fora. The varied 
composition of the analysis material renders it possible to gain insight in the spectrum of 
opinions at play in the social debate. News articles, for example, reflect the issues at hand, 
as well as providing a forum for politicians, experts and other people involved.  
 Despite the diversity of the analysis material, it cannot be labelled as representative. 
After all, it is a convenience sample with the aim to ensure diversity rather than 
representativeness. For example, when the saturation point of data referring to a certain 
frame was reached, the focus was redirected to finding alternative perspectives.   
 In total, 267 texts were collected. The material was examined with an open mind 
during a thematic coding, through which every possible relevant text fragment and image 
was selected and added to a database. Every item received an in vivo code, i.e. a keyword 
that appears in the material itself. For example, a newspaper article by Struys (2017; our 
translation) talks about ―radical‖ detainees who can contaminate other prisoners. Some 
words suggest that it is dangerous to incarcerate a radical individual with other clean 
detainees since there is ―a real risk for contamination.‖ The same article argues that ―radical‖ 
individuals formed a real ―problem when returning to society‖ and hence might also affect the 
larger population. The solution to ―eliminating this danger of contamination as much as 
possible, is to erect isolated departments for radicalised people,‖ where they can be ―de-
radicalised‖ before safely returning to society. All these separate text fragments were 
selected and coded so that they could be clustered in a subsequent phase, known as axial 
coding.4  
 Out of the 267 articles, 2.721 excerpts were coded on account of their containing 
framing devices (words, images, metaphors or arguments) that directly or indirectly refer to 
radicalisation, including its causes, consequences, solutions and possibly moral judgments 
(reasoning devices). Following the thematic analysis, the citations were axially coded. Based 
on the assigned codes and a comparison between the different coded fragments, we then 
linked the logically connected framing devices and reasoning devices to form patterns, thus 
constructing a limited number of frame packages. The overall idea that allowed for a 
package to be treated as a coherent whole, was the actual frame we were looking for. 
Assigning the most appropriate name to a frame package was an important step in the 
process, considering it already involves a kind of framing in itself.    
                                                          
4
 For the rest of the chapter, excerpts from the data are presented in our own translations.   
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 The reconstructed frame packages were placed into a frame matrix. This frame 
matrix shows how the different frames are related to each other. In this way, we have, 
inductively and progressively, worked towards a limited number of frame packages. A main 
criterion in this case was that the whole of frames and counter-frames should be exhaustive, 
which means that, together, they need to cover every aspect of the issue. Another criterion 
was that the frames and counter-frames had to be mutually exclusive. When the frames 
were constructed and described in a matrix, an additional analysis cycle was used to sort all 
excerpts according to the frame typology. If an excerpt could not be placed within the 
typology, it was taken to point towards an unidentified frame or an article without a frame 
(Van Gorp 2010). In the end, the reconstructed frames were viewed as valid because all 
excerpts could be classified within the typology. This led to the identification of twelve 
(counter-)frames, discussed at length below.  
 During this process, seven interviews, aimed at validating the different frames and 
counter-frames, were conducted with various experts on ―radicalisation.‖ These experts 
included youth workers, academics, journalists and imams. Additionally, two workshops 
were organised with journalists, framing experts, youth workers and the spokesmen of a 
local mosque. During these workshops, there was debate about the credibility of the frames, 
including about the level to which they were thought to be recognisable and usable.  
 In the matrix, a distinction is made between frames and counter-frames. Frames offer 
a problematising description of the issue, and counter-frames de-problematise the topic. This 
might seem to present a static view, in which some perspectives on radicalisation are 
conceived of as negative while others are considered as positive. Yet, in the context of 
―radicalisation,‖ some of the counter-frames are seen as de-dramatizing rather than de-
problematising. These counter-frames do acknowledge a problem but want to refute the 
sense of urgency which is felt to be present in society. The complex relation between the 
frames and counter-frames is later discussed at length. Counter-frames are often more 
challenging to reveal and are partly supported by the creative thinking that took place during 
the interviews and workshops.  
 
3.1.2. Policy analysis 
What common sense discourse refers to as "jihadi radicalisation" is anything but a new 
phenomenon. Some experts speak of the 3rd or 4th generation of jihadi actors in Europe 
(Kepel 2015). Yet this is the first time that the public space has been saturated to this extent 
by the notion of ―radicalisation.‖ Since the beginning of the Syrian war, and especially since 
the Paris attacks of January 2015, the question of ―radicalisation” has been dominating the 
public debate. 
 We believe that there is an objective reason to analytically separate different 
dimensions of the phenomenon. On the one hand, there are the discourses on jihadi 
radicalisation, produced by both the bureaucratic sphere and civil society. On the other 
hand, there is the sociological phenomenon of radicalisation, which leads individuals to 
engage in a disruptive logic with society and possibly to use violent means against it. In sum, 
we should distinguish the discourses produced on radicalisation from discourses produced 
within the world of radicalised actors. 
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 The notion of public space has been the subject of many theoretical elaborations, 
particularly since the work of Jürgen Habermas. Some recent authors have attempted to 
modernize the analysis of Habermas‘s modern liberal public space by introducing the notion 
of oppositional public space (Negt and Kluge 2001). One of the reasons why the notion of 
public space is unsatisfactory to account for complex phenomena such as radicalisation is 
that phenomena such as these occur and develop in very closed spaces, inaccessible to the 
public eye. 
 As a phenomenon, violent radicalisation acts as a central issue for the society that 
seeks to protect itself from it, while also operating on the margins of that society, both in 
terms of the small number of violent ―radical‖ actors and in terms of their secret or discrete 
mode of operation. Few people are actually brought into contact with "radicalised" actors. 
But virtually everyone is led to develop an opinion on the issue. This contributes to the 
increase of socially constructed representations, speeches and framing discourses regarding 
the subject. In this sense, what society says when it speaks about violent radicalisation does 
not tell us anything about what the trajectories of radicalised actors reveal about our society.  
 To move to a more operational level in the field of political sociology, we need 
concepts that allow us to distance ourselves from a conception of public space steeped in 
political philosophy, in favour of a sociologically informed understanding of the kind of 
practices that occur in daily interactions. To achieve this, we use the following concepts 
provided by political sociology: 
 
 The public policy domain 
 The central public policy concept 
 Policy domain actors 
 Public policy networks and communities 
 The concept of infra-political margins 
 
The contemporary radicalisation debate mobilises a great deal of bureaucratic and 
institutional energy. Within the public space, we witnessed the emergence of reflections, 
analyses, institutional devices, funding schemes, etc., which eventually take the shape of a 
specific institutional arrangement dedicated to formulating public policy-responses. This field 
of actors and the web of interactions that connect them may consequently be called a policy 
domain (Laumann and Knokke 1987). 
 A policy domain is not a fixed field defined by static and hermetic boundaries. It is a 
dynamic and living space that evolves according to external and internal circumstances. On 
the external level, we can mention changes in the economic, social and cultural 
environment, etc. Internally, the number and nature of the actors participating in the policy 
domain may vary. Relationships between different public policy areas may also evolve as a 
result of these internal and external developments. 
 Housing, culture, social cohesion, and the integration of migrants constitute 
relatively old domains of public policy. They are structured around legislations, regulations 
and easily identifiable budget allocations. The prevention of radicalisation is a more recent 
addition in this respect. Nevertheless, it seems to us that we can now recognize the 
emergence of a new public policy domain related to radicalisation. The legislation passed by 
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the federal parliament, the report of the parliamentary commission of inquiry on the Brussels 
attacks of 22 March 2016, as well as the decrees and directives adopted by Belgium‘s 
regional governments all act as indications that a new domain of public policy has emerged. 
 This anti-radicalisation policy has been constructed with a specific dual structure. It 
has been developed due to concerns related both to the prevention of violent radicalisation 
among young people, and the elimination of terrorism. It thus constitutes a domain in which 
the classic distinctions have been blurred between actors in public policy areas who used to 
focus on prevention, and those who used to deal in repression.  
 Therefore, we could hypothesize that the prevention of radicalisation is a 
transformative policy concept. Its effect is to modify the logic of other policy domains such as 
immigrant integration, social cohesion in cities, youth, the penal system, etc. One could go a 
step further and consider that radicalisation is a policy concept geared towards a new 
security era. In line with Giorgio Agamben (2015), it could be argued that the logic of anti-
terrorism and anti-radicalisation herald the transition from the rule of law to the state of 
security.  
 Actors in the public policy domain are collective actors operating within a formal or 
informal organisation. They can be public (governments, parliaments, municipalities, street 
level bureaucrats, etc.) or private (voluntary private associations). These actors may wield a 
high level of power (ability to legislate, ability to finance, professionalization, etc.) or a low 
level of power. Actors in a public policy area develop strategies such as mobilisation, identity 
construction, speech production, etc. Public policy actors are linked to each other in different 
ways. They can be closely and durably involved in the implementation of a program, in which 
case we talk about networks of public policies. But the actors can also be connected in a 
loose and sporadic way, in which case we talk about public policy communities. 
 One of our guiding hypotheses is that the strategies of these actors influence each 
other within the same field. Therefore, we believe that the key element is to recognize that 
the strategies adopted by the actors of a public policy domain are mutually consequential, 
i.e. that they depend on the positions and the strategies of the other actors in the field. This 
is not to say that there is actual consensus within the field, although there is a minimal 
consensus concerning the field‘s operating rules. The disagreements do not concern the 
existence of the field or its foundations, but its particular modes of operation. 
 Policy domains are open to interactions from above and below. From the top, it is 
obvious that the whole environment of a policy domain can be modified or even suppressed 
by macro-political or macro-economic factors (military intervention, economic crisis, 
environmental change, etc.). This is what the CONRAD project has called macro-social 
transitions. From below, the public policy domain can be influenced by infra-political margins. 
 The notion of infra-political margins is borrowed from the work of anthropologist 
James Scott (1990). This idea allows us to take into consideration the fact that the degree of 
openness to the public eye of what we call the "public space" is not equal in all its 
dimensions. For various reasons, certain spaces are characterised by a lack of openness or 
even by a high degree of opacity. 
 As far as ―radicalisation” is concerned, the notion of infra-political margins makes it 
possible to understand how radical trajectories can take shape. One example taken from the 
experience of a mosque in Verviers illustrates the role of infra-political margins. After the 
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mosques‘ activities had been reorganised under the leadership of a ―civic imam,‖ one could 
observe that it resulted in certain segments of the young people to break with the group. 
Those who had indeed broken away ended up becoming an ominous radical cell that met 
regularly at a snack-bar.  
 
3.1.3. Digital storytelling 
Digital storytelling is a participative group process used in a variety of disciplines (oral 
history, educational sciences). Its aim is for each participant to tell a personal story and to 
capture it in a series of strong, evocative images that can be spread across the Internet. The 
process is semi-structured and outcome-driven, comprising six stages: 1) storytelling and 
writing, 2) making storyboards, 3) creating images (pictures, photos, collages), 4) recording 
the voice of the storyteller, 5) assembling voice and images by means of a digital application, 
6) collectively valorising the outcome by publicly showing digital stories.  
 Digital stories are distinct from documentaries, movies or video-testimonies. They 
have a very short narrative structure which is reduced to its essentials. It is told from an ―I‖ 
perspective, transforming the story into an authentic personal message, revealing a narrator 
exploring and expressing their emotions and vulnerabilities. Digital stories are crafted so as 
to create a space of deep connection between the narrator and the listener/spectator. 
 Given its open and flexible character, the underlying reasons and interests of digital 
storytelling vary from setting to setting, but the general idea is to empower people 
individually, as well as collectively. The research literature often articulates three types of 
empowering potential, although recent action research in Brussels (Claes 2015; 2016) also 
opens other perspectives, which could be particularly relevant for conducting difficult talks on 
―radicalisation.‖ We distinguish five potentials:  
 1) Educational potential. Many studies have emphasised the educational benefits of 
using Digital storytelling. DST is regarded as a deep learning tool that improves literary and 
writing skills (Robin 2006; Sylvester and Greenidge 2009). It also enhances academic 
achievement and critical thinking (Yang and Wu 2012) and helps to bridge the digital divide 
in schools (Gyabak and Godina 2011). 
 2) Instrument of participation, and co-creation. Digital storytelling also enables people 
to ―bond and bridge,‖ providing a strong instrument of participation, co-creation, and 
cooperative learning. This coincides with literature that shows how digital storytelling 
strengthens democracy (Hull and Katz 2006; Couldry 2008). Digital storytelling triggers 
dialogical processes that promote social change (Couldry 2008). According to Lambert 
(2013), digital storytelling gives a voice to people that normally do not have access to media 
channels and thereby opens new doors to civic participation. Digital storytelling also 
reconnects people through the power of personal, authentic stories. In this respect, digital 
storytelling promises to create a strong digital environment for conducting difficult talks on 
―radicalisation.‖ 
 3) Narrative instrument of self-expression. Digital storytelling is a powerful narrative 
instrument of self-exploration and self-expression. Hence it can help people to reintegrate 
traumas and difficult moments into their personal life trajectory. Making this integration 
visible in a combination of words and images can be part of a therapeutic healing process 
and help strengthen ownership and dignity.   
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 4) Instrument for embracing plurality in public space. Recent action research in 
Brussels (Anneessens neighbourhood, Molenbeek) also shows the potential of digital 
storytelling for transforming public spaces into spaces of plurality. Digital storytelling creates 
a digital environment through which a plurality of views can be made visible in public space. 
The stories, projected on walls or screens, can serve as an inspiring context in which group 
discussions in public spaces can be organised. Digital stories have the additional advantage 
of preserving privacy interests. Participation in digital storytelling is voluntary. Explicit 
consent for rendering digital stories public is asked by the facilitators and the methodology of 
digital storytelling allows for anonymising the narrator. Moreover, the narrators themselves 
act as the authors of their own appearance. Through the process they decide which parts of 
themselves will be revealed and which parts remain in the intimate sphere. 
 5) Potential for conflict-transformation. Action research in Brussel also evidenced 
processes of conflict transformation through digital storytelling. People learn to support 
divergent views on sensitive topics through the recognition and valorisation of authentic, 
personal stories, but also through the shared process of making stories. Recent action 
research in Brussels has also shown that dealing with sensitive topics (education, violence 
within families) in a process of digital storytelling, often requires facilitating techniques 
inspired by restorative programmes (talking piece, rephrasing messages).  
 
3.1.4. Restorative justice  
Restorative justice is not usually considered as a collection of concrete practices such as 
victim-offender mediation and family group conferences, but rather as a set of values and 
principles that re-define our understandings of crime and may re-orient the practice of all 
those working in a judicial context (Zehr 1990; Marshall 1996). Pali and Pelikan (2010) 
identify three elements that recur in the theory and practice of restorative justice: a life-world 
element, a participatory element and a restorative element. Restorative justice stresses the 
life-world element because it does not only regard crime and conflict as unlawful behaviour 
or a violation of legal rules, but also as concrete harm caused to human beings, as a 
disturbance of human interactions, and as a web of frictions and frustrations that needs to be 
expressed and recognised by the parties concerned. A respectful restorative response aims 
at constructing a safe space in which these personal stories can be told and listened to in a 
respectful manner. The underlying restorative intuition comes down to the idea that 
exchanging stories in a dialogical setting generates a context in which conflicting parties can 
be moved by each other's tale. Finding appropriate practices that embody this life-world 
element, is one of the key steps to conflict transformation. 
 Restorative justice stresses the participatory element, for the simple reason that 
restorative justice is shaped by democratic ideals of ownership, participation and 
deliberation. It starts from the strong belief that conflicting parties are affirmed and can grow 
in their dignity, self-respect and autonomy if they are given a stake in responding to crime or 
conflict. Restorative justice is about encountering ―the other‖ and coping with ―otherness‖ 
while re-positioning the image of the self, other parties and the world. At the practical level, 
participating towards finding solutions for conflicts or participating towards negotiating 
conflicting interests are seen as expressions of shared ownership. Conflicting parties thus 
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become the owners of their conflicts and thereby regain some control over their lives 
(Christie 1977). 
 Thirdly, restorative justice stresses the restorative element. It conceives its practices 
with the aim of restoring something. What this restorative element precisely contains, is not 
always clear and very much depends on how participants define their needs, experiences 
and expectations. But the common idea is that the response to crime is something 
constructive, in the sense that it can provide conflicting parties (victims, offenders) with a 
supportive tool to give meaning to what happened or is happening to them, to cope with their 
shattered assumptions and to open up new perspectives for the future. By doing so, 
restorative justice focuses on mobilising moral emotions such as empathy, repentance, 
forgiveness, and hope. These emotions risk being obscured in a punitive climate that is 
dominated by fear, resentment and retribution. In rediscovering these restorative emotions, 
the proponents of restorative justice hope to transform conflicts into new opportunities for 
human interactions in the future. Exchanging personal narratives (the life-world element) and 
actively participating in finding a response to conflicts are regarded as important vehicles for 
releasing and channelling these restorative emotions. 
 Restorative justice has many practical applications: from minor offences such as acts 
of vandalism or theft, to more serious crimes such as sexual violence, armed robbery and 
murder, or even gross human rights violations and the aftermath of terrorism (Staiger 2009). 
Moreover, during recent decades, the scope of restorative justice practices has been 
enlarged to include very different types of inflicted harm and injustices, as well as conflict 
situations in intercultural settings (Pali and Aertsen 2018; Vanfraechem and Aertsen 2018). 
Restorative justice practices are now also evolving towards the community level, in order to 
de-individualise conflicts and to capacitate and empower groups, agencies and public 
authorities.  
However, restorative justice can also be considered as a method for developing knowledge, 
expertise and theory in the fields of law, criminology and social sciences in general. It is 
precisely in dialogical processes that unilateral and stereotypical perceptions of phenomena 
and incidents can be shared thanks to the provision of a safe space in which one can listen 
to ―the other‖ without the need of self-defence or justification. Such an environment also 
creates the possibility to question and challenge predominant meanings and understandings 
of phenomena, and therefore valorises conflicting parties as generators of knowledge. In this 
regard, restorative justice connects to the aforementioned approaches and methodologies of 
discursive analysis (which allows for dialogical truth as well as narrative truth), framing 
analysis (in which counter-frames are constructed and explored by means of retrospective 
analysis, but also through the active participation of stake-holders and conflicting parties), 
and digital storytelling (which presents an instrument for sharing individual stories and 
listening to opposing ones, thus contributing to conflict-transformation). Topics such as 
crime, justice, extremism and ―radicalisation‖ tend to evoke ambivalent, contradictory and 
inconsistent attitudes among citizens, which are best understood and studied, however, as 
―meaningful symbolic behaviour,‖ through which events are interpreted, evaluated, 
categorised and structured (Verfaillie 2012). 
         Against this background, the CONRAD project decided to work with ―restorative 
circles‖ (or dialogue tables) in Molenbeek and Verviers. Restorative circles are frequently 
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applied at group level to discuss all kinds of issues, conflicts and disputes – or even just to 
create or support a climate of cooperation. They were inspired by the restorative justice 
model of ―peace-making circles‖ (Fellegi and Szego 2013). The use of restorative circles with 
young people, family members and friends, victimised or otherwise affected individuals or 
their representatives, fellow citizens in local communities, youth workers and representatives 
of public authorities would enable all those concerned to express their experiences and 
needs within the context of their complex life-worlds, to voice their opinion, to clarify their 
expectations, but also to listen to deviating or opposing ideas and opinions, and to finally 
express their common understanding of ―radicalisation‖ and – if necessary – to expand their 
common alternative understandings. 
 
3.1.5. Participatory action research 
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of youth researchers has opted for participatory 
action research (PAR). The reason is that research as a social practice is vulnerable to 
power dynamics, not only while committing the results to paper but also before conceiving of 
the research setup. Since power imbalances already have a major impact on the lives of 
young people, especially those from low-income families or stigmatised neighbourhoods, it is 
crucial to pay extra attention to power when conducting research with these participants.  
 Although it has gained momentum since the 1990s, participatory action research is 
still a rather marginal phenomenon (Vanfraechem and Aertsen 2018). It originated as a 
reaction to certain limitations and difficulties within qualitative research. According to Punch 
(2002: 326-7) the following traps may be avoided by using PAR:  
 The imposition of adult views: adults may have certain assumptions about 
young people, whereas young people may simply have a different way of 
viewing the world,  
 Young people‘s vulnerability to unequal power relationships in research: 
being used to having to try to please adults, young people may fear adult 
reactions,  
 Young people‘s limited vocabulary and different language use,  
 The imposition of adult interpretations: adults presume that young people 
prefer ‗appropriate‘ methods, are more competent at them, and that they have 
a shorter attention span.  
PAR introduces an alternative relationship between researcher and research subject. Rather 
than studying a subject or subjects, the participatory researcher studies with them. 
According to Pain and Francis (2003:46) ―[t]he defining characteristic of participatory 
research is not so much the methods and techniques employed, but the degree of 
engagement of participants within and beyond the research encounter.‖  
 As a type of action research, PAR includes participants as co-researchers: ―[t]hese 
participatory, action-oriented methods engag[e] the children as co-researchers, 
photographers and discussants to help describe the socio-spatial dynamics of each site form 
their own perspective‖ (Loukaitou-Sideris, 2003: 132). But PAR is not only a methodology. It 
is underpinned by a rather different set of philosophical assumptions about the nature and 
purpose of research, because its primary focus is often on social change and action rather 
than mere social analysis (Kindon 2005). That is why ―[p]articipatory ethics might be 
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understood as an ethical stance against [academic] neutrality‖ (Cahill et al. 2007:306). It is a 
choice against academic dispassion, or a choice in favour of an ethic of care. This 
(contested) academic and philosophical position resonates with the words of Desmond Tutu: 
―if you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.‖ As 
such, PAR establishes a link between academic work and activism: 
A participatory ethics builds upon long-standing traditions of grassroots social 
movements, activism, critical race and feminist theories and the work of social justice 
advocates who strive to address unequal relations of power, open up new spaces for 
decolonized knowledge production, and challenge the dominant hegemonic 
paradigm. (ibid.)  
More recently, PAR was also adopted as a form of protest against the marketisation of 
knowledge (Pain et al. 2011:183). Smith (2007:102) mentions in this respect that ―research 
in [...] a time of uncertainty, and in an era when knowledge as power is re-inscribed through 
its value as a commodity in the global market place, presents tricky ground for researchers.‖   
PAR has a few distinct characteristics, the first of which is the belief that ―they,‖ namely the 
people, know better: 
Participatory research starts with the understanding that people – especially those 
who have experienced historic oppression – hold deep knowledge about their lives 
and experiences, and should help shape the questions, and frame the interpretations 
of research. (Torren and Fine cited in Cahill et al. 2007:309).  
As such, PAR involves working with a group. Most PAR researchers put this into practice on 
all levels: research questions, the choice and design of methods, the analysis of data, the 
presentation of findings, and the pursuit of follow up action are all discussed collectively 
(Cahill et al. 2007). In line with the previous observation, Hopkins (2010:43) concludes the 
following about the nature of this type of research: 
The unique qualities of participatory approaches mean that they nearly always 
involve working collaboratively with a group, and sometimes a group of young people 
may decide to research a particular topic and then ask a university researcher to 
work with them in the process. On other occasions, the researcher may devise the 
focus of the research in discussion with a group of young people, or with an 
organisation or agency working with young people. 
These co-operations allow for a variety of perspectives to emerge naturally, with the 
potential of addressing issues that otherwise might go unaddressed.  
Another feature of PAR is that the researcher has less control over the process and its 
outcomes: ―with participatory research then, the researcher often has far less control over 
the focus of the research and how the research is conducted as this is likely to be shaped by 
the young people or other groups involved‖ (Hopkins 2010:43-4). The lack of control is 
welcomed as an advantage rather than a problem. Some authors call it ―emergence,‖ 
indicating that the unforeseen is allowed, desirable even: ―[o]ur full acceptance of 
emergence is partly about shaking off the role of expert knower altogether‖ (Pain and 
Francis 2003:50).  
 
3.2. Social ecology 
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The study of a social phenomenon as ―radicalisation‖ should not make abstraction of the 
particular contexts in which it occurs; after all, all ―radicalisation‖ is local (Coolsaet 2016). It 
should actively collect the practical wisdom in a given context so as to gain a better 
understanding and ultimately create better-suited policies. In order to do this, a social 
ecology of ―radicalisation‖ should involve the use of a ―thick description‖ (Geertz 1973) of 
young people and other key experts, the social context of the neighbourhood or city in 
question and the complexities involved in the examination of the lived experience of those 
directly affected. For an in-depth discussion of social ecology as a model and the social 
ecologies of Brussels and Verviers, see annexes I and II. 
 
Introduction 
Social ecology is the description of a given social phenomenon in the wider social and 
spatial context in which it takes place. It is based on the understanding that local contexts 
function as an ecosystem, in which everything is connected with everything else. In the 
following sections a non-exhaustive selection of uses and understandings of ―social ecology‖ 
in various disciplines is treated.  
 
Social ecology in urban sociology 
From the 1920s onwards the Chicago School (Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, Louis Wirth, 
Herbert Blumer, Erving Goffman, Anselm Strauss, etc.) engaged in what they called urban 
ecology. Particularly Park and Burgess contributed to a model of urban ecology consisting of 
principles derived from biology. In the city, competition and segregation lead to formation of 
natural areas, each with a separate and distinct moral order. These models show a central 
business district surrounded by a zone in transition, a zone of working men‘s homes, a more 
middle class residential zone, and a commuter zone. ―Urban ecology is the study of 
community structure and organization as manifest in cities and other relatively dense human 
settlements (Figure 4). Among its major topics, urban ecology is concerned with the patterns 
of urban community sorting and change by socioeconomic status, life cycle, and ethnicity, 
and with patterns of relations across systems of cities.‖5  
 
 
Figure 4: Urban Ecology (Source: Burgess, 1925) 
                                                          
5
 See http://sociology.iresearchnet.com/urban-sociology/urban-ecology/   
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Social ecology in criminology 
The Chicago School has inspired Shaw and McKay (1942) in the development of the Social 
Disorganisation Theory, which links deviance and crime with disorder in particular 
neighbourhoods. The model was also crucial for the development of the subcultures theory 
in the Birmingham School.  
In contemporary criminology social ecology has remained popular as a model, through 
Byrne & Sampson‘s (1986) book The social ecology of crime and the work of, among others, 
Raudenbush and Morenoff on the ‗neighbourhood effects‘ on the presence of crime. Here,  
social ecology refers to a contextualized orientation which views offender and victim 
as part of a network of social relations, as well as the physical environment, of 
neighborhoods (…). From this perspective, crime is not viewed as an act which can 
be understood as an isolated act with individual motivations but rather as a collective 
product of ecological systems. (Bazemore and Schiff 1996: 328) 
Interestingly, in many contemporary criminological papers utilising ‗social ecology‘ as a 
concept, model or analytical tool it is seldom defined or problematised (e.g. Anderson 1998; 
Lauritsen and Schaum 2004). 
 
Social ecology in psychology 
It is unclear whether Bronfenbrenner (1974) was inspired by the urban sociological work of 
the Chicago School when he wrote about social ecology in his own field: developmental 
psychology. Bronfenbrenner believes that in order to understand human development, the 
entire ecological system in which growth occurs needs to be taken into account (Figure 5).  
The central precepts of the ecology of human development are that human 
development takes place within a set of nested and changing environments and that 
complex relations within and between those nested environments shape behaviors. 
(Ennett et al. 2008: 1777-1778) 
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Figure 4: Social ecology in developmental psychology (Source: Bronfenbrenner, 1974) 
 
 
The ecology Bronfenbrenner describes localises the individual (and his or her psychological 
development in particular) in wider concentric circles of micro-, meso-, exo- and macro-
levels.  
The micro-system includes activities, roles and relations in a defined setting (family, peers, 
etc.). The meso-system refers to interconnections among several microsystems (e.g. 
between family members and teachers). The exo-system talks about more distant systems 
that influence the individual indirectly through their impact on lower levels. The macro-
system includes the norms and values of cultures and subcultures, belief systems, 
ideologies, social structure, gender role socialization, national and international resources, 
etc. We could call it a socio-ecological systems theory (cfr. Henderson and Baffour 2015) 
This is not necessarily a spatial model, but it echoes a similar logic of the wider scales 
encompassing a given individual or a given social phenomenon. Ungar et al. (2013), 
interestingly, use a social ecology model to study resilience among children and their 
development under adversity: ―[t]he study of resilience focuses on one particular subset of 
processes associated with human development: those that enhance the experience of well-
being among individuals who face significant adversity‖ (p. 348) 
Bronfenbrenner‘s social ecology also links implicitly with the environmental psychology of 
Roger Hart (1970), Harold Proshansky (1978), Kevin Lynch (1960) and Moore and Young 
(1978).  
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Figure 6: Realms of environmental experience (Source: Moore and Young, 1978) 
 
These authors emphasise that an ecology of social relations, such as that of 
Bronfenbrenner, should be supplemented by an interest in the interaction between person 
and place and in the spatial context in which social relations take place, in order to better 
grasp the conditions of an individual‘s wellbeing. Moore and Young (1978), for instance, 
distinguish inner space (psychological), physiographic space (the built environment and its 
history) and social space (human relations and cultural values) (Figure 6). They call it a 
behaviour-environment ecological framework. 
 
Social ecology in anthropology 
The early ecologists of the Chicago School viewed space as merely "physical" or 
"geometrical," i.e. as homogeneous and lacking any intrinsic social characteristics (Cohen 
1976: 50). These ecologists also viewed the use of space by man as an economic 
transaction, making use of the resources available in order to realise his/her aims. 
Cohen (1976) proposes a new social ecology that views the local environment through four 
lenses (Figure 7): 
1. The instrumental orientation relates to the environment merely as a means or 
medium for the achievement of individual or collective ends, and not as a value in 
itself. Space or the environment serves as a resource or as a locus of resources the 
exploitation of which is either technically feasible or economically profitable.  
2. The territorial orientation relates to the environment in terms of control over it, be it 
in the form of physical dominance or of political organization.  
3. The sentimental orientation relates to the environment in terms of the sense of 
attachment it conveys to an individual or a community; attachment may be the result 
of a sense of belonging to a place, or it may be derived from a place's prestige.  
4. The symbolic orientation relates to the environment in terms of the significance, 
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which a spatial feature harbours for an individual or a community, either in aesthetic, 
moral, or religious terms.  
 
 
Figure 7: Social ecological analysis in anthropology (Source: Cohen, 1976) 
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4.1.1. ―Radicalisation‖ is problematic as a concept and a scientific tool 
The study of the research literature and the field research in Brussels and Verviers lead us 
to conclude that there are a number of problems related to the term ―radicalisation‖ and the 
process it purports to describe6.  
 THE LINEARITY MYTH. After the first terrorist attacks on European soil in the post-
9/11 era, namely those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), governments were quick to 
endorse the assumption that extreme ideas constitute a logical first step towards terrorism 
and that individuals with grievances will first adopt extreme ideologies before committing 
acts of violence. Underlying this ―conveyor belt model‖ is the assumption that the main root 
cause for this terrorist violence lies buried within the ideology or the religion itself (Miller and 
Selig Chauhan 2017: 26), which are often conceived of as a sort of virus, infecting 
vulnerable urban youngsters and spread by recruiters, online brainwashing or ―radicalisation‖ 
in prison. This causal relation, however, is heavily criticised in recent research. Indeed, 
extremist behaviour is rejected by many ―radicals,‖ as well as by large majorities in Muslim 
countries or in Muslim communities across Europe (Groppi 2017; Reinares et al. 2008). 
Additionally, known terrorists mostly have a series of rather diversified reasons for 
committing violence and acts of terror, while research into the life-worlds of documented 
Islamic terrorists shows that many of them did not have a particularly religious past or had 
little knowledge of Islam (see state of the art). Nevertheless, this conveyor belt model and its 
assumption of a contagious ideology/religion, remains the dominant governmental approach, 
and is also supported by some of the dominant scientific models, such as McCauley and 
Moskalenko‘s (2008) staircase to terrorism. 
 THE FOCUS ON THE INDIVIDUAL. Most of the scientific literature limits its focus on 
―radicalisation‖ to an individual process and underplays the importance of collective 
processes (Gielen 2008). Although studies on ―de-radicalisation‖ practices may claim that 
―radicalisation‖ must be understood on a micro-, meso- and macro-scale (Feddes et al. 
2016), such practices tend to focus exclusively on the level of the individual (Hallich and 
Doosje 2017). As Schmid (2013) argues, focussing on the micro-level obscures the role of 
the environment in which ―radicalisation‖ may occur, while also downplaying the role and 
responsibility of society and the government. In his analysis, the meso-level refers to a 
―radicalising‖ or ―radical‖ environment that supports the individual or renders him complicit. It 
thus provides the missing link connecting the terrorist to a broader reference group that feels 
disgruntled and experiences injustice, with the potential of ―radicalising‖ certain youngsters, 
who might then go on to become part of a terrorist organisation (2013:4). In his analysis, 
Schmid also refers to the macro-level, for which he observes the role of the government and 
                                                          
6
 In fact, several of the problems related to the concept of “radicalisation” were signalled by youth workers at 
the onset of the project. 
Research question 1: What does the study of the existing literature 
teach us about ―radicalisation‖ as a concept?  
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society (at home and abroad), and specifically examines the ―radicalisation‖ of public opinion 
and party politics, the tense relationships between majority and minority groups, and the 
absence of socio-economic opportunities. The individual phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖ 
does not take place in a void but should rather be understood against the background of 
global transitions, of a heated and polarised public debate, of surging populism and far-right 
extremism in politics, and of a plethora of policies, programmes and projects tackling 
―radicalisation.‖ 
 STIGMA. Another central problem in the dominant discourse on ―radicalisation‖ is 
that, until quite recently, the term only referred to Muslim communities. ―Radicalisation‖ in the 
name of ―Islam‖ is perceived as an exceptional phenomenon that fundamentally differs from 
other forms of political violence, whether right-wing, left-wing or nationalist extremism (Van 
Bouchaute et al. 2018). However, the similarities and differences between militants operating 
in the name of a religious ideology, on the one hand, and those involved in other forms of 
violent extremism, on the other, are rarely investigated (Rabasa et al. 2010). In all 
probability, RAND Europe (2011) constitutes the only large-scale study comparing various 
forms of violent extremism. This false exceptionalism in the public and political debates on 
―radicalisation‖ is experienced by the Muslim community as stigmatising. ―Radicalisation‖ is 
an ambiguous concept, because it has come to associate both ―radical ideas‖ and Islam with 
violence and terror.  
 CONTROL. The refusal to distinguish radical ideas from extremist violence results in 
a situation in which entire populations can be and are controlled, thus bordering on an 
unconstitutional policy and security practice. Furthermore, the assumption that 
―radicalisation‖ is the result of failed integration (an assumption often formulated in the early 
days of ―radicalisation‖ policy in Europe) has partly contributed to the current mix of 
counterterrorism and social cohesion policy. The UK PREVENT programme, for instance, 
―has confusingly oscillated between tackling violent extremism in particular and promoting 
community cohesion and ‗shared values‘ more broadly‖ (Richards 2011: 143). Colaerts 
(2017) refers to some countries adopting practices involving the distribution of ―checklists‖ 
which not only mentioned changes in behaviour, but also included extreme political opinions 
and certain types of Islamic garments as indicators of ―radicalisation.‖ Schmid points to the 
role of state actors: ―[t]he use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent 
years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international 
human rights standards‖ (2013:iv). These practices, he continues, are indicative of the fact 
that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can 
―radicalise.‖ 
 RADICALISM AS LEGITIMATE POLITICAL THOUGHT. From a historical 
perspective, the term ―radicalisation‖ is problematic in its relationship to ―radicalism‖ as an 
expression of legitimate political thought. Over the last few decades, ―radicals‖ and 
―radicalism‖ have been understood as opposing traditionalism and the status quo, and thus 
including left-wing, right-wing and even centrist and liberal incarnations. As Colaerts (2017) 
indicates, political ―radicalism‖ is not new, nor is it necessarily suspect. At the same time, 
many historical examples of radicalism were characterised by violent episodes: the 1890s 
workers and anarchist movement, the early fascist groups in Italy and Germany during the 
1930s, the 1960s revolutionary groups such as the Afro-American Black Panther Movement, 
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May ‘68 in France, separatist nationalist groups such as ETA and IRA, etc. In this respect, 
Neumann (2008:3) points out that ―as late as the early 2000s, hardly any reference to 
radicalisation could be found in the academic literature on terrorism and political violence.‖ In 
the political discourse of the last decades certain examples of ―radicalism,‖ such as ―radical‘ 
ideas‖ or ―radical‖ manifestos were generally considered favourably. After the 9/11 attacks 
the term ―radicalisation‖ was adopted as a less value-laden term to engage in analysis of 
terrorism. As an ideology, radicalism challenges the legitimacy of established norms and 
policies, but it does not, in itself, lead to violence. In other words, radicalism can exist without 
the advocacy of violence in its striving for social or political change.  ―Radicalism‖ can be an 
innovative social force, a ―political action‖ shaped by a certain context (Colaerts 2017; Della 
Porta and LaFree 2012; Reinares et al. 2008:5). From this perspective, grievances as a 
result of ―widespread feelings of inequity and injustice, a very acute sense of marginalisation 
and humiliation‖ (Reinares et al. 2008:9) can be translated into outrage and a radical political 
stance. 
TOO NARROW AND TOO WIDE. We believe strongly that the term ―radicalisation‖—
it was first coined in policy documents—is also unfit for scientific purposes. It refers to a 
phenomenon we are not sure actually exists. Of course, we can conceive of a process in an 
individual that precedes his or her willingness to commit terrorist violence. Yet, the study of 
root causes in the process of ―radicalisation‖ in the last 10 to 15 years has mainly yielded 
dissensus—what we know for certain is that we know very little. We argue that this is 
probably because the term ―radicalisation‖ throws too many (and sometimes unrelated) 
phenomena in one basket. It is too vague and does not correspond to a homogeneous 
empirical phenomenon. At the same time, very little research has been undertaken to 
compare religious ―radicalisation‖ with phenomena which might be similar, like extreme-left 
or -right political violence or sectarianism. The gaze of the ―radicalisation‖ concept is, in 






4.1.2 (European) ―radicalisation‖ policy is characterised by definitional vagueness and a 
bazooka-type multi-agency approach 
Based on the analysis of European policies related to ―radicalisation‖ (see annex III) we can 
conclude that EU policies display a wide variation in terms of objectives, underlying 
philosophies and domains of action. 7 To illustrate this point, we present four examples:  
 the 2005 resolution of the EU Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, which 
includes a list of the following recommendations: (1) to develop intersectional 
strategies which allow the different levels of power to collaborate; (2) to promote an 
inclusive discourse without stigmatisation while maintaining respect of human rights; 
                                                          
7
 In consultation with two other Belspo-funded research projects on ―radicalisation‖ (FAR and AFFECT) we 
agreed to divide the tasks regarding policy analysis. As a result, this report only presents an analysis of the 
European policy. However, in broad terms the same conclusions apply to Belgian federal and regional policies on 
―radicalisation.‖  
Research question 2: How is ―radicalisation‖ framed in the public 
debate and approached in (European) policy? 
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(3)  to organise education for professionals who are affected by this issue; (4) to 
support cities by organising exchanges and reunions; (5) to reinforce youth education 
within families as well as schools; (6) to promote partnerships with civil society; (7) to 
promote and support programmes of disengagement; (7) to financially support 
professionals dealing with ―radicalisation;‖ (8) to provide financial support to 
organisations; (9) to promote collaboration between  international organisations; (10) 
to regularly evaluate the member state actions in this field.  
 the Radicalisation Awareness Network, the main vehicle of the EU in this field, which 
advocates on: (1) the development of counter-narratives; (2) the support of teachers; 
(3) exit-work and ―de-radicalisation;‖ (4) work with young people, families and local 
communities; (5) support of local authorities; (6) anti- and ‖de-radicalisation‖ work in 
prisons (7) support of police and law enforcement; (8) the remembrance of victims of 
terrorism; (9) health and social care.  
 the 2014 EU strategy, which focuses on (1) inequalities and discrimination, 
intercultural dialogue and education; (2) moderate discourses and dialogues in the 
media; (3) governmental communication; (4) the development of dissuasive 
discourses; (5) online ―radicalisation;‖ (6) training of first-line practitioners; (7) actively 
involving civil society and the private sector; (8) implementing strategies of 
disengagement adapted to the context; and (9) research on the subject. 
 the 2016 communication of the European Commission, which proposes 7 fields 
within ―prevention work‖: (1) supporting research; (2) the fight against online 
propaganda; (3) combating ―radicalisation‖ in prisons; (4) accessible education; (5) 
an inclusive society; (6) the further development of security mechanisms, policies and 
technologies; and (7) helping out third countries in fighting ―radicalisation.‖ 
Remarkably, this 2016 communication mentions 7 fields in the prevention of 
―radicalisation‖, whereas only two of these can actually be labelled as ―prevention.‖ 
The overview presented above shows that ―radicalisation‖-related policy at EU level is highly 
varied, involving a wide array of networks, organisations, programmes, policies and projects, 
each with diverging objectives and emphases: ―European counter-radicalisation programs 
differ greatly from one another in terms of aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy 
and each experience is deeply shaped by political, cultural, and legal elements unique to 
that country‖ (Vidino and Brandon 2012:164).  
 We refer to this multitude of objectives and actions as the ―bazooka,‖ echoing 
European Central Bank director Mario Draghi‘s policy in the years of the financial and 
monetary crisis of 2014 and after. Considering this ―bazooka‖ approach we could conclude 
that the main European actors are unsure about which actions to prioritise, probably due to a 
lack of scientific consensus regarding the root causes of ―radicalisation.‖ As a result, the EU 
tackles the problems of ―radicalisation‖ and the danger of (home-grown) terrorism by 
―shooting at everything that moves,‖ i.e. by deploying a wide variety of tactics and actions.  
 How have we arrived at this bazooka-type of ―radicalisation‖ policy? As stated above, 
the word ―radicalisation‖ has only recently become a part of policy debates, namely in the 
years after the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. In the early years of terrorism and 
―radicalisation‖-related policy at EU level, the fight against terrorism took priority over the 
fight against ―radicalisation.‖ As a result, the ―prevention‖ section in those early years only 
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represented a small proportion of the policy developed, which was mainly geared towards 
security and protection. Only after the attacks in Madrid and London did it gradually become 
clear that terrorists are often home-grown rather than foreign, leading to the realisation that 
the EU should focus more on the process of ―radicalisation.‖ This probably also explains why 
some documents, especially early policy documents, do not make the effort of defining 
―radicalisation.‖ This can also be seen, regrettably, in more recent documents.  
 To show the process involved in the EU ―radicalisation‖ policy over the last 15 years, 
we present a (non-exhaustive) timeline of EU policy initiatives, starting in 2004 with the 
appointment of a European Union Terrorism Coordinator. A year later, in 2005, the first 
policy framework was presented with the influential EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. This 
framework consists of four pillars: prevention, protection, prosecution and reaction. The term 
―radicalisation‖ is only mentioned in the first pillar, where it is defined as ―the phenomenon of 
people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism‖ (COM, 
2005). The hypothetical clause ―could lead to‖ reveals a weakness of definition comparable 
to  the formulations in the AIVD (2004) anti-terrorism statement which states that the 
prerogative of the Dutch intelligence services is to intervene in cases of real terrorist threat, 
as well as in cases of extreme beliefs ―which could severely disrupt society.‖ The problem 
with this hazy definition and the policy that relies on it, lies in the fact that it not only targets 
(imminent) violent behaviour but also extreme or orthodox beliefs, whereas liberal 
democracies and their constitutions, in principle, offer citizens the freedom to hold whatever 
beliefs they want. This definition also remains problematic because the current state of the 
art gives no scientific evidence, neither for the assumption that extreme or orthodox beliefs 
lead to violence, nor for the conditions under which this is supposed to occur. Therefore, to 
target people holding extreme beliefs within a framework of anti-terrorism (or indeed a 
criminal law) cannot properly be justified. 
 A 2008 brief by the European Economic and Social Committee does, however, refer 
to the “definitional challenge‖ of violent ―radicalisation‖ and its prevention. Interestingly, the 
document focuses mainly on ―terrorism‖ and links violent ―radicalisation‖ to failed integration 
and exclusion, which certainly did not have any scientific base at the time, and which 
remains contested as a root cause today. This text symbolises the EU ―radicalisation‖ policy 
in the second half of the 2000s: well-intentioned but also mostly steered by political gut-
feeling and a lack of scientific basis. 
 After 2010, a myriad of new policy initiatives was developed with an increasing focus 
on ―radicalisation‖ outside the classic anti-terrorism policy (but still based on the 
controversial insight that radical ideas lead to violence). In 2011 the Radicalisation 
Awareness Network was founded, which currently includes more than 3000 frontline 
practitioners, and which is organised in nine working groups (narratives, education, EXIT, 
youth, local authorities, prison, police, remembrance of terrorism victims and health and 
social care). In 2012 the European Network of De-Radicalisation was founded. The 2014 
revision of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy is another great example of the bazooka 
strategy, focusing on ten priorities which include research, prevention, policing, fighting 
online ―radicalisation,‖ disengagement, tackling inequality and discrimination, etc.  
 While the European Commission has been the most active and powerful European 
actor in ―radicalisation‖-related policy, the European Parliament has only been involved in 
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one legislative action on ―radicalisation,‖ namely the (non-binding) resolution of 2015. 
Kundnani and Hayes (2018) suspect that government leaders and the Commission have 
played an active role in restraining the Parliament‘s willingness to take further legislative 
action. The 2015 resolution refers to ―radicalisation‖ in a rather curious statement, which 
claims that ―[it] has become a term used to describe the phenomenon of people embracing 
intolerant opinions, views and ideas which could lead to violent extremism‖ 
(P8_TA(2015)0410:3).  This quote contains a number of interesting elements. Firstly, it 
is not a definition but rather seems to refer to other people‘s definitions, while also containing 
some doubt as to the Parliament‘s authority to say anything conclusive on the matter. In this 
regard, the formulation in itself also brackets (the lack of) scientific evidence concerning the 
phenomenon, since it only refers to the discursive reality in which certain people use certain 
definitions to talk about a given phenomenon. Secondly, a remarkable shift has taken place 
since, in this document, the word ―extremist‖ has been replaced by ―intolerant.‖ This is 
relevant from a socio-legal perspective, because we can intuit that many extreme beliefs are 
totally harmless and do not constitute a risk for society, whereas intolerant beliefs are, to say 
the least, akin to intolerant behaviour and hate-related violence. Furthermore, 2015 was the 
year in which, on the European level, ―extremism‖ and ―radicalisation‖ were no longer 
understood as an exclusively religious, Muslim affair, with other ―extremisms‖ being named 
more consistently.  
 The 2017 brief of the European Economic and Social Committee contains a definition 
which focuses specifically on radical violence. It foregrounds an approach which, in line with 
the model of Vidino and Brandon (2012), identifies three levels of prevention work. 2017 was 
also the year in which the High-Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation was founded.  
This group brings together the most important actors at the European level: representatives 
of the Member States, the Commission, representatives of the RAN, FRA, Europol, Eurojust, 
etc. Moreover, the Committee of the Region brief was published in that same year, 
introducing the following definition: ―in the absence of a commonly accepted definition of 
‗violent radicalisation,‘ [we define]  ‗radicalisation‘ as a phenomenon of people who regard 
the use of violence as legitimate and/or use violence themselves in order to achieve their 
political objectives which undermine the democratic legal order and the fundamental rights 
on which it is based‖ (p.17). This definition resonates with Hannah Arendt‘s (1969) 
reflections on violence and, more recently, with the Flemish study of anti-radicalisation 
policies in prevention work, undertaken by Van Bouchaute et al. (2018). Following this 
scholarly tradition, the problematic term ―radicalisation‖ ought to be replaced by ―political 
violence,‖ a term with two advantages: it refers directly to violence rather than extreme or 
radical ideas, and it moves away from the false exceptionalism of Muslim ―radicalisation.‖  
 From the above presentation and discussion, we can draw seven conclusions 
regarding EU policies related to ―radicalisation.‖ Firstly, we can argue that there has been 
little to no progress in defining the social phenomenon of ―radicalisation.‖ If insight into the 
social phenomenon is limited, it will hinder effective policy-making. Indeed, a hazy definition 
probably leads to bazooka-like policies almost automatically. For instance, the weight of the 
literature is focused upon terrorism rather than ―radicalisation.‖ Christmann (2012:1) claims 
the following in this respect:  
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[T]he evidence is concerned with that smaller cohort of individuals who, once 
radicalised, go on to commit acts of violence in the pursuit of political or religious 
aims and objectives. This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the 
radicalisation process that precedes terrorism, including radicalisation that does not 
lead to violence. 
Of course, inherently linking ―radicalisation‖ to terrorism has an impact on the kind of actions 
that are taken. In this regard, Heath-Kelly (2012) refers to the invention of ―radicalisation,‖ 
which allows governments to deploy anti-terrorism measures pre-emptively. 
 Secondly, the confusion of projects, policies, programmes and actors tackling 
―radicalisation‖ is closely linked to the wide variety of definitions used by different European 
actors. Indeed, the variety of definitions also shows that the institutions involved each act 
according to their own assumptions and underlying philosophies. The variation (and the 
chaos) only increases, of course, since the legislative action regarding ―radicalisation‖ 
remains the prerogative of the Member States: ―European counter-radicalisation programs 
differ greatly from one another in terms of aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy 
and each experience is deeply shaped by political, cultural, and legal elements unique to 
that country‖ (Vidino and Brandon 2012:164).  
 Thirdly, most ―preventive‖ actions are not related to prevention in the usual sense. 
They include actions like the screening of online propaganda and recruiters by national 
intelligence services, as well as supporting research or collaboration with non-EU states. 
Also, actions focusing on classic prevention work tend to ignore the potential fall-out for 
frontline practitioners, who are instrumentalised within a framework that mostly remains 
repressive and is linked to criminal law approaches. Using local practitioners with solid ties in 
local communities and established relationships of trust as government antennas may cause 
disturbing side-effects for these first-line practitioners, who are never identified or critically 
discussed in EU policy texts. 
 Fourthly, the EU policy on ―radicalisation‖ can generally be characterized as a 
―bazooka‖ approach. This entails a plea for collaboration with various actors in civil society, 
often by mixing ―radicalisation‖ and social cohesion initiatives (the so-called multi-agency 
approach). The UK-based think tank Demos argues that governments have a legitimate 
claim to counter certain ideologies which undermine social cohesion by fostering integration 
and empowering disenfranchised communities. However, these efforts should be pursued 
separately from counterterrorism efforts (Briggs et al. 2006). Vidino states in this respect that 
―[a] ‗counter-radicalisation‘ strategy that blurs the line between supporting social cohesion 
and countering terrorism is likely to achieve neither‖ (2010). Indeed, such a dynamic has 
several negative consequences in the sense that projects for social cohesion and the people 
within individual organisations are increasingly regarded by intelligence services as detection 
mechanisms rather than as initiatives aimed at bringing people together. This evolution also 
damages the credibility of frontline workers. It has been documented, for instance, that 
programmes such as the UK PREVENT programme have led to well-intentioned individuals 
being ostracised from their own ethnic or religious groups because of their activities in 
―radicalisation‖ projects under the PREVENT umbrella (Richards 2011). 
 Fifthly, most of the statements issuing from European actors formulate a rather 
inclusive discourse. For instance, the first three priorities of the 2014 Counter-Terrorism 
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Strategy focus on (1) fighting inequalities and discrimination, promoting intercultural dialogue 
and strengthening education, (2) promoting moderate discourses and dialogues in the media 
and on social networks, (3) improving governmental communication explaining policy 
decisions in order to avoid extremist responses. It is remarkable to see that this type of 
moderate and inclusive discourse has gained the upper hand at EU level, whereas in many 
Member States the dominant tone is that of populist and right-wing discourses on 
―radicalisation,‖ migration and the refugee crisis. Here the EU wishes to promote a sober and 
positive discourse, promoting human rights, education, socio-economic prosperity and 
intercultural dialogue. However, as Kundnani and Hayes (2018) argue, most of the actions 
as formulated in the Action Plans of the European Council of governmental leaders are 
repressive in nature and parliamentary oversight is nearly inexistent. The authors also claim 
that most of the content of these Action Plans is not shared by the general public: ―[t]he 
Swedish Presidency, which oversaw updates to the Action Plan in 2009, was ‗of the firm 
opinion that the revised version... should be a public document,‘ but was overruled by the 
other members of the EU Council‖ (Kundnani and Hayes 2018: 18). 
Sixthly, the dominant view on ―radicalisation‖ remains mechanical, based on the linear 
conveyor belt model:  
Radicalisation was essentially seen as a conveyor belt process in which ―vulnerable‖ 
Muslims were susceptible to external influencers – first Al-Qaeda then, from 2008, a 
broader church of ―radical Islamists‖ – said to espouse an ―extremist worldview‖ that 
―distorted the reality of Western policies and conflicts around the world in order to 
justify violence‖ (Kundnani and Hayes 2018:18-9). 
This can be seen in the underlying assumptions related to a variety of detection schemes 
(e.g. detection checklists, Colaert (2017)) or the use of counter-narratives. Concerning the 
latter, the RAN states that ―[d]eveloping counter-narratives on the basis of such limited and 
general knowledge has of course little chance of success‖ (2016:2). Another example of this 
mechanistic approach can be seen in the development of de-radicalisation programmes, 
which are seldom evaluated on their effectiveness. Also, the use of data mining and 
detection technologies to screen the Internet as well as initiatives to hold Internet companies 
responsible for ―radicalisation‖ (while there is no scientific consensus about the role of the 
Internet as a root cause) shows how the European actors continue to reduce this complex 
social phenomenon to a rather simple and linear, individual and psychological process: 
Most governments have focused on technical solutions, believing that removing or 
blocking radicalising material on the Internet will solve the problem. Yet this report 
shows that any strategy that relies on reducing the availability of content alone is 
bound to be crude, expensive and counterproductive. Radicalisation is largely a real-
world phenomenon that cannot be dealt with simply by ―pulling the plug.‖ (ICSR 
2009:1) 
Seventhly, policy documents seldom contain a critical discussion of the breeding ground for 
the development of extreme opinions and behaviour. What does it mean to be vulnerable? 
What does it mean to be at risk of ―radicalisation‖? And who are the people at risk? It can be 
argued that this breeding ground for ―radicalisation‖ is created by a multitude of factors, 
which bring about feelings of disengagement with society, as well as discontent or anger 
among certain (young) people, thus making it easier for them to be influenced negatively. If 
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the above questions are left unanswered and left to the discretion of local law enforcement, 
cases of wrongful suspicion are to be expected. This dominant focus on the individual, 
psychological process of ―radicalisation‖ also obscures the collective responsibilities of other 
institutions (judiciary, law enforcement, policy, media) and the role of collective 
―radicalisations‖ that are taking place in this context, namely the increase of hate speech, 
populist discourse and polarised political debate. 
 Considering the fact that the attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) happened 
more than 10 years ago we should be critical as to the lack of understanding about the topic 
of ―radicalisation‖ and the lack of terminological clarity in policy documents. Since the first 
mention of ―radicalisation‖ in 2004-2005, communications and recommendations have 
evolved but the main objective remains the fight against terrorism. The focus on 
―radicalisation‖ and its prevention remains secondary. Indeed, the different definitions of the 
term remain essentially linked to violent action.  
 
4.1.3. Twelve frames are used in the public debate on ―radicalisation,‖ only half of which are 
used in scientific literature 
We performed a study on the framing of ―radicalisation‖ (see Annex IV and Figoureux and 
Van Gorp, forthcoming). More specifically, the study aimed at identifying helpful 
opportunities with regard to broadening the communication about this term. ―Radicalisation‖ 
has been part of a lively debate in Belgium ever since the terrorist attacks of November 13, 
2015 in Paris and those of March 22, 2016 in Brussels, as well as the rising issue of 
departing Syria fighters. The debate on ―radicalisation‖ is part of a broader polarizing climate 
that influences the stability in Belgian society by way of framing.  
These frames present a certain prism or perspective that organises one‘s perception of 
―radicalisation.‖ Depending on the perspective that is used, the issue may be regarded in a 
different way: as a spreading illness, or as an empowering force, for example. This study 
wants to gain insight into the meaning of ―radicalisation‖, by mapping all the frames that are 
prevalent in Belgium. To broaden the view on the issue, the study also develops a number of 
counter-frames, which present a non-problematising perspective on ―radicalisation‖ in 
Belgium.  
―Radicalisation‖ is a special topic on which to perform a framing analysis, since there is no 
consensus on whether the phenomenon even exists. Some also consider the term ―useless,‖ 
and claim that it describes normal events, while others believe it to be stigmatizing and 
counterproductive. In other words, this ambiguity makes ―radicalisation‖ a more confusing 
than clarifying term.  
 The term ―radicalisation‖ was originally used within European police and intelligence 
circles shortly after the 9/11 attacks, at which point it simply meant ―anger‖ (Coolsaet 
2016:3). Following the attacks in Madrid and London by homegrown terrorists in 2004-2005, 
the term was suddenly widely used both in policy documents (Kundnani 2012) and in the 
media (Hörnqvist and Flyghad 2012). Radicalisation soon became a ―container concept,‖ to 
refer to ―everything that happens before the bomb goes off‖ (Neumann 2008:4).  
 Today, the term ―radicalisation‖ has a negative connotation, whereas the term used 
to be more neutral and therefore less emotionally charged. In its unbiased sense, to be 
radical means ―to be extreme relative to something that is defined or accepted as normative, 
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traditional, or valued as the status quo‖ (Mandel 2009:105). In general, ―radicalisation‖ is 
understood as a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly more 
extreme political, social or religious ideals and nurture aspirations that reject or undermine 
the status quo (Wilner and Dubouloz 2009).  
 Over the years, however, the meaning of the term has been shaped into ―a new lens 
through which to view Muslim minorities‖ (Kundnani 2012:3), and has even been equated 
with ―Muslim-danger‖ (Fadil 2017:9). Since there is no consensus about the definition of 
―radicalisation‖, the meaning of the term varies according to the speaker using it.  
 According to our inductive framing analysis, there are 12 frames and counter-frames 
which structure the public debate on ―radicalisation‖ in Belgium. We have labelled them as 
follows: A criminal career, Virus, Mutiny, Two roosters in one cage, Puberty, 
Meaningfulness, Penance, The Freedom Fighter, Resilience, Embrace the threat, The 
continuum and A catalyst.  
 The first four frames consider ―radicalisation‖ a social problem. In these frames 
―radicalisation‖ is identified as (Figure 8): 
1. inherently linked to criminality 
2. an evil ideology that spreads like a virus 
3. the revolt of certain groups against society 
4. an effect of the clash between two (incompatible) cultures 
 
 
Figure 8: 4 frames used in the ―radicalisation‖ debate 
 
In the eight counter-frames, which de-problematise the phenomenon, ―radicalisation‖ is 
identified as (Figure 9): 
1. part of the process of growing up 
2. an intense, positive engagement with religion/ideology giving purpose to life 
3. an individual‘s way to find forgiveness 
4. someone standing up to defend the weak 
Project BR/165/A4/CONRAD: Constructive analysis on the attitudes, policies and programmes that relate to radicalisation 
BRAIN-be (Belgian Research Action through Interdisciplinary Networks) 60 
5. an effect of the changing pressures in society 
6. something which is experienced as threatening as a result of ignorance  
7. a marginal phenomenon in a much larger social group 
8. an intrinsic element in a healthy public debate 
 
The framing analysis contributes to the question of alternative discourses by revealing the 
existence of a wide variety of non-problematising discourses in contemporary debates. It 
also shows that many of these interpretations stress the non-violent aspects of the 
phenomenon or imply that ―radicalisation‖ does not necessarily involve a security risk. 
 The main governmental approaches, however, echo only two of the twelve frames 
listed above, namely the Virus frame, which presents ―radicalisation‖ as a contagious 
disease, and the Resilience frame, which stresses the individual‘s capacity to overcome the 
pressures in society. Both these frames are adopted in many governmental responses to 
countering violent extremism (CVE), policies (checklists, PREVENT, deradex) and de-
radicalisation projects (Bounce, Diamant +). Underlying both these frames and approaches 
is a mechanical and teleological conception of ―radicalisation,‖ an approach that is highly 
popular among governmental responses because it simplifies the complex interplay of 
processes which we 
 
 
Project BR/165/A4/CONRAD: Constructive analysis on the attitudes, policies and programmes that relate to radicalisation 
BRAIN-be (Belgian Research Action through Interdisciplinary Networks) 61 
 
Figure 9: 8 counterframes used in the ―radicalisation debate 
 
call ―radicalisation‖ into a one-dimensional, linear phenomenon that can be detected, 
prevented and reversed. 
 Researchers such as Groppi (2017), who view religion as the main root cause for 
―radicalisation,‖ can be said to provide evidence for the Virus frame. These authors believe 
that reasons for violent extremism should be found in the religion itself and that religious 
orthodoxy is a precursor for terrorist violence. However, the evidence presented by these 
authors is only valid on the condition that this conveyor belt model of ―radicalisation‖ is 
indeed true (Vidino and Brandon 2012). However, there seems to be a growing consensus 
among scholars that this linear process connecting orthodoxy to violent extremism does not 
exist (Kundnani 2012). Of course, this is a frame that is used widely in the public debate 
because of its simplicity, both by politicians and by tv-studio experts. 
 Other dominant frames are those that stress the role of criminality (A criminal career), 
perceptions of injustice and relative deprivation (Mutiny), geopolitical factors (The Freedom 
fighter), group dynamics (Two roosters in one cage), experimenting and identity crisis during 
adolescence (Puberty), the importance of distinguishing radical ideas and the willingness to 
engage in violence (The continuum). 
 The counter-frame of Meaningfulness is almost entirely absent in the literature on 
―radicalisation.‖ Indeed, Feddes et al. (2016) are the only ones to echo this counter-frame in 
their reference to sense-seekers.  However, the Meaningfulness frame is particularly present 
in witness reports of foreign terrorist fighters or former ―radicalised‖ people such as AId‘emeh 
(2015). Yet for reasons that are unclear to us, this has not been picked up by researchers. 
The same applies to the Penance counter-frame, which refers to an individual‘s feelings of 
guilt and the urge to right the wrongs of the past by engaging in orthodox interpretations of 
Islam. This counter-frame surfaces quite strongly in witness reports of (former) ―radicalised‖ 
people but is again not picked up by researchers.  
 Researchers such as Ponsaers et al. (2010) would probably call this type of 
emotional-personal explanation a justification a posteriori since, rather than explaining the 
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actual behaviour, it provides a rationalisation after the facts. However, this can be said about 
more than one counter-frame. How should we understand the absence of this frame in the 
scientific literature? Is this absence completely corroborated by evidence or could it unveil 
the bias away from emotional, non-rational or even non-cognitive triggers and causal factors 





4.1.4. Young people from Brussels identify six layers of meaning in the term ―radicalisation.‖ 
Who is ―radical‖8? The term ―radicalisation‖ is multi-layered and, according to young people 
from Brussels, refers to:  
1. a positive conviction 
2. the willingness to engage in violence 
3. a stigmatising label 
4. a traumatic experience generated by the political and media attention after 
the attacks in Paris and Brussels 
5. a ―perfect storm‖ flooding over youth and youth work 
6. a mirror showing societal conditions 
The first layer of meaning refers to the conscious choice, a positive conviction, to a person 
who‘s loyal to his/her own principles and acts upon those principles. This layer of meaning 
predates the phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖. In this sense, ―radicalism‖ is a sign of courage 
and integrity often attributed to charismatic heroes such as Nelson Mandela and Ghandi.  
The second layer of meaning refers to the willingness to commit terrorist violence. This 
second layer, like the first one, refers to an explicit loyalty towards a set of values and 
convictions and a willingness to act according to those values, even if this will demand 
sacrifice. Yet, there are also differences. What distinguishes negative and positive 
―radicalism‖ is the content of the conviction; the former is characterised by disbelief in human 
equivalence, affective dynamics of hate and contempt, the absence of self-reflection, 
clouded judgement and destructive feelings. Of course, positive ―radicalism‖, according to 
these urban youth, can turn into negative ―radicalism‖, but this implies an intense overturn of 
convictions and values. 
The third layer of meaning refers to the contested and sensitive category of religion and how 
it connects with ―radicalisation‖ as a label, a stigma. The term is part of a stereotyping and 
stigmatising machine, like a knife that is turned in the wound over and over again. 
The fourth layer identified by urban youth in Brussels reminds them of the traumatic 
experience of terroristic violence in Brussels. It refers to bewilderment, the powerlessness to 
understand how someone is capable of blowing himself up in the name of religion or 
ideology. Especially in the Molenbeek context the term has a strong affective meaning, as 
several inhabitants have indicated. Also for youth workers, who knew some of the young 
people who left for Syria, the word conjures guilt, shame and loss of sense. Existential 
questions were posed: is it even worth it to do youth work? How could we have prevented it? 
                                                          
8
 This section presents some excerpts of the book containing the research results obtained in the Brussels case 
study, to be published in the spring of 2020. 
Research question 3: How is the phenomenon understood and 
experienced by vulnerable groups in Brussels and Verviers? 
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How come the mothers did not see this coming? These are the existential issues which 
make it difficult for those concerned members of the Molenbeek community to discuss the 
topic.  
The fifth layer of meaning sees ―radicalisation‖ as the crossroads where different 
phenomena meet: the local effects of international, geopolitical conflicts, doubts and despair 
among young people, the attraction of IS propaganda, the negative radicalism among some 
of those young people which they did not see coming. This period was experienced as a 
perfect storm, as the interplay of contextual factors that are unpredictable, as the pieces of a 
puzzle in Hafez and Mullins‘ (2015) model. 
The sixth layer of meaning refers to the collective reaction of the Brussels youth work 
organisation D‘Broej to the terrorist attacks. ―Radicalisation‖, to them, is a critical mirror that 
reflects a vulnerable society. That vulnerability, or more accurately, those multiple 
vulnerabilities in society intersect in the lifeworld of urban youth with a migration background. 
Both the terrorist attacks and the attractive pull of negative ―radicalism‖ should be 
understood, according to these youth workers, as a symptom, showing the urgency of 
tackling social vulnerability. 
Understanding these multiple meanings, sensitivities and trauma‘s is necessary if one wants 
to work with groups such as urban vulnerable youth or stigmatised communities. If not, 
research or other projects with these groups will most certainly not succeed. What this 
exercise also shows is that even sensitive terms, when discussed in a safe environment, can 
yield rich discussions and that these young people have a remarkably nuanced 
understanding of a complex phenomenon, definitely if one takes into account how they were 
personally affected by it.  
 
4.1.5. Inhabitants of Hodimont, Verviers, consider ―radicalisation‖ in terms of a disruption 
(―rupture‖) of society. 
Although Verviers is far from the only city in Belgium confronted with the phenomenon of 
―radicalisation,‖ the events of January 2015 will instil in the public discourse the idea that 
Verviers is confronted with a specific problem of ―radicalisation‖ among its young people9. 
The case is read in connection with the fewer than a dozen young people who left to fight in 
Syria and Iraq in the ranks of IS and other insurgent organisations. It is also related to 
controversies that attracted national media coverage about the role of a local imam. 
According to the national press, the imam - whose son was also arrested for threatening 
words spoken in public - spread a radical version of Islam in the city which was suspected to 
have encouraged several young people from Verviers to join the jihad in the war zones 
mentioned above. 
 The impact of ―radicalisation‖ on the city allows us to identify several collective 
vulnerabilities. The social ecology conducted as part of the project shows that Verviers as a 
classical decaying industrial city is confronted with internal social, territorial and cultural 
divisions exacerbating the polarisation between newcomers and natives. These lines of 
division are also illustrative of the unequal distribution of power between groups and 
territories. This has led to a fragmentation of both the social and physical public space. The 
                                                          
9
 This section is composed of excerpts from a book which will contain the research results in the case study of 
Verviers, to be published in the course of 2020. 
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macro-level transformations which have shaped the urban space have also generated multi-
level collective vulnerabilities which have proved conducive to the development of disruptive 
youth mobilisation.  
 Several elements contributed to the establishment of Verviers‘s reputation as a city 
where ―radicalisation‖ was perhaps greater than in other cities. The controversy involving a 
radical imam and the shooting of the Rue de la Colline in January 2015, a few days after the 
Paris attacks of January 2015 play an obvious part in the matter. Yet to delineate the 
phenomenon, one must go back further in history.  
 Since the mid-1970s Verviers has seen the development of a small pietist Salafist 
current. Very active in the Kobaa mosque in the Rue des Fabriques, it did not, however, 
attract much media attention until the mid-2000s. Around this time, the weekly magazine Le 
Vif-L'Express started to publish reports and analyses of the particular situation in Verviers.  
 One of the crucial elements with regard to the analysis of the first phenomena of local 
―radicalisation‖ in Verviers lies less in the particular history of the city than in its geography 
as a  border city. Verviers is only 35 km from Aachen. It is in this city, however, that in 1978, 
the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in exile developed a very active Islamic centre 
around the person of Issam Al Attar. A number of Arabic-speaking Muslim executives 
regularly attended this centre and developed a network of activities and relationships closely 
associated with the current that fiercely opposed the regime of Hafez El Assad and later of 
his son Bachar. This is how Le Vif-L‟Express summarizes the multiplicity of religious and 
political groups in Verviers:  
More than 100 different nationalities are represented in Verviers. Precisely because 
of its open and social character, but also because of its proximity to the German and 
Dutch borders, Verviers has always been the laboratory for many rebel movements, 
beginning in the 19th century with Marxism. PKK Kurds, Turkish Grey Wolves, 
Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) and GIA (Islamic Armed Groups), Moroccans 
from GICM (Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group), Muslim Brotherhood (which has 
the largest mosque in Wallonia), Chechens fleeing Russian repression, Somalis 
trafficking khat (the drug) and maintaining foreign relations with Somali pirates (an 
inhabitant of Verviers acted as a ―fixer‖ for the journalists of Envoyé spécial, France 
2, in 2008), Salafists of the strictest observance, who do not hesitate to name one of 
their future cultural centres after the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya, an 
ideological reference to the Islamic State, in whose name the Shiites and Syrian 
Alawites must be killed ... 
After the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher of 7 and 9 January, 2015, this was 
a new event that shook Belgium, and the world. On 15 January 2015, a special unit 
chartered by the federal police was deployed to the Rue de la Colline in Verviers, on the 
suspicion of there being preparations for a terrorist attack. The suspected individuals had 
been tapped over the phone. Upon the police‘s arrival at the scene, the culprits opened fire 
on the police who fired back, killing two of the three individuals on site. The last one tried to 
escape but was caught by the police. Weapons and explosives were found inside the house. 
Twelve other searches were carried out during this operation in different districts of Brussels 
and Verviers. This event largely contributed to the idea of Verviers as "a hotbed for radicals" 
even though the three suspects were not actually from Verviers, but from Brussels. 
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Newspapers and media published many articles on the event, often with evocative headlines 
such as: "Stronghold of jihadism," "Radicalism being fought since 2007" or "Tired of the 
radicals in Verviers," reinforcing the idea of a dangerous, lawless city. 
 This event, which stigmatised an entire city on the national and even international 
scene, sparked a feeling of indignation among the inhabitants of Verviers, mostly due to the 
magnitude of what was to follow in comparison to what actually took place in Verviers. One 
could even argue that this event was interpreted by several local actors as the trigger to 
change and improve their city. A collective desire to improve the image of the city slowly 
started to emerge. In a relative short period of time, the Family and Entourage 
Accompaniment Service for Radicalism (SAFER) was set up. 
 The Verviers social workers express great exasperation when they are asked about 
the phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖ in their city. One of them explains: "I am almost in denial 
when I hear about ―radicalisation‖. When I am interviewed by journalists, I want to tell them: 
go away, there is nothing to see here! Verviers is no more radical than any other city, and 
jihadist radicalisation is only one radicalism among others." Many of our respondents have 
personal knowledge of young people departed to Syria and Iraq. One of them explains: 
"Very few of those who have gone to Syria come from the district of Hodimont. They come 
from other parts of the city. They left for reasons very different from each other." 
 Alongside Islamist radicalisation that has been strongly linked to the city of Verviers, 
we have also been able to detect other radical movements. Indeed, radical movements have 
been present in Verviers for years, such as the Rex party created by Leon Degrelle in the 1930s, 
which can be connected to the emergence of the extreme right in Verviers today. Originally linked 
to the Catholic world, the party became more radical in the second half of the 1930s and 
adopted a fascist ideology. Degrelle then experienced a fall in the legislative elections of 
1939, but still managed to get four members elected, including one from the Verviers district. 
Subsequently, the supporters of Degrelle's party went on to collaborate with the Nazis during 
the World War II. Afterwards, the extreme right movement in Verviers is found under the 
aegis of AGIR. In 1994, a particularly serious event occurred during a football match between 
Belgium and Morocco: shots were fired from the AGIR office, located in the Hodimont district, 
hitting a young Moroccan. Several hundred people were involved in this incident and two 
police officers were injured. A few days later, a large police force surrounded the AGIR 
headquarters in Verviers, following a rumour about the arrival of troublemakers. Besides 
AGIR, the New Front of Belgium (FNB) is another extreme right-wing party, which was 
present in Verviers until the elections of 2006. At present, the Popular Party managed to 
obtain 6% of the votes in the municipal elections of 2012 in Verviers and 7% in those of 
2018. 
 This inventory of the far-right movement in Verviers allows us to move away from the 
Islamist focus on ―radicalisation‖ and to highlight the existence of other radical movements in 
Verviers. Moreover, by means of the interviews conducted we have been able to identify 
another movement that can also be described as radical but less visible for those outside the 
Turkish community. In view of current events, one might think that it is the Maghreb young 
people who are the most affected by Islamist-type speeches. However, some of our 
interlocutors tell us the opposite. Some young Turks are also being tempted by radical 
speeches oriented towards the Turkish nationalist movement. There is probably no single 
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key to understanding the ―radicalisation‖ of young people in Verviers and the engagement of 
some of them in violent actions abroad. These individual cases mobilize various personal 
factors such as, family, relationships, religion, ideology etc. 
 Against this determinist point of view, the CONRAD group at Verviers suggested 
―radicalisation‖ should be considered as a peculiar modality of a larger phenomenon, namely 
the biographical intentional break with the social and political order (Crettie 2011; Paugam 
2014; Denave 2015). Of course, not all forms of disruption with the social order lead to 
violent ―radicalisation.‖ It is thought, however, that this is a fertile avenue to explore because, 
conversely, there is no form of violent ―radicalisation‖ that has not been preceded by a social 
disruption with the family, or the social and political environment. 
 Youth and youth workers from Terrain d‘Aventures are confronted with the 
phenomenon of radicalisation from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. If from a 
theoretical point of view, all are wondering about the motivations of young people to break 
with their family environment to pursue deadly adventures in the heart of the Syrian-Iraqi 
conflict, they are also confronted in a practical way through their young people. 
From the above we conclude that an alternative interpretation of ―radicalisation‖ 
emerges from the study on the Verviers social ecology and history. We argue that what 
society calls ―radicalisation‖ is a heterogeneous collection of individual mobilisations 
characterised by their disruptive nature, a seemingly homogeneous term that masks (badly) 
a variety of often incomprehensible trajectories. Additionaly, these disruptive mobilisations, 
careers and biographies are not necessarily and systematically violent ones. The association 
between ―radicalisation‖ and violence is not questioned sufficiently. According to the model 
that was elaborated in Verviers, disruptive mobilisation may be considered as deviant, 
defiant or unbounding (déviante/défiante/déliante) (see Figure 10). In the following 
paragraphs we shortly outline the central conceptual framework developed in the Verviers 
case study. 
 
Between reliance and unbounding 
The concept of ―reliance‖ was coined in French by Roger Clausse while ―déliance‖ was 
theorized by Bolle de Bal (2003). Neither term refers to the fixed and static nature of 
people‘s life trajectories but rather to dynamic processes, or to a trajectory. As such, they 
express the idea that people are permanently creating, recreating or disrupting human and 
social bonds (Bolle de Bal 2003). This dynamic is at play in a field characterised by 
conflicting social forces, which in our case is the urban space of Verviers. These concepts 
presuppose a process and a result, which are always in motion and never definitive. 
Focusing on the notion of ―reliance‖ and ―déliance,‖ is a way for us to better understand the 
reasons why social actors engage in disruptive trajectories, by more or less conscious 
choice and in a more or less rationalized way. 
 The young people we observed, connect with or disengage with their social 
environments through processes of social affiliation or disaffiliation. When considering the 
so-called phenomenon of ―radicalisation,‖ we generally believe the result of disruptive local 
mechanisms needs to be identified more closely. While many view ―radicalisation‖ as a 
critical moment, we look at it here as a trajectory of actors embarked on a path mapped out 
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by a whole series of disruptions, which are not all violent and which researchers should seek 
to identify. 
 
Between confidence and defiance 
Youth workers must constantly play with the trust or distrust that young people give them. 
They struggle to try and avoid the unbinding of the social fabric by connecting them as 
strongly as possible to society. Theatre activities make it possible to work at young people's 
distrust of society by thinking about what links them to the rest of society. Through their 
activities, youth workers seek to stimulate positive answers the objective of bringing added 
value to society. It is through the comprehension of their daily work that we can measure the 
importance of social work and particularly of social work involving young people who are 
vulnerable or in a situation of disruption with society. When society allows young people to 
express themselves, they perceive it as a strong signal that they have a place in society and 
that this place is important.  
 
Between deviance and desistance 
The profile and pathways of radicalising young people are difficult to establish, but most 
converge towards a fairly specific profile: young people in their twenties, from disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, usually with a low level of education and trouble entering the labour 
market. Many of them have precarious jobs when they are not unemployed. A reality that is 
less often mentioned is their going through deviant delinquent trajectories. Nearly all radical 
actors who turned into foreign fighters in Verviers had already been involved in previous 
deviant activities. This reality is generally rarely questioned and when it emerges, it is often 
dismissed as irrelevant. The question is not to state or invalidate a causal relationship 
between delinquency and ‖radicalisation,‖ but rather to counter the lack of systematic 
analysis on how to preventively construct desisting approaches with regard to this target 
group and how to empower youth workers when faced with the problem.  
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 Figure 10: the conceptual framework developed in the field research in Verviers 
 
4.1.6. Vulnerable young people and youth workers experience the interplay of policy, media, 
security actors, scientists and civil society as a ―radicalisation machine‖ 
Targeted and vulnerable communities experience the assault of government policies with 
regard to ―radicalisation‖ as a machine10. One youth worker referred to it in terms of the ―de-
radicalisation industry,‖ which lead the CONRAD research team to abandon the search for 
the ―root causes‖ of ―radicalisation‖ and to focus instead on local experiences with regard to 
the radicalisation dispositive. We analyse the alliance and the interplay between several 
actors: the media, the authorities, the security actors, the justice system, the civil society 
organisations and the scientists. In the metaphor of the ―radicalisation machine‖ the 
apparatus that focuses on ―radicalisation‖ either directly or indirectly is presented as a 
machine, whose parts move according to mechanical rules without being conscious of how 
they interact with the other parts or how they might affect outside world. The term is 
borrowed from the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault, whose term le dispositif 
refers to the institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and structures of 
knowledge that generate power dynamics within and between social groups. The machine 
comprises the system of relations between the parts: discourses, institutions, organisations, 
architecture, regulating decisions, the law, administrative measures, scientific claims, norms 
and values. As a whole, the machine is characterised by the fact that it is exclusively 
concerned with wielding its power and consolidating its further existence. In other words, the 
machine is blind, thoughtless and only focused on survival.  
 The same applies to its parts: researchers and civil society organisations need to 
secure future funding, journalists need to generate clicks, politicians need to be re-elected. 
                                                          
10
 This section presents some excerpts of the book containing the research results obtained in the Brussels case 
study, to be published in the spring of 2020, and is, in modified form, also reproduced in a submission to the 
criminological journal Panopticon, see De Backer et al. (forthcoming). 
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At the same time, the machine‘s individual parts follow their own separate logic. For 
instance, certain actors may benefit from spreading images of dangerous young people, 
environments and religious communities. Certain discourses, politicians and media may also 
reinforce one another when it comes to this type of imagery, while citizens strongly adhere to 
a constructed narrative featuring the suspicious young Muslim, the no-go ghetto, the 
dangerous mosque – as though these constituted a self-evident, objective reality.  
 The authorities are one of the machine‘s strong parts. They show themselves in 
different ways: as the actor whose budget cuts in civil society almost force youth work 
organisations to adopt the logic of ―de-radicalisation,‖ or as the organiser of projects for 
social cohesion which function as a form of counter terrorism (Heath-Kelly 2013). Richards 
(2011) mentions in this respect that the UK PREVENT programme has ―surprisingly 
oscillated between fighting violent extremism and promoting cohesion between communities 
and ‗shared values.‘‖ This strategy, which is simultaneously geared towards social cohesion 
and counter terrorism, probably manages to achieve neither (Vidino 2010). The authorities 
also wish to ―responsibilise‖ an increasing number of citizens and professionals in tracking 
down ―radicalisation.‖ Another term borrowed from Foucault, namely ―governmentality,‖ 
allows us to understand this tendency as the state trying to shape the behaviour of its 
citizens in order to increase the effectiveness of its administration (McKee 2009). The 
responsibility of the administration is hereby passed on to the ―big society‖ (Bartlett 2010). 
Statements by individual politicians have only reinforced the experience of threatening 
authorities in vulnerable neighbourhoods.   
A Brussels youth worker: but someone with responsibility who talks in terms of 
―cleaning up a municipality.‖ You immediately know you‘re heading in a certain 
direction, and that, as a society, you‘ll be walking into an even greater number of 
traps […] But someone with a mandate, an executive mandate, who‘s going to divide 
people against each other and target them instead of seizing the moment to unite 
them. That‘s not what they‘re supposed to do.  
Civil society organisations struggle with the role inside the machine. On the one hand, their 
reaction is dismissive and critical. On the other hand, however, they depend on government 
funding. As a result, the landscape of local organisations and their mutual relations are 
disrupted by call for projects with regard to ―radicalisation,‖ which one organisation will 
respond but which another other will refuse categorically. Lena, who works as a coordinator 
for a youth organisation mentions:  
I thought yeah great and now suddenly there‘s channels for subsidies. I know we 
really considered things seriously here. Are we in? Are we going to submit a project 
under the header of ―de-radicalisation‖? We eventually decided not to, because didn‘t 
agree as a matter of principal. And at that moment we could still make the choice to 
refuse out of principle.  
One of the youth workers shares the same reserve:  
By responding to the calls for subsidies we were guilty, as youth organisations, of 
joining the radicalisation machine. Today we‘re really asking ourselves if we should 
have done it.   
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Organisations who respond to these calls are blamed for conforming to the government‘s 
instrumentalising security logic. What could be a resilient network of organisations is divided 
and conquered by the machine.  
 The media also play a determining role in the machine. The research about 
―radicalisation‖ reveals, for instance, that the media carry a great responsibility in creating 
and consolidating the image of ―suspect communities‖ based on origin and religion (Lakhani 
2012). Especially in the case of Molenbeek, where journalists and their TV vans took over 
the town square for weeks and months, the media left its mark. An inhabitant:  
That was the worst thing. It shouldn‘t have happened. For me personally, for 
everyone, those are serious traumas that still haven‘t been resolved. A feeling of 
inferiority ad yes […] gosh, a culprit because sure there‘s two or three who did it, but 
you‘re guilty as well because you live in Molenbeek. And then you hear so much in 
the press…  
The international media dubbed Molenbeek the ―jihadi capital of Europe,‖ a ―hub for 
radicalisation‖ and an ―ultra-segregated zone of lawlessness‖ (Fraihi and Dewolf 2016). As 
Guittet remarks, these claims and statements have contributed to the stigmatisation of local 
communities and to the ―production of that which they reject‖ (2018:5). At the same time, 
these (international) media undermine the local prevention work of several professional 
actors by minimalizing the complexity of their jobs. ―This tendency among journalists and 
politicians to outdo each other in their disdain for the neighbourhood has definitely made it 
more difficult to talk about the rich and unique characteristics of Molenbeek.‖ (Guittet 2018:5) 
Of course, security actors also have a role to play. Their objective is to guarantee the safety 
of all citizens, even at the cost of the freedom or the well-being of a small group. One local 
inhabitant claims that ―as Muslims, we are excessively targeted.‖ In this security dynamic 
legal frameworks are extended, and there is a perception of legal uncertainty, as in the case 
of the Canal plan.  
Interviewer: One of the other consequences, especially of the attacks in Paris and 
Brussels, was the deployment of the famous Canal plan. First of all, how do you 
relate to this plan? And, secondly: what does the Canal plan mean for you 
specifically? 
Youth worker: That‘s a very good question! I‘ve never seen that Canal plan on paper. 
I‘ve looked for it, asked for it, found statements made by the minister. But I never got 
it. So it‘s a bit unclear to me what the main lines were. I have noticed what it can 
mean and what it can mean for us specifically. Namely that, under the header of the 
Canal plan, we were visited by the social inspection.  […] Erm, only, erm, I do have a 
problem with it if it would appear that, and I think this should be investigated 
seriously, sending down the social inspection was used as a way for the police to 
determine whether certain organisations are shady or not, or other such missions 
related to the Canal plan.   
Because of her final objective—consolidating and increasing its power—the radicalisation 
machine is a treacherous thing. It is impossible to tell whether it will act repressively, when it 
will appear, and when it will disappear. It feeds on emotions like collective fear, moral panic, 
suspicion, islamophobia, injustice, humiliation, betrayal and rejection. At the same time, it 
spreads the illusion of rationality. For instance, the radicalisation machine presents the 
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process of ―radicalisation‖ as a mechanical, straightforward and linear one, a process that 
can be detected, prevented and disrupted by way of counter-narratives. Another example of 
this (false) rationality can be found in the soldiers patrolling the city centre, of whom we 
could ask the question how great their chances are of preventing an actual attack. Is their 
presence not rather aimed at providing the population with the feeling that their safety has 
increased?  
 The concept of the radicalisation machine is a metaphor. As such, it will never be 
complete or perfect; it only helps us to better understand a complex reality. One interesting 
aspect of the image of the machine is that it closely corresponds to the life-world of Brussels 
youth work in the period after the attacks. The experience of youth workers is of an 
omnipresent ―they‖ sticking labels on the young people of Brussels and on themselves. The 
idea of media and politics influencing each other is familiar to them as well. In the fight for 
existence of the Brussels Boxing Academy (BBA), a part of the organisation D‘Broej, 
Brussels youth workers realised all too well how closely media and politics are intertwined, 
and how political convictions can change when the images in the media are altered.    
 Fear and anger are the resources and the exhaust of the machine. The media spread 
fear through the terror threat. Populist politicians and security services respond to this, partly 
out of self-interest. They activate a security theatre (Schneier 2003) which makes the 
experience of the threat even more tangible. The media then further spread these ―war 
scenes‖ via sensational images. The consequence of which is greater fear among the 
population, which mixes with a paranoid tunnel vision.  
 Shortly after the attacks, this tunnel vision reached its highest point. A youngster is 
removed from his class room and interrogated because his beard is too long. A student in 
his final year at a trade school is denied an internship at the European Commission because 
of his origins and his religious beliefs. One month after the Paris attacks, two youngsters 
from the Royal Athenaeum in Jette are taken away for questioning, because one of the 
teachers interpreted their arguments as sympathy for the attackers. Two boys are stopped at 
the Monaco border because they appear on a black list, without knowing how they got on it 
(or how to get back off it). The panic reaction in the school which houses the boxing hall of 
the BBA also teaches us how suddenly everything can be interpreted as a sign of 
radicalising danger:  
We, the people from the BBA, were forced by the school principal to take down the 
collection of national flags from the ceiling, because apparently people saw it as 
reason for radicalisation. I suppose because there was a Palestinian flag as well? 
We‘d hung up those flags in the Olympian spirit, in which sport is meant to unite 
people. It all depends on how you look at it.  
This all takes place against the background of prior injustices. Youngsters experience the 
Brussels police officers in their patrol cars as fremdkörper. According to the youngsters, 
these young officers are often not from Brussels, and behave like ―cowboys‖ (De Backer 
2017; 2018). Stories about police violence are legion. House searches with regard to 
terrorism prevention cause severe traumas. A youth worker:  
Guarding children against traumatic images of police officers with machine guns in 
the doorway, I mean, even if you have to search a house or you have to be 
somewhere, the basics is to protect children from things that can traumatise them to 
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that extent and then you walk right into that trap by running down doors with a 
violent, aggressive attitude and performing house searches.  
For urban youth with a migration background, the substratum of injustice is also linked to in 
ethnic profiling and random police checks which are part of their everyday reality. For 
instance, talking about his brother‘s mysterious death after being hit by a police car, Ayoub 
(24) also mentions the time when, as a fifteen-year-old, he left school and was stopped by 
officers who demanded they take his picture because they were building a data (Van 
Tenderloo 2019). Saad, Florent, Gilles and Severin (all 16 years old) claim that, when 
hanging around in public spaces, only the first two (with a darker skin colour) are submitted 





4.1.7. Rather than ―jihadogenic,‖ Brussels and Verviers are places that generate 
vulnerabilities 
Recent criticism regarding the dominant research literature on ―radicalisation‖ points to the 
missing link between some urban areas and the processes of ―radicalisation.‖ Perliger and 
Milton (2016) conclude, for example, that out of 1200 foreign terrorist fighters, 70% came 
from the same cities. The top three of Western cities when it comes to the number of foreign 
terrorist fighters are London (38), Antwerp (32) and Brussels (30). Vilvoorde and Molenbeek 
occupy the 9th and 11th place respectively. If we consider the municipalities of Brussels and 
Molenbeek as part of the same city region, Brussels indeed is the capital of jihadi warriors.  
 According to Khosrokhavar (2018), this can be explained due to the social networks 
available in these areas (and the presence of recruiters), but also due to the specificity of the 
urban spaces. These are characterised by quantifiable, objective dimensions such as a high 
presence of migrants, low educational levels, high unemployment, high delinquency, 
imprisonment and recidivism, illegal economy, low-skilled labour and disrupted family 
structures. On a subjective level, these areas are also characterised by feelings of 
stigmatisation and victimisation along with anger regarding the treatment of minorities. 
 These general characteristics are to a large extent applicable to the field research 
sites of the CONRAD project. Both Hodimont in Verviers and the deprived neighbourhoods 
along the canal area in Brussels share the characteristics of a diverse population with 
migrant backgrounds, high unemployment rates, low educational levels, illegal economy, 
dense living conditions with a lack of green public spaces and poor housing conditions. On 
the subjective side, feelings of stigmatisation and victimisation are very much present in the 
stories of young people from these areas. In these stories, we notice individual and collective 
experiences of injustice, humiliation and rejection, especially with regard to the school 
system, discrimination on the labour and housing markets, the contested place of these 
youngsters‘ religion and culture in Belgium, and, not in the least, police violence. The digital 
stories collected in the Brussels and Verviers site exemplify these life-stories of exclusion 
and rejection.    
 Based on the field research in both sites we can also conclude that some important 
nuances and critical remarks on the ecological approach formulated by Khosrokhavar (2018) 
Research question 4: What are the characteristics of the so-called 
‗jihadogenic‘ spaces of Brussels and Verviers? 
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are necessary. Three assumptions often underlie the analyses of urban areas marked by 
migration, social deprivation and subjective feelings of exclusion: (1) these areas are socially 
fragmented, (2) religion plays a major role in this fragmentation, and (3) migrant groups 
produce closed collective identities while living in ghettos. However, these assumptions are 
challenged by our findings.  
 In the neighbourhood of Hodimont, for instance, social fragmentation is not primarily 
caused by an inward-looking migrant community which intensely self-identifies with its 
religion. Rather on the contrary, this closed quality is the result of political forces who fail to 
unite the different neighbourhoods bordering the inner city under the umbrella of a strong 
collective identity. This lack of a collective Verviers identity and the inability to provide it, 
painfully came to the fore after the discovery and dismantling of a terrorist cell in January 
2015 and, later, after the arrest of a radical imam. Suddenly, as a result of the media storm 
that swept across the city, attention was drawn to the urgency of restoring a positive image 
of Verviers.  
 In Brussels, a series of migration waves has made the city one of the most ethnically 
diverse in the world. In a small and dense area such as Anneessens, which is part of the city 
centre and at walking distance of the main touristic hotspots, more than 140 nationalities live 
together. Even in the municipality of Molenbeek, which has a strong Moroccan community, 
different cultures, nationalities and religions (from orthodox Russians to Evangelists from 
Guinee and Ghana) continue to live together. It is obvious, in this case, that the image of 
inward-looking communities living in ghettos is simply inappropriate. Rather, both the 
deprived areas along the Brussels canal area and the Hodimont neighbourhood in Verviers 
can be viewed as archipelagos of interspersed minority communities.  
 Observations from within the Moroccan community in Molenbeek further reveal that 
these communities are also internally diverse: lines of difference can be drawn between life-
styles of generations, between different migration waves, between lower class and middle 
class, between Sunnis and Sufis, between conservative and progressive groups, between 
Amazigh and Arabic Moroccans, between Muslim Amazighs and atheist Amazighs, etc. This 
also implies that religion is not the main determinant of local collective cultures. Instead of 
framing this community as monolithic, we prefer to use the terms superdiversity (Vertovec 
2007) or diversity within diversity (Geldof 2016) to denote the huge difference within migrant 
communities, which are usually assumed to be monolithic.  
 The assumption that social deprivation, migration and religion set the stage for 
processes of ―radicalisation‖ is contradicted by the case of Verviers, which suggests that, 
more than the poverty of Hodimont, the geographic location of Verviers on the German 
border has historically made Verviers a strategic locus of exile for different radical, political 
groups. Even in digital times, physical connections may cause geo-political conflicts and 
radical positions to migrate to a small provincial city like Verviers. The separateness or 
―outsideness‖ of certain urban European areas is not only symbolically visible, but also 
geographically.  
 Farhad Khrosrokhavar distinguishes two types of urban areas: the banlieux or 
suburbs at the outside border of a city, and the enclaves in the inner city, which are clearly 
marked off from the affluent parts of the city. However, the research sites in Verviers and 
Brussels belong to neither of these two types. In Verviers, the neighbourhood of Hodimont 
Project BR/165/A4/CONRAD: Constructive analysis on the attitudes, policies and programmes that relate to radicalisation 
BRAIN-be (Belgian Research Action through Interdisciplinary Networks) 74 
draws its distinctness from its location at the other side of the river, at least, when seen from 
the city centre. Yet it fluently merges into neighbouring areas such as Dison, so it cannot be 
regarded as an enclave in any literal sense; nor is it a suburb either since it is within a 
stone‘s throw of the city centre. Moreover, the idea of a dividing line between a wealthy city 
centre and a poor, deprived quarter is not applicable to Verviers, since the commercial heart 
of the city has been struck by economic decline for several decades, and the wealthy 
neighbourhoods are located outside the city, up on the hill.  
 In Brussels, the neighbourhoods and municipalities along the canal are even more 
difficult to qualify according to Khosrokhavar‘s typology (although he clearly had Brussels in 
mind when suggesting the category of ‗enclaves‘). The area in question covers a poor 
crescent-shaped section in the vicinity of the canal, yet, poverty spills over into the inner city, 
which can only boast a partly flourishing economy. The main activities associated with a 
service economy take place in the peripheral areas around Brussels, where the upper and 
middle classes are based. Recent social and economic transitions are blurring the lines 
between the poor, super-diverse crescent of around the canal area, and the rich 
municipalities at the edges of the Brussels Capital Region. Middle-class migrant 
communities tend to move to the outskirts as a sign of their social mobility, whereas white 
middle-class groups are moving into the canal zone which is undergoing a (minor) economic 
revival and processes of gentrification. As a result, real estate prices are increasing, and 
poor families are forced to move from the canal areas to the more distant peripheral towns 
and municipalities outside Brussels. 
 The description of these urban neighbourhoods as deprived, dense and diverse 
areas fails to capture the dynamic and numerous ways in which young people respond to 
their own living conditions, and the ways in which they manage to survive and even thrive 
despite difficult living circumstances. Urban areas like Hodimont in Verviers and 
neighbourhoods along the Brussels canal are at the crossroads of global transitions, which 
incidentally also makes these areas difficult to capture in static frames or typologies. Young 
people‘s participation in our field research showed that the transition into a digital era, the 
rise of social media and the omnipresence of a consumerist society, to name just a few, 
have an important impact on how young people with a migration background relate to issues 
of religion, identity, social exclusion, democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, young 
people‘s experiences with rejection, humiliation, betrayal, abandonment and injustice 
inescapably refer to social and political institutions that fall short in providing full access to 
basic human rights, i.e. the right to decent healthcare, housing, education and meaningful 
work. The Brussels field research reveals several personal and collective strategies in 
dealing with these vulnerabilities. Young students flee from their precarious housing 
conditions by spotting study places in the city, or by using the space of a youth club during 
the weekend. These youth clubs, as part of a wider network of organisations, offer 
educational support in order to remedy inequalities produced by the educational system or 
address social fragmentation by bringing people and neighbourhoods together. These 
personal and collective efforts to redress social inequalities can be understood as resilience, 
namely the individual and collective capacity to resist and transform shocks and stressors 
issuing from broader social changes through a set of resources, principles of interactions, 
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attitudes, and by means of strategies devised to manage individual and collective life-
wounds.  
 A similar strategy to order the research findings by means of a flexible combination of 
concepts has been deployed by the action research in Verviers. By setting out a nexus of 
three paired concepts (deviance-desistance, distrust-trust, disconnection-connection) the 
team found how young people, as well as their supporting organisations, oscillate between 
these different pairs of social interaction. 
 In view of the above, how should we interpret the connection between certain urban 
areas and the high concentration of IS combatants and sympathisers? Quite some 
researchers, often criminologists, favour an ecological approach, which locates social 
phenomena in specific places and understands those phenomena as a result of 
neighbourhood effects. According to Bouhana (2019) extremist hotspots are linked to a set 
of processes and changes that affect social integration; foster perceived group competition; 
increase social disorganisation and disadvantage; undermine levels of trust in legitimate 
authorities; undermine trust between pro-legal community members and impair community 
resourcing; compromise law enforcement effectiveness, as well as the effectiveness of 
informal deterrence; damage perceptions of procedural justice; afford unchallenged 
propagation of extremist group norms and unmonitored exposure to ―radicalising‖‘ agents; 
determine the selection of certain (susceptible) populations for exposure to criminogenic 
settings; and lead to collective and individual experiences of hardship and the absence of 
effective social support. However, the social ecologies of those areas constitute only one 
essential element in explaining the phenomenon. Bouhana further distinguishes four other 
major explanatory factors, including personal susceptibility, systemic processes (norms, 
governance, segregation, strains), settings and selection. 
 Khorsrokhavar seems to suggest a stronger connection than Bouhana does, by 
coining the term ―jihadogenic spaces.‖ These urban settings are characterised by 
deprivation, diversity, high unemployment, and illegal economy, which Khorsrokhavar then 
identifies as conditions contributing to the formation of ―jihadist‖ actors. Yet, his analysis also 
nuances this ecological perspective by pointing out that neighbourhoods with a solid 
presence of pietist Salafism are relatively immune to ―radicalisation,‖ indicating that the 
presence of ultra-orthodox Islam prevents the development of jihadism. In some cases, 
orthodox Muslims have even reported young jihadis to the authorities. The case of 
Marseilles, for instance, shows that young people who intensively identify with the city are 
much less likely to be attracted to the jihad. Pujol (2015) also argues, based on his long 
research in the ghettoised neighbourhoods of Marseilles, that the presence of strong social 
networks and strong identification with the neighbourhood and the wider city act as effective 
barricades against the lack of identity or feeling stuck between two cultures, both of which 
have been identified as a possible root cause for ―radicalisation.‖  
 The CONRAD research team argues against the use of the term ―jihadogenic 
spaces.‖ Using the term ―jihadogenic‖ while focusing uniquely on urban settings as a fertile 
ground for the formation of terrorist actors, may reiterate the risk of stigmatisation which the 
research project aims to avoid. After all, how often do we ask the question whether extreme 
right-wing terrorism and violence is caused or produced by the place of residence of the 
terrorist, especially if the extreme right-wing radical has a middle-class background? 
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Furthermore, the term ―jihadogenic‖ shifts the stigma from people to places. It reinforces the 
discrimination which people from deprived neighbourhoods often experience on the job 
market as a result of their place of residence. The case of Hodimont in Verviers offers an 
excellent illustration in this respect. Objectively speaking, there was not much reason to 
regard the neighbourhood with suspicion after a terrorist cell had been dismantled in January 
2015: the terrorist had ties with Brussels rather than Verviers and the street where it all took 
place, the Rue de la Colline, is located in the city centre of Verviers, not in Hodimont. This 
anecdote shows how governmental anti-terrorism and security policies also reproduce postal 
code stigma, regardless of objective facts.  
 One more reason for avoiding the term ―jihadogenic‖ is that essential discussions 
concerning such social and political issues as religion, education, institutional violence and 
exclusion on the labour market risk being reduced to issues of safety when considered in the 
context of ―radicalisation‖ and ―jihadogenic spaces.‖ In order to avoid this pitfall, the 
CONRAD research team adopts a mirror approach. Instead of asking how urban settings 
might contribute to terrorism, the team investigates what is mirrored by the complex 
phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖ with regard to the social impact of a society and a city in 








4.2.1. Policy recommendations 
A great deal of policy recommendations in the literature dealing with radicalisation focus 
strongly on the security dimension (risks reduction, information-sharing, multi-agency work, 
etc). This focus illustrates the discrepancy between the attention paid to repression and 
prevention. Since both are legitimate and necessary within a democratic society, the two 
approaches may converge but they might also lead to tension or even contradiction. In its 
final report, the Belgian Parliamentary Enquiry Commission on the Brussels Attacks of 22 
March 2016 stated: ―The hearing with the mayors concerned has revealed that it is 
necessary to articulate (and thus to strive for complementarity) a repressive approach and a 
preventive approach, which should therefore ideally never be confused or opposed."11  
 Considering the nature of the CONRAD project, we wish to focus on the preventive 
dimension (social cohesion) and consider certain aspects which may increase the resilience 
of young people when faced with discourses that could lead to their exiting society either by 
way of violent radical trajectories or through other forms of socially disruptive mobilisations.  
 We recommend opposing any strategy conflating – even indirectly – youth work with 
anti-radicalisation. A clear distinction should be made between the target groups and 
the methods of intervention proposed by such policies. There should always be a 
                                                          
11
 Documents Parlementaires, Chambre, 54e session, N°1752/009, page 166  
 
Research question 5: Which alternative discourses can be developed 
to talk about ―radicalisation‖ and how can these be useful for civil 
society and public bodies?  
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clear distinction between those in need of social cohesion measures and those who 
are at risk and in need of individual follow-up and help.  
 We recommend improving dialogue, partnership and collaboration within the youth 
sector so that youth workers share more convergent visions and procedures. All too 
often, the very basic idea of what constitutes radical behaviour and what needs to be 
done professionally to assist young people at risk, differs between institutions located 
within the same urban territory.  
 We also recommend local policy-makers to start a dialogue with concerned groups in 
society, including young people and their environments. Furthermore, these local 
(and national) policy-makers should develop a communication strategy to adequately 
inform the public about the complex phenomenon (and developments similar or 
related to) ―radicalisation‖. 
 We recommend increasing the institutional completeness of youth work organisations 
(i.e. recognized youth centres or more hybrid organisations) with due consideration 
for the existing needs at neighbourhood level.  
 We recommend increasing social and psychological support for youth workers. Youth 
workers are often caught in a web of multi-level vulnerabilities. As vulnerable 
workers, they often struggle within vulnerable environments for the sake of 
vulnerable young people. In addition to the insufficient level of funding of youth 
institutions, the very demanding nature of their job weakens the stability and 
resilience of their workforce which often results in broken professional careers and 
professional struggles due to an overload of work.  
 We recommend offering young people more opportunities for internal exchange with 
legitimate and knowledgeable facilitators (e.g. to discuss the place of religion in 
public and personal life) and external contacts with other social environments 
(nationally, internationally but also within the city).  
 We recommend a critical parliamentary discussion about  
 the blurred boundaries of the legal framework of security actors who engage 
in counterterrorism policy pre-emptively, 
 the importance of professional secrecy for frontline practitioners and the risks 
of shared professional secrecy in the local integrated security cells (LIVC-Rs), 
 the ways in which suspected ―radicalised‖ people are added to black lists 
nationally and internationally and how this harms their civil rights and their 
privacy,  
 the myth of collaboration and the multi-agency approach due to the inherent 
power imbalance between vulnerable groups, frontline organisations on the 
one hand and state and security actors on the other.  
 
4.2.2. Recommendations to broader society  
4.2.2.1. Speaking with vulnerable and concerned communities 
The dominant reading of ―radicalisation‖ as a mechanical, predictable and individual process 
neglects the life-world of the stigmatised communities in deprived urban areas. We advise 
organisations, citizen initiatives, academic institutions or media that wish to engage in a 
conversation on this topic to speak directly with the people involved and ask them about 
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what they experienced in the period before, during and shortly after the terrorist attacks in 
Paris and Brussels. How did those events affect them? What does the term ―radicalisation‖ 
evoke for them? What does it remind them of? For such an exchange to take place, we 
advise recognizing the vulnerability of the conversation partners and to anticipate the fact 
that these conversations can cause tensions or stir up old traumas. In this sense it can be 
useful to have a conflict mediator facilitate the talks. 
 Furthermore, we realise that the CONRAD project was limited in terms of reach. 
Other life-worlds have also been affected by the attacks and need to be heard, including the 
victims of the attacks, their friends and family, survivors and foreign terrorist fighters, 
returnees, police officers, military and security service personnel, the members of the 
coordination organ for threat analysis (OCAD/OCAM), etc. The method of digital storytelling 
presents an attractive approach in this respect. It allows for varying and clashing viewpoints 
to be exchanged in a personal story, combined with powerful images, the whole of which is 
then discussed in group. An additional advantage to this approach is that conversation 
partners are not even required to meet face to face.  
 
4.2.2.2. Keeping track of new events  
New social events constantly colour the meaning of the debate and its central terms. The 
term ―radicalisation‖ was not given a meaning by young people and youth workers in a void. 
On the contrary, it was always connected to their own experiences with regard to the Syria 
fighters, the government‘s security response plan, the media presence in suspect 
neighbourhoods, geopolitical evolutions, the terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris and the 
launch of project calls on ―de-radicalisation‖ or ―counter-radicalisation.‖  
 Since these events, the situation has continued to evolve on a national and 
international level with the incarceration of Belgian IS-children in POW camps, the migration 
and flight of IS warriors, the fear of radical Quran schools as well as the rise of extreme right 
in Europe, the Panorama disclosure of Schild en Vrienden, the attack on a mosque in New 
Zealand, incidents as the arson of an asylum centre in Bilzen, the electoral victory of Vlaams 
Belang and a series of increasingly militant demonstrations for ecological reform and animal 
rights. All of these evolutions have influenced the meaning of the term ―radicalisation.‖ 
Indeed, the term is increasingly being used to interpret broader social developments. This 
evolution confirms the intuition that ―radicalisation‖ is not only an individual phenomenon but 
also takes place on a collective level. This was also remarked by several researchers, who 
argue that focusing on the individual is a way for policy makers to circumvent responsibility. 
In that sense, the main focus on ―radicalisation‖ within the security debate needs to make 
way for an increased focus on the effects of the dominant discourse and policies that are 
being used in the field.  
 
4.2.2.3. Broadening the debate 
The CONRAD team argues for relinquishing the focus on security in the debates on 
―radicalisation‖. A discussion about so-called problematic and jihadogenic urban 
neighbourhoods cannot simply revolve around heightened control on allegedly suspect 
communities, since this will only result in increased stigmatisation. Policy attention for these 
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neighbourhoods and groups remain, of course, highly necessary, but should be geared 
towards tackling deprivation and discrimination.  
 According to the young people interviewed, rather than only talking about Islamic 
terror, we also need to refer to the hostile framing of Islam in Western societies. While most 
of these young people have connected their religious experience to the search for identity 
and meaningfulness, others feel doubt and find it hard to adhere to their beliefs, due to 
increasing insecurity, uncertainty and powerlessness. The so-called radicalisation machine 
is experienced by these young people as a process that is destroying their religion (―they 
manage to break everything‖), thus polarising the debate when it comes to the place of 
religion in society.  
 ―Radicalisation‖ takes place against the background of transitions and phenomena 
which, at first glance, have nothing to do with it. Yet, they need to be made explicit if we want 
to understand why some people suddenly seemed to be willing to engage in violence. For 
instance, the field research showed that new communication technologies and consumerism 
have a strong impact on the life-world of urban youth. The way in which young people view 
religion (see digital story ―Les Rohinyas‖) or the rule of law (see digital stories ―La Base‖ and 
―Est-ce qu‘il vont me croire?‖) is affected by the images they see on their smartphones. 
Given their personal life-experiences in vulnerable neighbourhoods, they get the impression 
that nothing around them ever changes, while the outside world keeps on changing for the 
better.  Vulnerable young people understand that they are at the receiving end of 
demographic, economic and social changes like impoverishment, deindustrialisation, the 
decline in living conditions, privatisation, social welfare budget cuts, the rise of framing in 
media debates and increasing discrimination. 
 These transitions have a strong impact on their identity formation. Indeed, they have 
the feeling that their identity is determined from the outside, as a norm they have to live up 
to. Thus, their identity is constantly challenged and contested and, as a result, they feel they 
are forced to betray themselves. As one young person commented: ―we live a lie‖ (see digital 
story ―La Barbe‖). In their experience, access to identity is unequal: there are those who can 
afford a new identity and there are those who cannot. These global transitions are inherently 
experienced as sources of injustice and as providing unequal access to a humane existence. 
Consumer economy and new communication technologies, as well as the unequal access to 
education (see digital story ―La Classe D‖) and the employment market are disrupting these 
youngsters‘ search for meaning and recognition. Interestingly, meaning, recognition and 
identity are factors which are often mentioned in ―radicalisation‖ research when trying to 
identify the so-called ―root causes.‖ It must also be noted though, that in their analysis of 
global transitions, these young people indicate that there are solid reasons for hope: the 
increasing ethnic and religious diversity in urban areas is identified as a source of 
opportunity for more solidarity, tolerance and freedom. 
 
4.2.2.4. Understanding ―radicalisation‖ in the context of personal and collective harm 
The stories told by vulnerable youngsters reveal deep harm and traumas which impact the 
way they view themselves, as well as their capacity for harbouring faith in others, trusting 
loyalty or expecting respect and care. Some of these experiences go beyond the level of 
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individual harm and are marked by a collective dimension.  This is the case, for instance, 
with regard to experiences of Islamophobia and police violence.  
 Youth workers point out that the behaviour of these vulnerable, urban youngsters is 
partly prompted by their life-long experiences with rejection, injustice, abandonment, betrayal 
and fear. Their reactions or coping mechanisms include fighting, fleeing, freezing or 
following. ―Radicalisation‖ can thus be understood in terms of these harms and subsequent 
coping tactics. We therefore also argue that ―radicalisation‖ is partly comparable to other 
forms of social deviance in which vulnerable and harmed individuals turn away from society, 
adopt a flight tactic, harden in an ideology, confront authorities, disappear in criminal 
networks or flee to safer spaces or IS-caliphates. In that sense, religion or ideology is merely 
a carrier upon which personal fears are projected.  
 Vandecandelaere (2017) has documented how young people from Molenbeek deal 
with the economically precarious circumstances of their neighbourhoods: some are 
(relatively) successful, obtain a degree in secondary or higher education, find a place in the 
job market because of a specific (often creative) talent, while others make due by finding 
work, mostly by securing an initial position as a volunteer, in the socio-cultural sector or 
through practice-oriented courses. The ones that remain, the groups that hang out in the 
street, are oriented towards illegal economy, gang-life, drug trade, robberies or theft. The 
negative engagement of this last group, as we know from the study of life paths of known 
FTF‘s, is an excellent breeding ground for recruiters (Perliger and Milton 2016). The flight 
from and rupture with society, as observed among ―radicalised‖ young people is very similar 
to the flight into addiction, or the adventure of gang life. Uncoincidentally, those same young 
people that were previously engaged in criminal careers engage in a search for meaning and 
penance by committing to extremist ideologies and violence. 
 Furthermore, our data show that individual harms coincide with vulnerable 
institutions. Neither police, justice, nor education are capable, in the deprived areas of 
Verviers and Brussels, to fulfil the ideals of the rule of law and the welfare state. This 
situation is reflected in the unequal access to rights and legal protection, in the lack of 
policies that sufficiently mitigate the effects of global transitions such as migration, the shift 
to a knowledge economy, poverty and relative deprivation. It is a vulnerability that can also 
be observed among the actors that populate our institutions: well-intentioned teachers, 
police officers, clerks, social workers, etc. In short, it is not only young people who are 
vulnerable. 
 
4.2.2.5. Liberating yourself from the radicalisation machine 
If we acknowledge the analysis of the radicalisation machine, the irrevocable question 
emerges how one can liberate oneself from it. Our first suggestion is to banish the term 
―radicalisation‖ to the periphery of the conversation. The ―radicalisation‖ debate keeps us 
from talking about the actual injustices in deprived neighbourhoods. It hides a much more 
crucial debate about the rule of law, police violence, unequal access to education, 
consumerism and the place of religion in society. In fact, the attacks in Paris and Brussels 
are wake-up calls, telling us to shift our attention to this fundamental conversation.  
 We advise organisations, researchers and journalists willing to organise a different 
and broader public debate to do away with the term ―radicalisation‖ and discuss the 
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underlying phenomena of which we believe ―radicalisation‖ might only be a symptom. Such a 
debate will shut down the machine, will recover power imbalances, will remove the 
obsession with security, and will address more important urgencies. The resilient debate we 
propose does not put up with the non-committal exchange of thoughts, stories or opinions; 
rather, it is aimed at action and change. As such, it is inevitably an ambitious debate. 
 We also call out to civil society, socio-cultural organisations and researchers to 
refuse funding from ―radicalisation‖-related project calls and contests or to formulate critical 
remarks in project submissions regarding the content and position of the term, as well as the 
effects of ―radicalisation‖-related projects, programmes and policies in the field. We also ask 
journalists to stop pursuing clicks and newspaper sales by featuring ―radicalisation‖ as a self-
evident, individual and psychological phenomenon or as something that is intrinsically 
related to Islam. 
 To conclude, we ask policy-makers to stop launching calls for these projects and 
programmes related to the prevention of ―radicalisation.‖ Young people and other vulnerable 
groups can definitely use funding for setting up emancipatory projects. However, this should 
not be done out of security considerations but because these projects are inherently 
worthwhile. 
 
4.2.3. Communication recommendations 
4.2.3.1. Three basic techniques  
The aim of the frame matrix (with the four dominant problematizing frames and the eight 
counter-frames as possible alternatives) is to act as a communication toolbox. The following 
overview is useful in at least two ways. Firstly, it wants to help its users to situate and thus to 
become more aware of their own way of communicating about ―radicalisation.‖ Secondly, it 
provides the opportunity to (re)consider alternatives, to communicate more consciously and 
to develop a communication strategy. After all, communicating about ―radicalisation‖ is not 
possible in a non-committal way. The lack of (scientific) agreement on the definition or 
causes of ―radicalisation‖ and even on its existence as an actual phenomenon makes 
communication on ―radicalisation‖ all the more impactful. Events such as terrorist attacks, 
street protests, online hate speech or clashes with the police might all fall under the umbrella 
of ―radicalisation,‖ turning it into a container concept. The frame matrix can help disentangle 
these different visions.  
 Furthermore, one should be aware of the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Continuously referring to young people from certain areas in Belgium (such as Molenbeek or 
Verviers) or to the Muslim community as radical entities outside Belgian society, may indeed 
result in young people feeling stigmatised and unwelcome, causing them to act out or 
―radicalise.‖ Thus, communicating about this topic should happen in a deliberate, nuanced 
manner. 
 This ―conscious‖ communication means, first and foremost, to examine whether 
one's own communication corresponds to one or more frames and/or counter-frames. For 
example, one might feel obliged to use the same concepts and choice of words as one‘s 
conversation partner, who might be using the Virus frame and speak in terms of ―isolation,‖ 
―contamination‖ or ―symptoms.‖ Using the frame matrix makes it possible to think outside of 
a certain frame and find ways to use alternative (counter-)frames and thus suggest an 
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alternative choice of words or metaphors. Furthermore, the overview allows one to situate 
the communication of other stakeholders more easily and thus gain insight into their 




The following pages illustrate how the toolbox works in practice. It should however be kept in 
mind that ―radicalisation‖ is a subject that generates a great deal of emotion. Consequently, 
a message appealing to one particular group may agitate or offend another. In the Belgian 
social debate ―radicalisation‖ is often connected to the terror attacks of November 13, 2015 
in Paris and of March 22, 2016 in Brussels. This means that emotions such as anger, fear 
and sadness are inherent to the conversation. From a different perspective, the current 
debate might also be perceived as stigmatising, since often ―radicalisation‖ is linked to Islam 
and the Belgian Muslim community, or neighbourhoods such as Molenbeek and Verviers. 
Ideally, it should be possible for the frames and counter-frames to be deployed in such a 
way that they can appeal to all citizens and can bring them closer together, thus 
counteracting the polarisation of the issue, or at least to preventing intermediate positions 
from shifting to the extremes. The emotionality surrounding the debate should not be 
regarded exclusively as a challenge or a negative aspect. It can also function as a 
motivation, a sense of urgency. People can feel distressed about their situation and hence 
feel inclined to act upon it.  
 Three basic techniques can be distinguished in the strategic deployment of framing. 
Firstly, frames can be used to identify ―radicalisation‖ as an issue, thus bringing it under 
attention. Next, there are the possibilities of countering the problematising frames by 
defusing the subject, i.e. what the literature calls ―deframing,‖ or by ―reframing‖ it. These 
three techniques will be discussed at length in the following paragraphs. 
 One characteristic of framing is that each frame represents a certain perspective on 
an issue, so that its other aspects remain underexposed. In this study, we identified twelve 
specific perspectives on the complex topic of ―radicalisation‖. Consequently, no single 
(counter-)frame can do justice to the entire topic. There are three arguments in favour of a 
deliberate and simultaneous use of frames and counter-frames. Firstly, the most complete 
picture can only be obtained when the twelve frames and counter-frames appear equally in 
communication. Since some frames seem more dominant than others, they may present a 
blurred view of the matter. It is therefore advised to make greater use of perspectives that 
are less common in the current debate. Secondly, not every problematising frame is 
connected to a specific counter-frame. Every counter-frame de-problematises ―radicalisation‖ 
with regard to a particular reasoning. Although this does not mean that counter-frames offer 
a logical and direct answer to the problematising frames, it does allow for a dynamic 
 
Use the overview with frames and 
counterframes to perform a self-
assessment: Where do I stand 
now, where do I want to go and 
how do I get there? 
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combination of frames and counter-frames. Thirdly, considering the public concerns, fears 
and uncertainties about ―radicalisation,‖ it is unlikely that using only de-problematising 




Technique 1: frame it! (but do it carefully) 
The four frames that make up the matrix, Virus, A criminal career, Mutiny, Two roosters in 
one cage define ―radicalisation‖ as a problem. This can, however, be problematic in itself 
because some frames might be perceived as stigmatising. For example, in the Virus frame, 
―radicalisation‖ is seen as a disease spreading poisonous ideas. Often, these ideas are a 
metaphor for Islam, and thus this frame could be stigmatising for the Muslim community. 
However, according to the Virus frame, a person is considered the victim of a disease, with 
the understanding that anyone can get contaminated and that the victim can therefore not be 
blamed. Any blame, in this case, would lie with the virus itself or the recruiters. The Flemish 
Syrian-fighters, for instance, were framed as victims of Fouad Belkacem, since they had 
everything to be happy (e.g. being a promising football player) and the reason for their 
radicalisation lay solely with the virus. The Mutiny frame sheds light on the frustrations which 
might be perceived by people with a migration background with regard to unemployment or 
discrimination. At the same time, Mutiny can present Belgian society as structurally 
discriminatory and unwelcoming to people with different backgrounds, which might in turn 
evoke angry feelings from people who feel attacked by these arguments and the implied 
accusation of racism. The frame A criminal career focuses on the personal choice for a 
criminal path, which also implies linking radical ideas to crime. The frame of Two roosters in 
one cage relies on the idea of clashing cultures and the incompatibility of two different 
identities and moral-cultural-legal systems. By doing so, the frame also implies structural 
superiority and inferiority of one of either cultures. Depending on the point of view, one 
community is seen as less valuable than the other. So, every frame has its own nuances and 
only the complete picture can reveal all of them.  
 Our research team therefore advises people to carefully use one or more frames in 
their communication, and to acknowledge that the underlying sensitivities are real. This can 
also help to strengthen mutual understanding. For example, Two roosters in one cage takes 
into account that ―radicalisation‖ can take place among different groups in society. Stating 
that the West and Islam are incompatible, this frame also identifies ―radicalisation‖ in 
Western society. This might be a starting point for people to gain insight in the viewpoint of 
No (counter)frame is correct or 
wrong in itself, a balanced 
combination of frames and 
counterframes is generally 
preferred. 
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―the other‖, acknowledging that constant provocations have a negative impact on social 
cohesion.  
 The problematising frames can also be seen as appealing to a particular reality, in 
which clashes with police, street violence or terrorist attacks are reasons for concern in 
Belgian society. In this respect, the frames can also function as a call for action. Considering 
―a criminal career,‖ for example, one can consider the importance of better assistance in 
prisons, and the importance of an efficient judicial system, while Two roosters in one cage 
points towards the importance of stimulating dialogue between population groups. The aim 
in using these frames should be to improve matters; only using these frames to point out 
dysfunctions in Belgian society will have a negative effect on communication. 
 Communication that manages to strengthen reciprocal understanding of the tensions 
experienced by other groups could ultimately also result in an enhanced connection between 
population groups. For those struggling with certain feelings, it is important that these be 
acknowledged by others as real. Otherwise, these feelings can grow and lead to frustration. 
Emotions can be tempered as soon as they are expressed, and others show understanding. 
This goes in different ways. The fears and emotions of people affected by the terrorist 
attacks (Brussels, Paris, 9/11...) are undeniable, whether they are experienced by primary 
victims or society at large. At the same time, certain population groups feel neglected or 
unwelcome, and struggle with a search for identity. These feelings should also be 
acknowledged.  
 In any case, after carefully ―touching‖ the frames, and especially their emotional 
charge, the intention is to always switch to a counter-frame, as will be discussed during the 
elaboration on the third technique. The first technique can also be combined with the 
second, albeit with a greater risk that people will get bogged down in a (discussion about) 
the problematisation of ―radicalisation.‖ 
 
Technique 2: deframe it!  
Deframing means contradicting a frame by stating that its definition of the situation or the 
subsequent reasoning is incorrect. Suppose that one wants to counterframe A. Deframing 
means that frame A is explicitly contradicted and that counterframe B is presented as the 
alternative (―not A, but B!‖). Reframing implies that only counterframe B is used, yet without 
directly referring to the problematising frames (―B!‖). The American linguist George Lakoff 
(2004), however, points out a risk in this respect. If the message is not to think about an 
elephant, the first thing that one will think of is an elephant. In other words, by invalidating 
frames, the final result may be the opposite and the frame may actually be reinforced. The 
general advice is that, if one wants the audience not to think about something, one should 
not bring it up oneself.  
 When using frames directly, this must be done with great care, and the same applies 
for deframing. For example, the first technique indicated a sympathetic attitude and 
understanding of the feelings that underlie frames such as Mutiny or Two roosters in one 
cage. It is advisable to also deframe in this context: the initial feeling of fear and 
incompatibility may not stand in the way of dialogue.  
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Research shows that the effects of framing are stronger when it comes to subjects of whom 
the listener has less knowledge. As soon as personal and direct experiences are involved, 
the impact of framing becomes more diffuse. When it comes to ―radicalisation,‖ only a very 
small minority in Belgian society can claim direct experience. The act of deframing should be 
supported by strong arguments as to why certain frames are incorrect or why they deserve 
to be qualified. The main reason for doing this cautiously is that these arguments will have to 
compete with people‘s personal (albeit often indirect) experiences, what they read in the 
newspaper, see on television or find on the Internet. On the one hand there are real-life 
events (vandalism, terrorism, increased police and military controls, ethnic profiling, etc.), 
which are placed under the ―radicalisation‖ umbrella, and on the other hand there is a 
socially constructed reality about a society with a higher number of people from an immigrant 
background, tensions between ethnicities, and religions that are perceived as incompatible 
etc. The link between Molenbeek and the terrorist attacks in Paris, for example, is 
undeniable. However, this does not mean that every young person in Molenbeek should be 
seen as part of those events, nor does it justify the stigmatisation of the communities to 
which these youngsters belong. Reality is not as black and white as is often thought. The 
frames and counter-frames, with all their nuances, can help to clarify that.  
 A frame that is eligible for deframing is Two roosters in one cage. The main building 
block of the frame is the idea that Western and Islamic cultures would not be 
complementary, making it difficult or impossible for these two cultures to live together. For 
example, a ―Westerner‖ could argue that Islam does not regard men and women as equal 
and that Muslims are homophobic. One way of countering this could be to ask whether men 
and women really are equal in the eyes of Belgian people without a Muslim or migration 
background and whether they are all truly tolerant of homosexuals. In other words, the 
dividing line between the two cultures cannot be drawn so clearly. An additional argument 
could be to point out several examples in which cohabitation of different cultures is seen as a 
positive opportunity.  
 The Virus frame, in which ideas (e.g. religion/ideology) are seen as the root cause of 
―radicalisation,‖ can also be deframed. This could be done by pointing out the differences in 
interpretation of religion and ideology and by moving on to the use of The continuum 
counter-frame. The continuum addresses the divergence in personal interpretations of a 
religion/ideology and thus shows that one perception cannot be generalised to the whole 
spectrum. Considering there about 1.8 billion Muslims in the world, how come only a very 
small minority of them are engaged in violent extremism? 
Always keep in mind that by 
invalidating frames, the end result 
may be the reverse, namely that 
the frame is reinforced. 
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Technique 3: reframe it! 
The main advice of the research team is to use the counter-frames as much as possible. 
Since these counter-frames are complementary, they can also be combined. Offering 
alternative perspectives makes it possible, through critical thought, for civilians to develop 
both a personal and well-funded view on ―radicalisation.‖ Using more counter-frames can 
therefore contribute to a more nuanced and balanced debate on ―radicalisation.‖ Safe 
spaces of dialogue should be created, which are open to counter-frames and where 




However, the counter-frames represent more nuanced and abstract arguments, which 
makes them less suitable for displaying them in easy-to-understand images and slogans. 
Therefore, the language that will allow these counter-frames to be used in a concise manner 
needs to be further developed.  
Concrete figures and statistics can of course help to support a statement, but. in a heated 
debate, it seems that an accessible and appealing type of language is preferable. Usually, 
the strength of frames lies in very short messages, which capture the main ideas. Since 
counter-frames are generally more complex and more nuanced, it is a challenging exercise 
to formulate them in catchy terms or phrases. For example, within the Freedom fighter 
counter-frame, ―radicalised‖ young people are often referred to as ―heroes,‖ performing ―acts 
of bravery.‖ 
 Some counter-frames, such as Puberty, Meaningfulness and The continuum 
advocate abandoning the term ―radicalisation‖ since they consider the phenomenon it 
describes as a known issue that does not require a new word. For example, Meaningfulness 
describes ―radicalisation‖ as part of the ―normal‖ search for meaning in life. Following this 
argument an otherwise normal process is blown out of proportion by describing it as 
―radicalisation.‖ One could, in this respect, indeed argue to stop using the term 
―radicalisation,‖ or to use alternative terms, such as ―positive commitment‖ or ―political 
awareness.‖ This of course depends on the preferred frame. Continuing to use the term 
―radicalisation,‖ is also an option since it may be considered as difficult to ignore. Yet one 
might opt for more concreteness when using the term by making a distinction, for example, 
between violent and non-violent ―radicalisation,‖ or by introducing specific terms such as 
―extreme right-wing‖ and ―Muslim‖ ―radicalisation.‖ In the latter case, one already 
acknowledges that different forms of ―radicalisation‖ are possible. 
  
4.2.3.2. Additional communication advice 
Everyone communicates from a certain perspective. If it is not clear to people which frame 
they are using, it might be because they are unaware of their own viewpoint. To avoid 
Use more counterframes. 
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making assumptions, or ignoring the perspective one has adopted, it may be advisable 
engage in a discussion with people from different backgrounds about how they perceive 
matters. It is necessary to become more aware of one‘s own, fixed beliefs as a way of 
opening up to ―the other.‖ Connection is only possible if one is willing to make an effort, if 
one really wants to understand the specific perspective through which someone else 
observes the same reality. Trying to understand this will bring people closer together. Once 
this happens, a new common ground can be established, with common frames and frames 
of thought. This should make it possible to continue living together in a connected society 
where dialogue is possible and different population groups no longer oppose each other. 
Security and trust are crucial in this regard. One can opt for indirect communication, to 




A point of criticism made in conversations by young people who are often the subject of 
media framing, as well as by the youth workers who work with them, is that Muslim 
youngsters are no longer allowed to be teenagers. They state that behaviour which is normal 
for a young age, such as provocations or experimenting, is judged differently when it comes 
to the Muslim community. They are quickly labelled as ―radicalised,‖ even when this clearly 
does not apply to them. This may also result in the actual ―radicalisation‖ of some young 
people. It is advised, in these cases, to use the Puberty counter-frame, in order to 
contextualize and de-dramatize teenage behaviour. However, referring to the emotionality of 
the ―radicalisation‖ debate, this counter-frame might be seen as problematic with regard to 
certain concerns about the phenomenon. Indeed, the Puberty counter-frame may normalise 
―radicalisation‖ to such an extent that the phenomenon, in whatever form, may no longer be 




Another perspective that is often used is the image of the ―victim.‖ For instance, young 
people – e.g. young Muslims, or youngsters from Molenbeek and Verviers in this case - are 
Find out through which 
perspective you and ―the other‖ 
observe the same reality, and 
look for matches with your own 
perspective. 
Use the Puberty counterframe to 
show the normality of certain 
behavior. 
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considered the subject of media framing. They are perceived as victims of a system 
(possibly a ―machine‖) that operates outside themselves and is beyond their control, a 
situation which they can only undergo as innocent victims. Victimisation can evoke feelings 
of solidarity. However, the research team advises to avoid a too simplistic form of the Victim 
frame, since it silences the voice of the young people themselves and places them in a 
passive and weak position. Victimisation is something that one undergoes or copes with. 
Looking at more structural transitions and the institutional level, young people can be 
considered as vulnerable, as people who are structurally disadvantaged in society when it 
comes to receiving and being able to seize opportunities. They are undergoing a large 
structural phenomenon, but only have a margin of resilience with it.  
 It appears that the young people of Molenbeek and Verviers are unable to express 
themselves, whether because they are not given this opportunity, or because it has to be 
done in a way that is less familiar to them. It would be advised to let them speak for 
themselves, and for youth workers to guide them in their contact with ―outsiders.‖ 
Opportunities for dialogue should be used to the fullest. Indeed, there may be pitfalls and 
bad previous experiences, but by closing the door to people with their best interest at heart 
(journalists, researchers), the gap in society remains. The Resilience counter-frame can be 
advised here, as a means to empower young people. For example, youth workers should 




Another counter-frame for the communication on ―radicalisation,‖ is The continuum. This 
counter-frame points out that ―radicalisation‖ is indeed a social issue, which is, however, only 
linked to a very small group of citizens. The continuum identifies the risk of generalising the 
category of ―radicalised‖ people, which inevitably leads to stigmatisation. Following the same 
argument, it is also advised to be aware of in- and out-group way of thinking. People tend to 
perceive the heterogeneity in their in-group but regard the out-group as homogeneous. The 
action of one person belonging to the out-group may thus be seen as representative for the 
entire group. It is crucial to be aware of this psychological mechanism, and to try and see the 
heterogeneity of the out-group as well.  
 Additionally, Embrace the threat is focused on stimulating rapprochement between 
different population groups, by distancing oneself from the initial fear and attempting to 
connect with people with whom, at first glance, one has nothing in common. It goes beyond 
the de-categorisation of ―the other‖ and the natural reflex to see the other group as an entity. 
 
Give young people, who are the 
subject of media framing, a voice 
and stress their individual and 
collective power. 
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Lastly, in the framework of this research, the overview of twelve frames and counter-frames 
was translated into cartoons which each express a different perspective on ―radicalisation.‖ 
They can be used in group or personal conversations to start a discussion on 
―radicalisation.‖ They are meant to evoke emotion, reactions and stimulate a debate, in an 
accessible, less verbal way. The cartoons can also be used in a context where the term 
'―radicalisation‖' is to be avoided, since term is never mentioned in the cartoons. In that 
sense, they can be used to discuss a phenomenon of which even the existence is still 
ground for debate. In earlier conversations with young people from Brussels and Verviers, 
the cartoons proved to evoke interesting discussions on a complex and sensitive issue. Of 
course, the frame and counter-frame overview and cartoons can also be used by 





4.2.4. Recommendations on terminology 
4.2.4.1. Use non-problematising alternatives 
In the search for alternative terms for the term ―radicalisation‖ the framing analysis can also 
offer some suggestions. We cannot claim that any frame is closer to an ―objective reality‖ or 
presents a truly more accurate description of the process at work than another. Two counter-
frames, Embrace the threat and Resilience, do not offer different terms. They define 
―radicalisation‖ as an inherent part of society, and hence as a phenomenon one must deal 
with. Using a different term is, according to these counter-frames, not relevant. Listed below 
are terms that, within a particular counter-frame, could serve as alternatives  
 Within Penance, radicalisation can also be called ―self-sacrifice‖ or ―self-exaltation,‖ 
―salvation‖ or ―purification‖. 
Use The continuum and Embrace 
the threat to tackle generalisation 
and stigmatisation and to promote 
dialogue between population 
groups. 
Use the cartoons to start a 
discussion on ―radicalisation‖ in a 
socially challenged context, even 
when the term ―radicalisation‖ is 
to be avoided. 
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 Within Continuum, radicalisation is an ―ideology,‖ a ―trend,‖ a ―distinctive 
interpretation of a religion or ideology‖. 
 Within A catalyst, radicalising individuals are ―idealists,‖ radicalisation is a ―political 
dynamic‖ and a ―commitment.‖ According to this counter-frame, one should also 
speak of ―re-radicalising‖. 
 Within Puberty there are alternative terms such as ―a search for identity,‖ ―a radical 
period‖ and ―adolescent (mis)behaviour / malpractice / misconduct‖. 
 Within The freedom fighter, ―radicalising‖ individuals are reframed as ―heroes,‖ 
―helpers,‖ and ―freedom fighters.‖ Here, ―radicalisation‖ is seen as standing up for the 
weak.  
 Within Meaningfulness ―radicalisation‖ is reframed as ―expressing one‘s religious 
identity,‖ ―belief‖ and ―commitment‖. 
Depending on the frame that is being used, a whole new set of synonyms or alternative 
terms emerges. Combined with the communication recommendations offered above, this 
can inspire professionals (social workers, other civil society organisations but also 
journalists) to use non-problematising terms, thus framing ―radicalisation‖ as a young 
person‘s quest for meaningfulness, recognition or penance, or an idealist striving for a just 
society. These myriad terms and varieties resonate well with the findings from the field 
research in which young people criticise the term ―radicalisation‖ because it simplifies a 
much more complex social reality. In the field research, ―radicalisation‖ was soon replaced 
by alternative terms such as ―derailment,‖ ―blinding,‖ ―freezing,‖ ―hardening‖ or ―polarisation‖ - 
terms that can also be adopted more easily when speaking about related or similar social 
phenomena. 
 
4.2.4.2. Problematise ―radicalisation‖ 
From the field research in Brussels we know that ―radicalisation‖ is understood by urban 
youngsters as (1) a positive conviction or commitment, (2) the willingness to commit 
violence, (3) a stigmatising label, (4) a traumatic experience, (5) a perfect storm flooding 
youth and youth workers and (6) a mirror of a dysfunctional society. It is clear that this term 
is problematic if one wants to work with this particularly vulnerable and to some extent 
involved group.  
 The term ―radicalisation‖ reduces a complex and concrete reality to an individualised, 
psychological and teleological dynamic that is inherently related to security. It obscures and 
even renders suspicious young people‘s heart-felt commitment with religion and their search 
for identity. As we know from the field research in both Molenbeek and Verviers, dealing with 
religious issues is one of the areas in which these young people feel least supported and 
most lost and confused since they cannot connect to the religion of their family and parents 
nor relate to the Islam of the local imam. As a term, ―radicalisation‖ identifies Islam as an 
inherently violent religion, which further contributes to these youngsters‘ identity struggles 
and to their feeling stuck between two cultures, thus compromising their religious 
commitment. It contributes to a longer series of injustices and refers to a society that does 
not acknowledge its own vulnerabilities and responsibilities. Since it refers to one or multiple 
traumatic experiences it impedes a meaningful debate on the term with many urban (Muslim 
and non-Muslim) young people. From the fieldwork we can conclude that the use of the term 
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closes doors and is therefore no longer useful from a research perspective. ―Radicalisation 
radicalises," as one youth worker put it.  
 From the critical study of the available research we can also conclude that 
―radicalisation‖ is a contrived concept which tries to group everything that is going on within 
individuals in the period before they engage in terrorist violence. We also know that there is 
no single terrorist profile and the study of the life-courses of known terrorists and foreign 
terrorist fighters teaches us that there is a lot of variety among these profiles as well.  As a 
result, the search for root causes has been a difficult if not impossible exercise. We need to 
face the possibility that ―radicalisation‖ as a pre-terrorism phase among religious and 
possibly other groups as well) does not constitute a definable object of study. We do not 
know whether such a unique and homogeneous process even exists. What we do know is 
that some people have radical convictions and some people commit violence and/or have 
travelled to Syria. 
 
4.2.4.3. Use ‗radicalism‘ rather than ―radicalisation‖ and distinguish between violent and non-
violent radicalism 
In fact, rather than talking about ―radicalisation‖ as a unique, self-evident, homogeneous 
process, we need to talk about ―radicalism‖ (which does not pretend to represent a process), 
or, more importantly, about ―violent radicalism‖ (which stresses the aspect of violence). In 
the search for appropriate terminology we also need to consider that ―radical‖ can be 
interpreted as an amplifying adjective that can be precede a wide variety of nouns (and 
therefore: phenomena). Based on the input of the Brussels youth workers, we also need 
stress that there is a crucial distinction between positive and negative radicalism, a 
distinction which manifests itself in a search for meaningfulness and identity, a political 
commitment to radical change on the one hand and moral superiority, lack of self-critique 
and humour, intolerance and fanatism on the other (Knoope 2017). The latter is of course 
more problematic for any given society, yet, as long as the people harbouring these ideas do 
not support or (plan to) commit violence, a liberal rule of law allows them to think what they 
will.  
 In the case of violent radicalism solid alternative terms have been suggested or are 
currently being used. Three of them are particularly prominent: ―violent extremism,‖ 
―fanaticism,‖ and ―political violence‖. In our opinion, the latter term is particularly promising 
since it stresses the centrality of violence as a precondition for security actors to become 
involved and since it goes beyond the scope of Islamic ―radicalisation,‖ which has been the 
main focus for the last two decades. This term also resonates well with the moral ambiguity 
of political violence. Take for instance the way the first foreign terrorist fighters in Syria, who 
were called freedom fighters by the Western media during the early days of the Arabic 
Spring. In a RTBF interview, then foreign minister Didier Reynders remarked that ―for those 
young people who, possibly because of their idealism, are engaging in humanitarian work or 
leaving to fight alongside the Syrian liberation army, a monument might be built celebrating 
them as heroes of the revolution.‖12 Soon, however the label of idealism disappeared and 
was replaced by the image of the ―radicalised‖ fighter and the terrorist. Yet the identities of 
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the heroic young people remained the same. It is interesting to see that a term such as 
political violence or political terror is increasingly adapted by leading voices in the public 
debate13. 
 
4.2.4.4. Focus on ―terrorism‖ rather than ―radicalism‖ 
We also argue that the term ―radicalisation‖ makes it possible for security actors to engage in 
anti-terrorist action pre-emptively, deploying detection mechanisms at an early stage when 
nothing illegal is actually happening. This confusion of categories is not innocent: it extends 
the reach of the repressive apparatus and categorises large groups as potentially harmful or 
suspect. Young people are placed on a ―black list‖ by the police and security actors, without 
knowing why or how they can be struck off the list again. Giving these actors the right to 
intervene before any actual violence remains a questionable matter. For this reason, Elke 
Devroe (2019) argues for the removal of ―radicalisation‖ from the policy lexicon and to 
replace it by ―the preparation and execution of terrorist attacks‖. In a context of security and 
prevention it remains important to give precedence to terms such as ―(the preparation of) 
acts of terrorism‖ because it provides a decent, legal description in the framework of existing 
criminal law. Ideally, this will result in putting a halt to the current extension of the legal 
framework by security actors. 
 
4.3. Future (action-oriented) research  
The aim of the CONRAD project was to explore alternative ways to deal with the issue of 
―radicalisation‖, away from stigmatising and discriminatory approaches that risk reinforcing 
polarisation and distrust in society. Inspiration and guidance for such an alternative 
discourse (a way of thinking, talking and acting) was found in the field of ―restorative justice,‖ 
whose values and principles allow for a process of participation in, and re-definition of, the 
issue at stake. Whereas current restorative justice practices mainly focus on various types of 
crime or interpersonal conflict which bring together the victim, offender and their support 
persons in a form of dialogue, more recent interpretations and theories are applying these 
practices within more encompassing frameworks that are relevant to more complex social 
phenomena and developments. In this respect, research is being done on how restorative 
justice values, principles and methods can feed innovative approaches of ―doing justice‖ to 
areas and people who are caught in a complex, diffuse situation or climate of social tension 
or opposition.  According to a restorative justice philosophy, this can only be done through 
personal participation of those who are directly involved or targeted, by offering a safe space 
for the free expression and communication of ideas and experiences, including those of 
―voiceless‖ people. The element of ―restoration‖ or redress is also crucial, however, since the 
exchange between stakeholders aims at finding a new balance together, a kind of ―social 
peace‖ with which all parties can identify, and which will allow them to further build their 
lives.  
 Finally, the element of ―justice‖ should not be reduced to the understanding of justice 
as provided by the official justice system, but should comprise the ―justice‖ expectations, 
experiences and practices as shaped in an interactive dynamic where the informal justice of 
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the people bubbles up to the formal justice of the system, and where the latter percolates 
down to the justice of communities (Braithwaite and Parker 1999). Conceived in this way, 
restorative justice is founded in a positive (but not naïve, as restorative justice practices in 
extreme cases of human conflict demonstrate) image of humans, their communities and their 
capabilities, relying on their resilience in dealing with conflict, tensions and frictions in their 
surroundings. 
 Based on the premise that alternative discourses on ―radicalisation‖ should be 
developed in an ongoing process of participation and communication with the direct 
stakeholders, the initial expectation of the CONRAD project was to create spaces where 
dialogue can take place among and with citizens themselves, and completed with the 
contribution of professional actors where appropriate. This implied that the dialogue had to 
take place and the discourses had to be developed within local communities, with individual 
citizens, families and their own social (and religious) organisations. But as these 
communities are – ideally speaking - not islands, and concerns about the so-called 
phenomenon of ―radicalisation‖ are shared – without being very precisely defined or 
understood - by society at large, the dialogue had to be extended to representatives of the 
wider social environment, either by including civil society organisations or official bodies 
including the police, security actors and the justice system. This would create unique 
opportunities to confront existing, dominating or alternative images of ―radicalisation‖ as 
were also identified, for example, in framing exercises in media and policy documents, with 
the life-world of the people involved. Such a dynamic process would then result in new, and 
shared, understandings of ―radicalisation‖ or radical re-formulations of the issue, its causes 
and consequences.  
 In the timeframe of the CONRAD project, we managed to organise five dialogue 
tables, two in Brussels, two in Leuven, and one in Verviers. These were interesting events in 
terms of bringing together the different communities concerned (social workers, researchers, 
young people, residents, civil society members, policy-makers) and had a major impact on 
the course of the project, as these dialogue tables involved valorising and discussing certain 
outcomes such as the conceptual framework, the ethical framework and the digital stories. 
However, to be able to speak of actual ―restorative‖ discussions, would have required more 
time than was available. Collaboration within the CONRAD team and the first year of field 
research have shown that building trust often takes more time than anticipated at the stage 
of proposal submission, especially in the context of action research which, if undertaken 
according to its basic premises, allows participants to co-design the research agenda, even 
if that means redrafting the original proposal. 
 We believe that there is still great merit in the original idea and philosophy of 
engaging various participants in restorative meetings or discussions. From research into 
trauma and sexual or domestic violence we know that group sessions have had much more 
success in supporting and empowering victims. In fact, as Rachel Pain (2014) has argued, 
there are many similarities between the effects of global terrorism and the everyday 
terrorism of domestic violence. Since ―trauma‖ is not too big a word to use in the context of 
―radicalisation‖ and the concerned communities, we believe that trauma group work such as 
restorative circles would be immensely beneficial for the concerned communities. In these 
debates, the new outputs of the CONRAD project (i.e. the cartoons, the frame matrix, the 
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visualisation methodology) could be used as conversation starters or as tools to structure 
thought and inspire dialogue. 
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5. DISSEMINATION AND VALORISATION 
5.1. Cartoons 
The cartoons developed by the KU Leuven Institute for Media Studies are based on the 
twelve frames of ―radicalisation,‖ and can be used in focus groups, group conversations or 
face-to-face interviews (see Figure 11). The set of 12 cartoons is useful for those who 
experience some annoyance or hesitation in raising the issue of ―radicalisation‖ among a 
certain group of people. For instance, the researchers from the Institute for Media Studies 
used these cartoons to discuss the topic of ―radicalisation‖ with young people with a 
migration background in Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Verviers and Antwerp. Besides 
researchers, youth workers, teachers or journalists can also use the cartoons when wishing 
to discuss the topic of ―radicalisation‖ with (young) people in a less direct way. The great 
advantage of working with the cartoons is that the various dimensions of the concept of 
radicalisation can be explored and brought up in a playful manner. 
 
 
Figure 11: 12 cartoons portraying the frames and counterframes used in the ―radicalisation‖ debate 
 
The researchers of IMS formulated the following five recommendations, based on their 
experiences with this form of ―cartoon elicitation.‖  
1. Print the cartoons on cards that can be handed out and that can be handled by the 
participants themselves. This gives the participants the opportunity to have control 
over the duration of the conversation. Some prefer to go through the cartoons more 
quickly and then chat for a long time with all the cartoons spread out in front of them. 
If researchers want to keep more control over the time span, they can turn over the 
cards themselves. 
2. Sit at a round table. A round table is recommended because all participants can then 
see each other. At the start, all participants to the conversation have the pile of cards 
before them, in the same order, with the pictures face down on the table. One by 
one, the cards are turned and the cartoon in question is discussed. The first series of 
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questions are very open. What perspective on ―radicalisation‖ do you think is 
reflected here? What do you think about that? How does that make you feel? As 
such, the conversation goes on, reflecting and focussing on what the different 
participants bring to the table, until all frames have been discussed.  
3. The cards also make it possible to organise the (counter-)frames, for example by 
asking for the cartoons to be arranged according to how familiar they are to the 
interviewees. This can be done in two steps after initially turning over the cards one 
by one. First, the interviews are asked to make two stacks, one with pictures they do 
not recognize, and one with pictures they do recognize. Next, each of the two stacks 
can be further discussed and arranged. Interviewees devise an order in the different 
perspectives on ―radicalisation,‖ and compare and discuss these with the other 
participants around the table.  Alternative questions that may guide the ordering are: 
What frame best expresses your personal interpretation of ―radicalisation‖? Which 
frame is incompatible with your own views and why?  
4. Leave time for the interviewees to interpret the cartoons in their own, personal way 
and do not expect them to have understood the ―preferred reading‖ of the cartoon. 
Each cartoon refers to one frame or counter-frame. It is crucial that the interviewer is 
open to the participant's own interpretation of a cartoon. Each image is to some 
extent ambiguous and open to interpretation. Once the participant's spontaneous 
interpretation is clear, the interviewer can give an explanation that is closer to the 
(counter-)frame so that the participant can also express ideas and perceptions. 
5. Group and individual conversations are possibilities that are both worth considering. 
The cartoons can be used in combination with various questions that also determine 
the focus of the subsequent analysis. The aim of the IMS researchers within 
CONRAD was to find out what place ―radicalisation‖ fulfils in the life-world of the 
young people in Molenbeek and Verviers. It was about processes of assigning 
meaning that can be conducted individually, in a stigmatized group or in public 
discourse. It is to be expected that personal experiences and high involvement in a 
subject will determine the interpretation of the term ―radicalisation.‖  In a one-to-one 
conversation, this personal interpretation can be expressed to a greater extent. In a 
focus group, there is more striving towards a group consensus. The IMS prefers to 
combine personal conversations with group discussions. 
 
Note: anyone interested in high-resolution versions of the cartoons should contact 
researchers Marie Figoureux (marie.figoureux@kuleuven.be) and Prof. Baldwin Van Gorp 
(baldwin.vangorp@kuleuven.be). 
 
5.2. Digital stories 
Six digital stories have been developed, five in Brussels and one in Liège. They can be 
found on the project website: http://conradresearch.wordpress.com 
 
5.3. Dialogue tables, seminars and final conference 
Five dialogue tables were organised. Two tables, organised in Leuven in 2018, revolved 
around the topic of research ethics and had a mixed crowd of researchers, social workers, 
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restorative justice practitioners and members of security actors. One was organised in 
Verviers in 2019, with an equally diverse audience. Two dialogue tables were organised in 
Brussels in 2018, one of which centred on the digital stories of mothers from Molenbeek and 
the other showing the digital stories of the young people of the CONRAD project to a mixed 
audience. One two-day seminar on urban youth work, resilience and ―radicalisation‖ was 
organised in Brussels in 2018, with keynote speakers Lena Dominelli and Neil Denton.  
The CONRAD final conference was held in Brussels on 27 February, with keynote speakers 
Farhad Khosrokhavar and Martijn de Koning, presentations of the CONRAD team and two 
panels (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Programme of the CONRAD final conference 
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